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Abstract
Standard Deviations:
Reality, Reproducibility, and Politics in Performance Art since 1989
by
Jonah Westerman
Adviser: Professor Claire Bishop

Performance art is conventionally seen as having a privileged relation to reality because
of the way it insists on the immediate experiences of specific human bodies, the full depth of
which can never be adequately reproduced or captured. This understanding of performance as
accessing authenticity through ephemerality has long made it a stage for artistic and political
subversion. Since the early 1990s, however, a group of European artists responding to processes
of globalization that have changed the nature of political economy—the demise of the Soviet
Union, NAFTA, and new regulations concerning trade and travel in the E.U.—have developed
performance strategies that unsettle the traditional understanding of performance that insists on
the potency of an eruptive ephemerality. This dissertation discusses how the performance-based
works of Santiago Sierra (b. 1966, Spain), Artur !mijewski (b. 1966, Poland), Christoph
Schlingensief (1960-2010, Germany), and the artist collective, Neue Slowenische Kunst (formed
1984, Slovenia) use non-artist participants as a primary medium alongside photography, video,
and web-based platforms to assert the reproducibility of both people and events.
I argue that performance art since 1989 comprises a new mode of addressing audiences
designed to illustrate how history persists and repeats in the present, especially when we imagine
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we can escape it. As such, each artist engages and describes a specific local horizon that defines
a global totality in its own terms, at once acknowledging the newness of the post-1989 world and
refuting it. The works I analyze present audiences with the “same” object of interpretation in
order to elicit and describe the range of responses possible. I argue that every reproducible
performance functions as a sonar ping, issuing from the work of art and mapping the surrounding
human territory. From this notional zero-point, the work creates a political portrait, detailing a
spectrum of opinions and speculating on their historical derivation. Because of how these works
themselves deviate from traditional performance, they are able to chart a cognitive landscape that
describes where each of us stands in relation to others—they picture us and our various pictures
of the world as so many standard deviations.
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Introduction
Past Presence:
Performance Art and the Politics of Rupture
Even the most perfect reproduction of a work of art is lacking in one element: its
presence in time and space, its unique existence at the place where it happens to
be.
-Walter Benjamin,
“The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction” 1

Since the 1960s, the ephemerality of live performance has been its most characteristic,
potent, and difficult attribute—prized for its ability to confound viewers’ aesthetic expectations,
frustrate habits of vision and spectatorship, and, consequently, derange our ideas about reality
and the social world. This ephemerality was first characterized (through the ’60s) as creating a
unique kind of presence—that an action taking place in the space of art thrusts viewers into an
overwhelming superflux of experience: Something is happening right now. Focusing more
closely on an action’s relation to its mediated registration in photography, film, or video,
however, a later moment of performance practice and discourse (beginning in the mid-1970s),
insisted that such presence is impossible—performance creates an insuperable absence:
Something happened just then, but we will never again know what it was. I contend that this
focus on ephemerality, whether rendered in the language of presence or absence, has constricted
1

Walter Benjamin, “The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction” (1936), in Illuminations,
trans. Harry Zohn (New York: Schocken, 1969), 220.

2
the ways we evaluate performance-based work, generating a conceptual stagnation that cannot
respond adequately to how new works relate to audiences or engage with the social-political
environments in which they operate. This dissertation will discuss recent performance works that
use people as a medium—not because individuals are unique, but because they are somehow
replaceable, predictable, or generic—in producing installations, photographs, and videos that
mobilize new conceptions of subjectivity and mediation and reflect changing ideas about what
art should accomplish. By privileging reproducibility and repetition, these newer works trade a
concern with the transformative power of eruptive temporality for an interest in identifying and
describing the relationship between individual experience and collective social life in particular
places. I propose that performance works of the 1960s and ’70s made the personal political by
translating social problems into existentially precarious actions and, consequently, engendered a
dominant discourse mired to this day in an abstract, universalizing preoccupation with time.
Performance after 1989, however, describes how existential pre-occupations are in fact social
problems and requires a new approach capable of specifying the experience of space.
Before delving into what it is that makes today’s performance so different, we should
more fully flesh out this problem of presence and what it has meant to this point. Performance’s
catechism of presence is perhaps best expressed by art historian and progenitor of the Performa
Biennial (founded 2004) Roselee Goldberg:
The history of performance art in the twentieth century is the history of a permissive,
open-ended medium with endless variables, executed by artists impatient with the
limitations of more established forms, and determined to take their art directly to the
public. For this reason its base has always been anarchic. By its very nature, performance
defies precise or easy definition beyond the simple declaration that it is live art by artists.2

2

Roselee Goldberg, Performance Art: From Futurism to the Present (New York: Thames & Hudson,
2001), 9.

Performance is free of medium-based fetters; it can be anything. It is therefore direct in its
address to viewers and, in turn, radical. Further, Goldberg’s allusion to “liveness” should not
give us pause—she doesn’t mean this in any straightforward or categorical way. For example,
Goldberg includes in the same survey that begins with the passage above, Performance Art (first
published in 1979 and since updated twice), works like Matthew Barney’s The Cremaster Cycle
(1994-2002). Barney’s work comprises five films (totaling almost seven hours) that treat
biological processes of human sexual differentiation in allegorical fashion and with operatic
richness. Apparently, that the cycle concerns the meaning and mutability of the body merits
inclusion in Performance Art, even though the work itself is not presented in any live form. As a
result, her “simple declaration” might do more to obscure a working definition of performance
than it does to clarify one. This is not only typical, but exemplary of performance discourse’s
habitual hazy interlacing of embodiment and identity. I include the passage above for the elegant
economy with which Goldberg expresses the deep imbrication of two concepts central to
performance discourse: first, by rhetorically invoking the vexed category of presence (the more
paradoxically the better, as we will see), commentators then proclaim performance’s revelatory
capacity.
As performance scholars Mary Strine, Beverly Long, and Mary Hopkins put it,
performance is an “essentially contested concept”—a category composed by arguments about its
composition, like ‘the good,’ ‘democracy,’ or ‘art.’3 As such, what performance has been to this
point is deeply entangled with what critics and artists have said about it. We should note,

3

Mary Strine, Beverly Long, and Mary Hopkins, “Research in Interpretation and Performance Studies:
Trends, Issues, Priorities,” in Speech Communication: essays to commemorate the 75th anniversary of the
Speech Communication Association. eds. Gerald M. Phillips, and Julia T. Wood, 181-204. (Carbondale:
Southern Illinois University Press, 1990). Quoted in Marvin Carlson, Performance: A Critical
Introduction (New York: Routledge, 2004), 1.
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however, that this discursive quality of performance is not something that sets it apart; rather,
this ontological chicken-and-egg quandary is one it shares with most art practices of the late
twentieth and early twenty-first centuries. That performance from the 1960s onward gets so
entwined with its theorizations owes not least of all to its emerging directly from the crucible of
the post-medium condition—the early 1960s saw a break with traditional approaches to art’s
evaluation and comprehension at the same time that its production came to include Happenings,
environments, greater roles for audience participation, and physical gestures performed by the
artists themselves—whether outlandish and virtuosic, like those of Joseph Beuys, or simple and
understated, like some by Judson Dance Theater.4 The work of art came increasingly to rely on
the viewer’s physical and/or interpretive involvement for an event, action, object, or person to
become meaningful. One has to work to translate what appears to be a given fact, to understand
something just because it is there, in the space of art. And what people have said about all these
performance-based practices has tended to variously plot the same story that begins with
presence and ends with revelation.
Allan Kaprow, for example, insisting that “Happenings are events that, put simply,
happen,” describes the point of these activities as an attempt to expand painting beyond the
bounds of mediation.5 He writes, “Pollock…left us at the point where we must become
preoccupied with and even dazzled by the space and objects of our everyday life, either our
bodies, clothes, rooms, or…the vastness of 42nd Street. Not satisfied with the suggestion through
paint of our other senses we shall utilize the specific substances of light, sounds, movements,

4

We can, in turn, trace the roots of these 1960s experiments in engaging ascendant spectatorial regimes
back to innovations of the historical avant-gardes, particularly Italian futurist serate and Dada cabarets.
See especially Goldberg, “Futurism,” in Performance Art, 11-30 and Claire Bishop, “Artificial Hells,” in
Artificial Hells: Participatory Art and The Politics of Spectatorship (New York: Verso, 2012), 41-75.
5
Allan Kaprow, “Happenings in the New York Scene,” in Essays on the Blurring of Art and Life, ed. Jeff
Kelley (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003), 16.

5
6

people, odors, touch.” The apogee of modernist painting in its Greenbergian teleology of everrefined medium specificity pointed beyond the frame, eventually toward art as immediacy. Ink
and vitriol flew as artists and critics debated the state of art, its past, its future, “quality,”
“interest,” meaning, the role of the spectator, and so on. This will become a familiar story.
(Chapter one, which discusses the minimalist-inspired performance works of Santiago Sierra,
revisits the primal scene of postwar “theatricality” and its relation to the meaning of artworks
and their “presence”.) What is important for our purposes at this point is the extent to which this
immediacy was achieved through disorienting experience and what it was meant to do to
viewers. Happenings were confusing, even, according to Susan Sontag, violent, using people as
“material objects.” Most infamous is her account of A Spring Happening (1961), in which
visitors were assembled in a crate with a low ceiling and horizontal slits at eye level that allowed
them barely to follow surrounding actions—such as a naked woman being chased by a
spotlight—even as heavy objects were dropped on the crate’s roof. At the finale, menaced by an
advancing lawnmower, the audience was finally allowed to escape when the crate’s walls
suddenly fell apart.7 The relentlessly alogical and unpredictable nature of a Happening, for
Kaprow, “invite[s] us to cast aside for a moment…proper manners and partake wholly in the real
nature of the art and (one hopes) life.”8
Michael Kirby, writing in the pages of The Tulane Drama Review in 1965, develops in a
more scholarly idiom what it might mean to “partake wholly in the real.” He writes, “all
6

Kaprow, “The Legacy of Jackson Pollock,” in Ibid., 7.
For Sontag’s full rendering of Happenings’ dark side, which draws a connection to the theories of
Antonin Artaud, see “Happenings: An Art of Radical Juxtaposition” (1962), in Against Interpretation and
Other Essays (New York: Picador, 2001), 263-273. Further, for more explication of the connection
between this aggression toward the spectator and the desired effect of “rebirth,” as well as how this
amalgam differed from more proscenium-style contemporaneous works by artists such as Claes
Oldenburg, Red Grooms, and Jim Dine, see Judith Rodenbeck, Radical Prototypes: Allan Kaprow and
the Invention of Happenings (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2011), 162, 138-140.
8
Kaprow, “Happenings in the New York Scene,” 18.
7

6
Environments have made use of light, sound, and movement…Kaprow went one step further by
employing human beings as the “mechanized” elements.”9 They are mechanized elements
because actions carried out by people, either scored (for performers) or unscored (for the
audience) are structurally constitutive of the work but in and of themselves have no meaning, no
literary or dramatic motivation. They simply happen. Or, in Kirby’s words, performance at a
Happening is “non-matrixed.”10 People whose performance is non-matrixed—not part of an
overarching story illusionistically produced through conventions of character and place—are
simply being themselves, even if they’re doing something they would not normally do, like
charging others with a lawnmower. That they are not playing a role means observers more easily
confront their real emotions, anxieties, confusions, and so on, and, in reacting contribute their
own unalloyed persons as material for the performance. They are also stuff that happens. He
writes, “In this theatre, ‘suspension of disbelief’ is not operative and the absence of character and
situation precludes identification.”11 On Kirby’s reading, inability to suspend disbelief produces
immediately experienced reality—everyone is just being who they really are, even more so since
everything around them is so strange and alienating. The reality made available through this
alienation is a glimpse of what is most essential and intimate to one’s own personality, a peak
behind the veil of our normal well-behaved and socialized selves. Initially, Happenings depend
on groups to produce this hyper-self-aware atomization effect, but Kaprow moved on to imagine
less collective modes of achieving the same effect—for example, dipping one’s hands in hot and
cold water, and reflecting aloud, as in Affect (1974).
By the time Kaprow produced Affect, which scored and illustrated a series of such
phenomenological experiments, performance practices that explored the capacities of the
9

Michael Kirby, “The New Theatre,” The Tulane Drama Review 10, no.2 (Winter 1965), 24.
Ibid., 25.
11
Ibid., 43.
10

7
physical body could be found everywhere. Vito Acconci was trying to catch balls thrown at him
while blindfolded (Blindfold Catching, 1970), Chris Burden had himself shot in the arm (Shoot,
1971), Gina Pane climbed a ladder studded with sharp metal barbs (Unanaesthetized Climb,
1971), and Marina Abramovi& took drugs for catatonia to see what would happen (Rhythm 2,
1974), just to name a few examples. The differences that separate these projects from Kaprow’s
go well beyond any obvious taboo-busting one-upmanship. This generation of post-1968 body
artists directly thematized and called into question any notion of gaining access to a root reality
or basic nature. Where an early moment of performance had imagined it could secure presence,
the next generation focused on its impossibility. Fleeting actions, fraught encounters, and futile
auto-manipulations that revealed more flesh than spirit worked to uncover the fact that the body
held no special knowledge; rather, it became the vehicle through which one demonstrated the
existential relation between meaning and action.
Lea Vergine’s psychoanalytically inflected Il Corpo Come Linguaggio (The Body as
Language), published in 1974, set the tone for much scholarship to come by focusing on how
performer and viewer meet in the space of art to confront and satisfy their inherent emptiness—
each needs the Other to become significant.12 As a result, what we find in performance is not a
heightened moment of reality that reveals our basic nature—what we find is that through the
power of this encounter, we are revealed as having no essential nature, our dependence on others
to make us who we are comes into focus. Acconci needs the gallery-goer to whom he can
whisper not-so-sweet nothings and Abramovi& needs her audience to use her as they will.
Absence replaces presence as the central analytic category for dealing with performance art as
early as 1974.
12

Lea Vergine, Il Corpo Come Linguaggio (Milan: G. Preara, 1974). Republished as Lea Vergine, Body
Art and Performance :: The Body as Language (Milan: Skira, 2000).

8
Indeed, in a signal essay of 1981, “Re-Viewing Modernist Criticism,” artist Mary Kelly
seized on performance art’s newly visible negative core to lambast the form in toto. Describing
the same developments in painting that moved Kaprow beyond the frame, Kelly writes, “the
painterly signifier is manipulated precisely to trace a passage, to give evidence of an essentially
human action, to mark the subjectivity of the artist in the image itself.”13 For her, as for Kaprow,
the notion that the painting had become “an arena in which to act” acted as catalyst and precursor
for performance.14 She states, “In performance work it is no longer a question of investing the
object with an artistic presence: the artist is present and creative subjectivity is given as the effect
of an essential self-possession…the actual experience of the body fulfills the prophecy of the
painted mark.”15 According to Kelly, however, this effect is more reactionary than revelatory.
Bringing into view “the peculiar paradox of photography for [these] precarious art practices,” she
asserts, “Benjamin’s ‘aura’ may wither away in the age of mechanical reproduction but
authenticity remains. What is made more explicit, more transparent, by the so-called
dematerialization of the object, is that the production of authenticity requires more than an
author for the object; it exacts the ‘truth’ of the authorial discourse.”16 For Kelly, the trace of an
action—whether in paint, photography, or film—pries open a space between an original moment
and the significance with which it becomes invested. In that space, we can discern the operations
of power. The performance-based work is not identical to its author and, hence, not the outward
sign of inward self-sufficiency. Kelly’s diagnosis renders performance pathological; for her, it
necessarily falls prey to patriarchy insofar as it (1) responds to the subterranean demands of high

13

Mary Kelly, “Re-Viewing Modernist Criticism,” in Imaging Desire (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1996), 83.
By now this genealogy has become coin of the realm. See especially Paul Schimmel, Out of Actions:
Between Performance and the Object, 1949-1979 (New York: Thames & Hudson, 1998).
15
Kelly, “Re-Viewing Modernist Criticism,” 91, 93.
16
Ibid., 92-93.
14

9
modernism’s investment in authorial presence and (2) brings human bodies into ideological
capture the moment their live processes revert to static images.
However, for the next generation of performance’s (post-structuralism-attuned)
interlocutors—Philip Auslander, Peggy Phelan, and Amelia Jones—the fact that a performance
cannot be wholly captured by its documents offers the key to postmodern liberation. For them,
presence becoming absence only redoubles the power of performance’s ability to shock and
realign perception. Auslander’s Presence and Resistance: Postmodernism and Cultural Politics
in Contemporary American Performance (1992) thinks performance through media theory to
articulate how it can undo modernist hierarchies and the preference for presence (to which Kelly
alludes). He celebrates works (like those of Spalding Gray, Laurie Anderson, and the Wooster
Group) that “disperse” presence and “deauthorize” performers through the self-conscious staging
of technological buttressing. In so doing, he argues, these works dissolve the supposed
originality of live performance and denaturalize notions of coherent selfhood, pointing to the
“‘self-in-alterity’ that is the social effect of mediatization.”17 Performance is not what it seems,
and neither are we. With shades of Jean Baudrillard, Auslander maintains that it is actually
documentation that (retroactively) produces a performance (rather than the other way round),
which can then only be appreciated as an irremediably vanished unknown.18 The anxiety here is
palpable and not at all atypical. At any rate, the ephemerality of performance signals the absence
at its core and serves as metaphor for individual identity.
Phelan approaches performance’s fleeting temporality from a Lacanian perspective. In
Unmarked: The Politics of Performance (1993) she defines the ontology of performance as a live
encounter that always already recedes into the past, and, hence, “Performance is the art form
17

Philip Auslander, Presence and Resistance: Postmodernism and Cultural Politics in Contemporary
American Performance (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1992), 171.
18
Auslander, “The Performativity of Performance Documentation,” PAJ 84, no. 3 (September 2006), 85.

10
which most fully understands the generative possibilities of disappearance. Poised forever at the
threshold of the present, performance enacts the productive appeal of the non-reproductive.”19
This productive appeal is the way in which artist and viewer can reveal each other’s continual
becoming through a unique, ephemeral encounter. Even the static images Kelly worries about
can only serve as always inadequate aides-memoires. She writes, “Performance approaches the
Real … in moving from the aims of metaphor, reproduction, and pleasure to those of metonymy,
displacement, and pain; performance marks the body itself as loss…Thus for the spectator the
performance spectacle is itself a projection of the scenario in which her own desire takes
place.”20 The unmarked is the name that holds the space of this becoming, the absence that
deflates the myth of presence; it is the guardian of the contingency of meaning. The present
always disappears, the work is not any one thing because everyone experiences and remembers it
differently. Further, performance is metonymic for the very nature of life: “the after-effect of
disappearance is the experience of subjectivity itself…For to acknowledge the Other’s (always
partial) presence is to acknowledge one’s own (always partial) absence.”21 The result is that the
viewer again gets to peek behind the veil that shrouds reality—this time to see that it has no
essential nature, any conventional notions we have about the world and ourselves, are exactly
that: provisional half-truths arrived at for convenience or through the machinations of discourses
invested with coercive power.
Jones’s Body Art: Performing the Subject (1998) weaponizes Phelan’s negative ontology,
bringing it to art history’s battlefields of late 1990s identity politics. Replacing Phelan’s
“unmarked” with a structurally similar “radical narcissism,” Jones argues that performance art is
the postmodern art par excellence in its ability to debunk modernist myths about the self19
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contained insularity of masterful genius artists. For Jones, works by body artists like Carolee
Schneemann, Hannah Wilke, Yayoi Kusama, and Vito Acconci possess radical political potential
in their burlesquing of dominant codes of identity, which point to their mere historicity, their
inessential contingency. Seeing how the artist plays with social scripting again reveals to us, the
viewers, the lack installed at the heart of subjectivity and the fact that the ways we live our lives
are accidents of history. Jones writes, “By exaggeratedly performing the sexual, gender, ethnic,
or other particularities of this body/self, the feminist or otherwise nonnormative body artist even
more aggressively explodes the myths of disinterestedness and universality that authorize these
conventional modes of evaluation.”22 We see our own particularity reflected in the Other and
vice versa, by seeing our desires fulfilled or frustrated. There is no subject and no artwork; only
an effect of discourse. Jones reveals this operation, naming it “the Pollockian performative.”23
She thus brings us full circle to Kelly’s criticism, except that for Jones any ascription of selfsufficient presence to the artistic subject (whose activity produces traces we call performance art,
or in Pollock’s case, “action” painting) can now be unveiled as the universal truth of subjective
absence, the non-being that exceeds ideological inscription. It is the scholar/critic’s job to protect
this absence.
Since the 1960s, whether rendered in the language of presence or absence, the
ephemerality of performance art has secured its ability to reveal and transform reality. In the
language of presence, performance allows us more fully to inhabit a moment in time and connect
with our most immediate selves. In the language of absence, either the ontological vanishing
point of time itself or its evocation through inadequate capture in media means we cannot access
reality; whatever we might assume to be its stable ground is merely naturalized history—
22
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ideology. Each side of performance discourse’s coin posits a temporal eruption that reveals the
usually hidden truth of the world in the form of personal mystification. Both the language of
presence and absence secure performance’s direct address, its anarchic intrusion, and, hence,
recapitulate a notion of art’s political potential like that Benjamin ascribes to Dada’s “ballistic”
mission: “It hit the spectator like a bullet. It happened to him.”24 The momentary efflorescence of
performance suddenly ruptures reality, disclosing its secret truths. Moreover, presence and
absence as performance art’s two ballistic arcs recall the twentieth century’s two most famous
experiments in socially-engaged theater: Antonin Artaud’s “theater of cruelty” and Bertolt
Brecht’s “epic theatre,” respectively.25 In Jacques Rancière’s pithy encapsulation, in order to be
moved from a passive relation into an active one, “For [Brecht], the spectator must be allowed
some distance; for [Artaud] he must forego any distance.”26
In describing this critical dichotomy (and alluding to its long genealogy), I intend only to
point to how the temporal emphasis in performance practice and discourse—the insistence on its
revelatory power deriving from ephemerality—has constricted analysis, squeezing what could be
a wide-ranging conversation about performance art and politics into narrowly described circuits.
On either telling performance calls attention to the unique qualities of a moment in time and
thereby illustrates what is specific and particular (even if not sovereign and self-possessed) about
individual human beings, their bodies, and identities.27 One of the aims of this dissertation is to

24

Benjamin, “The Work of Art,” 238.
See, e.g., Antonin Artaud, “The Theater of Cruelty (First Manifesto),” in The Theater and Its Double
(1938), trans. Mary Caroline Richards (New York: Grove Press, 1958), 89-100; Bertolt Brecht, “The
Modern Theatre is the Epic Theatre” (1930), in Brecht on Theatre: The Development of an Aesthetic, ed.,
trans., John Willett (New York: Hill and Wang, 1964), 33-42.
26
Jacques Rancière, The Emancipated Spectator, trans. Gregory Elliot (New York: Verso, 2009), 4-5.
27
Since Jones’s writing, the acrobatics required of writers attempting to shed new light on the problem of
presence/absence (while remaining within the discourse’s terms) have reached Olympic heights.
Attempting, in 2011, to bring the analytic to bear on re-enactments of various kinds (historical,
performance art-based, and so on), while offering some new insight into the problem, performance
25

13
imagine how we might reappraise performance since the 1960s by opening critical discourse in
new directions, to think about what performance art can offer when we move past presence (and
absence).
The notion that such a move is possible, however, derives from more than the sense that
presence has run its discursive course. Since the early 1990s, a number of European artists
responding to historical events that have changed the contours of global political economy—the
demise of the Soviet Union, NAFTA, and new regulations concerning trade and travel in the
European Union—have developed performance strategies that foreground the reproducibility and
representability of people and events. In confronting these works, extant analytical tools fail.
This dissertation develops new ones through examinations of performance-based works by
Santiago Sierra (b. 1966, Spain), Christoph Schlingensief (1960-2010, Germany), Artur
!mijewski (b. 1966, Poland), and the artist collective, Neue Slowenische Kunst (formed 1984,
Slovenia). In Europe, the end of the Cold War generated more prominent changes in the daily
conduct of life than it did in the United States, and these situated experiences resulted in the
amplification of rhetorical appeals to both globalism and localism, to the promise of collective
markets and corporate administration as well as anxieties over the rights and traditions of
specific nations or regions. The performance works examined in this dissertation respond to this
double bind, attempting to give form to the cognitive and social torsion produced by its
simultaneous centripetal and centrifugal motion. As such, they outstrip the temporally focused
critical discourse issuing primarily from the U.S.—where these recent historical events were met
theorist Rebecca Schneider offers the following formulation: “This body, given to performance, is here
engaged with disappearance chiasmically—not only disappearing but resiliently eruptive…In this sense
performance become itself through messy and eruptive re-appearance.” If this passage contains any sense,
it’s that the dance of presence/absence has become an absurd Fibonacci sequence, spinning round and
round on itself, limning a succession of more capacious, but equally hollow chambers. See Rebecca
Schneider, Performing Remains: Art and War in Times of Theatrical Reenactment (New York:
Routledge, 2011), 102.
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with political rhetoric holding that the U.S. (as it existed already) was simply extending to new
territories—by asking after the importance of place.
This dissertation examines the work of four artists in succession, first discussing the
artists from the former West and then the two from the former East. In formal terms, all the
artists I discuss share a peculiar relation to performance art, both in using non-artist participants
as a medium in creating performances and in how they position the function of performance’s
technological mediation. Santiago Sierra is based in London and stages minimalist-inspired
sculptural installations that employ “unskilled” (usually immigrant) workers as inanimate
building blocks in the place of geometric objects. Christoph Schliengensief began his career with
a trilogy of films that treated the theme of German reunification before developing a series of
multi-media performance works in Germany and Austria that probe the nature of political
exclusion. Artur !mijewski is a video artist whose works explore the relationship between
historical memory and everyday interpersonal interactions by getting representatives from
various segments of Polish society (ranging widely from young nationalists to deaf high school
students to Holocaust survivors) to engage in deceptively simple activities like painting their
ideal image of Poland or playing a game of “tag.” And the Slovene collective, IRWIN, part of
Neue Slowensiche Kunst (New Slovene Art), analyzes the meaning and function of concepts like
‘nation,’ ‘state,’ and ‘citizen’ through an ongoing performance project begun right after the
disintegration of Yugoslavia when the collective proclaimed the founding of a new state “in time”
(that is, without territory), a utopian society to which anyone can belong by filing the appropriate
paperwork. There are now several thousand “citizens” of the NSK State in Time around the world
whose civic activities range from the production of “NSK folk art” to official summits and
congresses.
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Just after 1989, each of these artists switched from some more traditional form of artistic
production (painting, sculpture, or film) to begin creating works for which people are the primary
artistic medium. In contrast to most performance art since the 1960s, performers, or non-artist
participants, in these newer works are valued by the artist (and according to the logic of the
work) based on the generic components of their identities—not what is unique about them, but
what signifies their belonging to some group or class. The sudden, widespread popularity of this
strategy suggests an urgent anxiety regarding the nature and meaning of personal identity across
the continent. Indeed, this basic operation has been put to use by many more artists than just the
four listed above. Claire Bishop has described this maneuver of hiring non-artist participants to
be themselves as representatives of a larger demographic category as “delegated performance”
(more on this designation and its consequences follows in chapter one).28 Bishop advances a
typology of these performances in which she includes two of the artists I focus on, Sierra and
!mijewski, as well as many more: Maurizio Cattelan (b. 1960, Italy), Dora Garcia (b. 1965,
Spain), Phil Collins (b. 1970, United Kingdom), Gillian Wearing (b. 1963, United Kingdom),
Paola Pivi (b. 1971, Italy), Elmgreen & Dragset (b. 1961, Denmark; b. 1969, Norway), Annika
Eriksson (b. 1956, Sweden), Tino Sehgal (b. 1976, United Kingdom), among others.
For the artists I discuss in this dissertation, however, this use of people as a medium
comprises only half of the formal grammar they share—delegated performance is not the same as
what I will call reproducible performance; delegation is often necessary, but never sufficient for
reproducibility in performance. The four artists I discuss also depart from their forebears in
privileging reproducibility over ephemerality. As we have seen, while performance art has been
recorded by photography, film, or video since the 1960s, the power of the form has traditionally
28
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been thought to reside in the difference between a live event and its documentary traces, the
frisson of irrecoverably vanished immediacy. The works discussed in this dissertation, however,
posit no such distinction. Rather, the artists design their works expressly for travel, to encounter
audiences in places at great spatial and temporal remove from the moment of their mediated
registration. The key innovation here is that each new viewer becomes an extension of the work
itself, not a witness to a past, “original” event. These works spread spatially and, hence, continue
to develop over time. This dispersal comprises the first sense in which these performances are
reproducible. In every case, an initial moment of performance repeats a social form or
problematic within the space of art—economic relations of exploitation, the bureaucratic
armature of statehood, and so on—but the work itself is reproducible insofar as the work’s
meaning does not reside in what transpires between those involved in that first instance of
production. Rather, meaning accrues to the work as it meets with additional viewers in
subsequent encounters with its mediated forms.
Further, these various later vantages onto the work’s initial staging are more important
because they bring different audiences into relation through their engagement with the work and
the issues it raises. Not only does this different relation to mediation set off the artists I discuss
from others who make use of delegation (e.g., Sehgal and Garcia, for whose works liveness is
constitutive), but I argue that, taken together, these formal attributes suggest a shared, coherent
theoretical and critical approach to the concrete effects of Europe’s recent history—this last is
why I group them here. The works treat events as reproducible phenomena in order to create—
actually, to reproduce—the inherited, culturally specific worldviews audiences bring to their
interpretation. Individuals are asked to participate as performers only insofar as they qualify as
interchangeable representatives of a given demographic category, and the performance itself is
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no less authentic for existing as a recording. Posing as encapsulations of extant social realities,
these performance works gamble on their own legibility. That is, these performances ask how
people in one place understand people in another, and each work functions more like a mirror
than a window.
More than sharing a subject matter alone, then, I argue that a formal and theoretical
grammar emerges in both the former West and former East; moreover, this is designed to
demonstrate that the various processes of unification and homogenization accelerated by the end
of the Cold War only exacerbate historical divisions, that the mounting technologies of global
identity produce ever more fractured and volatile difference. The document of a performance
becomes not only a way of representing the people actually shown, but a tool for describing the
psychic and social relationship between those watched and those who watch. The artists I discuss
share this emphasis on the artwork’s ability to describe the persistence of the past in the
present—to reproduce through reception the entrenched habits of perception that reproduce
society and its pathologies—and an attendant suspicion as to art’s capacity to change people (and
the world at large).29 The artwork visualizes a network; the more discordant the interpretations,
the more descriptive the artwork. The significance of the people and events pictured rests with
the viewer. Ultimately, that process of judgment is the actual subject of these artworks and of
this dissertation. By disseminating technically reproducible performances in their different ways,
these artists elicit viewers’ modes of understanding social relations. This solicitation is the
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second and final sense in which these performances can be described as reproducible—the work
creates a space in which our own habits of vision and self-understanding can be externally
projected and made visible. Ultimately, then, what the works reproduce is not only the initial
actions that are their nominal subject, but viewers’ own perceptions of reality. As we will see,
each artist shapes this space differently and in ways that reflect their own cultural and historical
situation. By positioning reproducible performance as a method for accessing and surfacing what
it is viewers already think about the world (rather than how it destabilizes these perceptions), this
dissertation differs from recent performance writing of the 2000s that has made theoretical
advances in seeking to contextually ground appraisals of works in discussions of labor, yet still
attempt to preserve (or presume) its radicality.30
As a theoretical approach, pursuing these networks of reproduction refocuses attention
away from rupture (and its presumed dismantling of false perceptions) as the desired goal of
political art and on to its ability to sound out and identify the worldviews each of us inherits from
history (and how these have shaped us and how we continue to make the world every day).
Reproducible performance therefore bears a political mission anterior to the transformation of
reality—it seeks to describe reality, to account for it anew at precisely the moment when it seems
to be most unstable and fluid. In their different, contextually situated ways, each of the works I
will discuss points to the intransigence of history, to its resilience—especially in the face of
proclamations about the end of the Cold War or even the “end of history.” Proposing that a
person can be meaningfully understood merely by apprehending their demographic genera posits
the social significance of these categories—that they are indeed recognizable, even determining
indexes of social reality. The stakes of this cognitive gamble concern what people see when they
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see other people. And by creating the conditions in which this recognition can emerge, the artists
go even further than suggesting that society is a factory that labels its human products with
generic, but ideologically burdened stamps—‘immigrant,’ ‘disabled,’ ‘Eastern,’ and so on. They
create a networked machine that can precisely locate a viewer in time and space as the inheritor
of a particular culture and worldview, a way of making sense that is irreducibly political. It is not
(only) the performers who are reproducible, but all of us, each in our own way, who bear the
stamp of history and, in turn, produce labels for everyone else. Reproducible performance offers
a mode of visualizing and analyzing history’s persistent repetitions.
It is also worth noting that these artists deal with the question of identity in terms that
tend to focus on the categories most excited and destabilized in resonance with discourses of
globalization—that is, anxieties and proclamations about geopolitical economy. As such, they
focus more on questions of nation-states in relation to transnational forces. Class and race
usually figure, for them, as functions of local economic life; other questions concerning
embodiment are usually subsumed by either the (trans)national political or economic registers.
This focus offers insights into the torsioned double bind of post-Cold War life described above,
but has little to say about other questions of identity related to sex and gender. That all these
artists are male and conceive identity in these terms seems ripe for analysis in its own right, but
exceeds the current project, as dissection along these lines would require an equally rigorous
comparative apparatus. In other words, while each artist examined in this dissertation engages
the experience of identity as a process of situated embodiment and cultural inscription, to a man
they seem entirely to ignore gender as a vector of analysis. To interpret why this would be the
case given that they simultaneously insist on the inevitable splintering of the supposedly post-
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historical universal subject would necessitate excavating the different histories of feminism
within each of their political-aesthetic horizons.
That said, however, the conceptual strategies these artists deploy in articulating the
relationship between identity and difference in terms of geopolitical economy stem
genealogically from feminist discourse—especially feminist performance art and photography.
The basic maneuver exercised by the four artists featured here—that images of people engaged
in some behavior thought to be typical of their social station can describe the contours of
ideology when offered to viewers within the frame of art—was pioneered by artists such as
Hannah Wilke, VALIE EXPORT, Martha Rosler, Laurie Anderson, Adrian Piper, Cindy
Sherman, and Sanja Ivekovi&. That the male artists featured in this dissertation appropriate this
method to their different ends suggests that the current study (even within its current scope)
could be expanded to examine how the ways in which these men wield authorial, sometimes
even dictatorial, control in constructing their reproducible performances entails an implicit
critique not only of a post-historical universal subject, but of a traditionally masculinist notion of
removed observation. (Such a move becomes most explicit in relation to the works of NSK and
the surrounding critical discourse of “overidentification.”) That is, we could conceive their own
involvement from a one-step remove beyond the work’s frame as a complementary pose to that
struck by their feminist forebears from within it, further illustrating the fallacy of neutral, noninscribed identity. At the same time, the re-emergence of this approach to the activity of viewing
and judging art suggests that the earlier works might be differently theorized in terms of the
spatial analytic developed here, that we might be able to re-appraise the pre-1989 history of
politically-minded performance by focusing on its mediated forms and descriptive rather than
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transformative capacities. Each of these avenues, however, will have to wait for the next, much
larger version of this manuscript for full exploration.
In detailing how the artists considered in this dissertation conceive the reproducibility of
performances and viewers’ worldviews, each chapter examines how, when, and why the artist (or
group) in question turned to performance. I balance an emphasis on formal examinations of
works and on the rhetoric that accompanies them, allowing each context to evolve its own
descriptive idiom. To this end, each chapter advances a political genealogy of conceptions of
individual and collective being, asking after the artist’s experience of the relationship between art
and politics (on the one hand) and how this relates to relevant local traditions of conceiving self
in relation to others (on the other). In this way, we will see that even the terms “individual” and
“collective” cannot be taken for granted. Each chapter articulates the contextual definition of
these concepts and their interrelation. By way of a useful, grounding oversimplification,
however, we might say that individuality stands for what is unique in terms of a given subject’s
experience and identity, while collectivity refers to what is shared across multiple subjects.
Subjectivity, then, is understood as a given ratio of individual to collective, each being to some
extent operative in the functioning of consciousness. But again, notions of whence these derive
and, crucially, the esteem placed on either component of subjectivity vary widely from place to
place and artist to artist. My aim is not to arrive at transcendent, “best” definitions, but to trace
and historicize their relative deviation. I work to situate each artist’s turn to reproducible
performance within the artistic and media ecologies through which they developed and in which
they operate. In this way, I excavate the theories and terms that guide analysis of each artist’s
work from those works rather than trying to apply one interpretive approach across all contexts.
The results are sometimes idiosyncratic, but this is only more generative when conducting such a
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comparative study. In the end, vast differences will appear between the works considered, and
these differences will deliver insights into the diversity of contemporary understandings of the
relationship between individuals and collective life, between art and politics, and how each of
these responds to situated traditions of accounting for the composition and nature of reality.
Chapter one, “Abuse Value: People as Things in Santiago Sierra’s Post-Minimalism,”
describes Sierra’s use of non-artist participants (selected for their ability to represent a larger
demographic category) as building blocks of sculptural installations. Using people like cubes,
cones, or L-beams, Sierra’s works present viewers with a social gestalt rather than fleeting
actions that intimate the depths of individual experience. This chapter revisits early 1960s
debates around theatricality and presence in painting and sculpture to draw out how the
implosion of modernist criticism proposed questions about the nature of spectatorship that are
still unsettled. Specifically, I pursue how minimalism represented and catalyzed not only the
relocation of art’s meaning away from the work itself and onto the viewer, but hinted at a way to
conceive the collective aspect of individual perception—what the reception of artworks can show
us about what we share with others rather than what splits us apart. I use this approach to the
debate in arguing that Sierra’s performance-based installations, photographs, and videos
necessitate a careful parsing of the social aspect of aesthetic judgment, one that vitiates
traditional notions of art’s capacity to transform viewers, but points toward other political
capacities.
Chapter two, “Gesamtkunstwurst: Christoph Schlingensief’s Multimedia Exorcisms,”
further interrogates how reproducible performance can draw out the collective aspects of
individual experience. Focusing on Schlingensief’s works that blend live actions with web-based
participation, television appearances, and video documentation, I argue that his performance
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practice does more to describe and display the media environment into which it enters than it
does actively to disrupt it. Drawing on the development of New German Cinema and its theories
of spectatorship, as well as Jacques Derrida’s writing on the specters of history, I demonstrate
how Schlingensief constructs situations designed to probe the contours of ideology, producing
controversies that chart the divergent ways different people can interpret the same thing. These
controversies function to conjure historical demons, making them available to debate.
Performance becomes a way of bringing these demons out into public view, of creating
microcosmic public spheres that allow individuals to see what they share as products of cultural
inheritance.
Chapter three, “Repetition / Compulsion: Artur !mijewski, Autonomy, and
Individuality,” crosses the now spectral Iron Curtain and continues the discussion of how this
group of post-1989 artworks locates present-day politics in shared historical experience.
!mijewski’s works begin with his assembling a cast of “authentic” characters (deaf students, or
Polish nationalists, or amputees, or a Holocaust survivor…) and find full articulation in videos
that narrate what transpires as these people execute a set of instructions. These works also
engage with the political stakes of collective experience, but shift the focus by working to
identify the core of individuality that resides in each of us and can be mobilized to separate
already collectivized people. Collectivized thought is pathological here, and recourse to Sigmund
Freud’s Beyond the Pleasure Principle helps to articulate how, in this context, group belonging
is seen as suicide. Engaging the history of Polish conceptualism, I argue that !mijewski’s
probing of individual accountability becomes the medium through which he navigates contextspecific and theoretically complex issues regarding the autonomy of art.
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Chapter four, “Ambassadors of the Future Past: IRWIN and History as Readymade,”
analyzes how IRWIN questions the very notion of context through a dedicated practice of
unoriginality. I trace the history of official and unofficial art in former-Yugoslavia and Slovenia
in discussing how and why these groups work as collectives focused on the repetition of
historical forms. I discuss IRWIN’s paintings, which recycle and recombine elements from
Suprematism, Nazi Kunst, and Socialist Realism, as well as the NSK State in Time—an ongoing
conceptual performance project begun in 1990 when the collective transformed itself into a state
that exists only conceptually (in time, not in space).31 I argue that the effect of these works is to
thematize history as not only temporal in nature, but spatial as well. Their works probe how
individuals make meaning based on their own context, but also ask how context itself comes to
be in the flux of geopolitical relations between different places. Discussion of Marcel Duchamp’s
readymades fleshes out this theory of history, as it addresses the process of making meaning as a
simultaneously temporal and spatial operation. I argue that IRWIN’s paintings and the passports
given to NSK State citizens are condensations of reproducible performance itself—they function
as loci from which individuals can measure their proximity to (or deviation from) collective
culture, which varies in relation to their specific experience of geopolitical reality wherever they
actually are. Individuality thus appears at the crux of various interrelated collectives of different
orders of magnitude.
The conclusion, “Standard Deviations: Performance Art and Spatial-Indexical Politics,”
summarizes the ways these artists reconceive what art is supposed to do (the political work it
should accomplish) in the post-Cold War world. I argue that the various mechanics of
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reproducibility discussed in this dissertation demonstrate that, in the present historical moment
(usually characterized as comprising fluid markets, flexible borders, instantaneous
interconnectivity, and increasing homogeneity), the political task of art rests in its ability to
describe what is unchanging about social reality, to point at it, and make plain the intransigence
of our ordinary, everyday modes of understanding the world by indexing the situated, historical
character of reception. No matter how jarring or outlandish the works may seem, these
reproducible performances work to immerse viewers in habits of perception rather than
transform them—not because conservation is important for its own sake, but because the past
persists in the present regardless of conservation, and we repeat history most easily when we
think it’s over. I engage the work of philosopher Peter Sloterdijk to detail the various ways in
which these artists navigate our globalized double consciousness—our irreducibly global-local
life—by producing works that analyze, describe, and sometimes even police the borders between
collective and individual, identity and difference. Further, I offer some thoughts as to patterns of
similarity and difference that emerge in comparing the artists themselves, with special attention
to the persistence of Cold War dynamics and divisions, as well as to how thinking about
historical persistence in the global future might offer some guidelines for comparative art
historical methodology.
There is nothing new, strictly speaking, about artists relying on a viewer’s participation to
complete or activate a work. What is new, however, is the idea that the truth and power of art
reside in repetition rather than revelation. I argue that performance art since 1989 comprises a
new mode of addressing audiences designed to illustrate how history persists and repeats in the
present, especially when we imagine we can escape it. The works I analyze present audiences
with the “same” object of interpretation in order to elicit and describe the range of responses
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possible. Each chapter, then, focuses on how the performance strategies implemented confront
the role of collective history in shaping individual consciousness concerning a particular,
pressing social issue. I argue that every reproducible performance functions as a sonar ping,
issuing from the work of art and mapping the surrounding human territory. From this notional
zero-point, the work creates a political portrait, constructing a spectrum of opinions and
speculating on their historical derivation. Because of how these works themselves deviate from
traditional performance, they are able to chart a cognitive landscape that describes where each of
us stands in relation to others—they picture us and our various pictures of the world as so many
standard deviations.
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Chapter One
Abuse Value:
People and Things in Santiago Sierra’s Post-Minimalism

Nature, we say, is beautiful if it also looks like art; and art can be called fine art
only if we are conscious that it is art while yet it looks to us like nature.
-Immanuel Kant, Critique of Judgment1

I try to do things that are the most natural in the world.
-Santiago Sierra, “Interview with Teresa Margolles,” BOMB2

Significant Others
In July of 2004 Santiago Sierra (b. 1966, Madrid, Spain) undertook the production of a
characteristic work, Polyurethane Sprayed on the Backs of 10 Workers, in Lisson Gallery in
London. To create the piece, Sierra hired ten people—each an Iraqi immigrant living in
London—for the nonspecific sum of “as little as possible.”3 As with almost all of Sierra’s works
that involve non-artist participants, what these people were paid for was their submitting to be
used as material for the creation of an artwork. Five days before the show opened, the ten Iraqis
assembled in the gallery and were swathed in protective latex sheeting and repeatedly arranged,
arm-in-arm, in standing human chains of various lengths (two people together, five people,
1
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seven…(figure 1.1)). Each time positioned so that one end of a group touched the wall of the
gallery and the other stuck out into the space of the room, the workers were then sprayed from
behind with polyurethane foam, a quick-drying plastic-polymer compound hazardous in liquid
form, but which as a hardened solid functions as a protective layer (for insulating homes and
strengthening airplane wings, among other uses). As the spray started to harden, the people
would peel themselves free, leaving an indexical tracing of their huddled forms standing upright
and stuck to the gallery walls. These foam casts, a thirty-six-minute black-and-white video
portraying the process of their creation, and assorted detritus (like the empty drums that had held
the liquid plastic) were what visitors to the gallery found on attending the show’s opening five
days later. The piece also exists online at Sierra’s website, which hosts the video, a jumpy
succession of grainy stills, and a verbal description of the work only slightly more detailed than
its title and fashioned in the same clinical idiom.4
The work comprises live performers undergoing a prescribed set of actions and thus
relies on the use of human bodies as a material, but provides no way in which these people might
simultaneously interact with an audience. Strictly speaking, this delay in interaction is not a huge
departure from performance art’s various forms over the past hundred years or so. Performance
‘for the camera’ is a preferred mode for some of the genre’s most iconic practitioners: Vito
Acconci, Hannah Wilke, Adrian Piper, and Marina Abramovi&, just to name a few. In fact, it is
on the strength of this kind of work that a peculiar gravitational pull has, of late, been exerted on
neighboring photographically-based oeuvres—Man Ray’s photographs of Duchamp and Cindy
Sherman’s of not-Cindy Sherman, for example—drawing them into discussions of performance
art. But performance studies (in equal and opposite proportion to modernist art criticism’s
4
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condemnations of ‘theatricality’) has always trumpeted the form as resolutely post- or intermedial. That is, as we saw in the introduction, art does not have to retain a live component to
become performance. Rather, the question of performance (including the status of its liveness)
has been tethered to the higher order problematic of (inter)subjective authenticity—whether the
subjectivities of performers and audiences can be made to manifest fully in presence or whether
these will be always already absent.
All the participants in Polyurethane share a specific circumstance; as a result, the work
cannot be adequately explained by this presence/absence schema. The piece’s title tells us they
are workers and signals the object status of their bodies while the description on the website
further elaborates that all ten “workers” are Iraqi immigrants living in London. This shared
national identity/immigrant status, however, remains enigmatic, anchoring the work to some kind
of sense, but only in the most opaque terms—it’s not clear by looking why these ten workers had
to be Iraqis. Further, even if it were clear why the ten should be Iraqi, there is no distinction
made amongst and between them. Why these ten? Only in stolen glimpses (at the end of the full
video) do we ever see the participants’ faces—protective clothing and hoods with face shields
insulate them from the potentially damaging spray and obscure anything that might individuate
them. The still images play up their uniformity. These people become embodied, yet abstracted
representations of a demographic category.
Claire Bishop describes this use of people as a form of “delegated performance.”
Describing the turn from a primary concern with liveness and the uniqueness of the individual
performance artist’s body and experience that characterizes “contemporary art performance,” she
writes:
By relocating sovereign and self-constituting authenticity away from the singular artist
(who is naked, masturbates, is shot in the arm, etc.) and onto the collective presence of
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the performers who metonymically signify an irrefutable socio-political issue
(homelessness, race, immigration, disability, etc.), the artist outsources authenticity and
relies on his performers to supply this more vividly, without the disruptive filter of
celebrity.5
Bracketing for now the question of celebrity and its relation to authorship in Sierra’s works, we
should focus for the moment on the consequences of a shift from authenticity as something
belonging to an individual (artist) by virtue of something extraordinary (an experience, attitude,
inspiration, and so on) to something supplied by a collective who/that is meaningful precisely
insofar as it is impersonal. As Bishop puts it, “Although unique qualities are sought in each
performer, these are—paradoxically—also infinitely replaceable”—ten Iraqis, for example.6
While the presence of the performance “genius” is a vexed category, riven by anxiety over the
ineffable and fleeting nature of a moment in time, the appearance of delegated performers is
simple and brute, a testimony to an event, a witness to a human-made state of nature. They
cannot possess the presence performance usually posits (including in its absence) because they
figure as generically signifying units, symbols of a group. The only particularity they possess—
as far as the work is concerned—is also what they all share. The experience of time, therefore,
also seems immaterial here—there is no functional difference between video and work if the
people (and hence, whatever experience is transpiring) are themselves reproducible.
This focus on group identity, moreover, concerns not only the work’s featured subjects,
but its viewers as well. This shift in the nature of the work’s authenticity also shifts how it
addresses audiences. On the formal-visual level, Polyurethane comprises signs that are
principally indexical. The molds left secured to the walls bare the shape of the people from
whom they received their form, and the video that documents the process by means of
5
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photographic registration—even though no longer a mechanical-chemical process—produces
automatic and predictable recordings of that-which-has-been in front of the lens. Further, on a
conceptual level, this piece relies on a kind of expanded, sociological indexicality. We do not
need to be in the room with the eponymous workers, but apparently we need to know that they
are Iraqi immigrants whose services could be obtained very cheaply. This fact secures an
authenticity for the work, a reality effect (these are “real” workers, subjecting their bodies to this
treatment in exchange for money), which lodges the work’s meaning in its ability to demonstrate
something about a state of social and economic affairs.
Most of Sierra’s works trade in this kind of expanded social indexicality. He’s made
pieces all over the world using the same conceptual formula: Identify a vulnerable local
population and exploit it. “Exploit” is intended here in the technical sense: Pay people the bare
minimum to expend their labor power and deplete their physical well-being in producing
commodities that will prove much more valuable and lucrative to those more firmly in command
of the means and modes of production. As a so-called global artist, then, Sierra juggles the
general and the particular, depicting the local expressions of transnational political-economic
forces. As we will see, his works create not only individualized vistas onto our collective
condition, but force a reckoning with how we value such depictions and how that process of
valuation is itself site specific. This chapter will explore how his use of people to make
minimalist-inspired performances creates a category confusion between what art represents and
what it means, or between what it is and what it does. With reference to how debates about
minimalism from the 1960s (and the Kantian framework of aesthetic experience they deployed)
have shaped ways critics consider what it means for Sierra’s works to address viewers as well as
to the critique of capital that lies at the heart of his own method, I will demonstrate how these
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performances stage, above all, the inability to discern from a work’s content how it will affect
viewers. By pointing to the difference between ideological critique and aesthetic judgment,
Sierra’s works show us that we have to look for art’s political capacities in the interaction
between a work and its viewers, rather than either’s supposed determining influence on the other.
While Sierra’s performances share an unmistakable idiom, they conform to unique social
conditions wherever they are. In April 2000 in Mexico City, five day laborers were hired for four
hours a day for five days to create The Wall of a Gallery Pulled Out, Inclined 60 degrees from
the Ground and Sustained by 5 People (2000) (figure 1.2). The piece, Object measuring 600 x 57
x 52cm Constructed to be Held Horizontally to a Wall (2001), performed at Peter Kilchmann
Galerie in Zurich, employed political exiles from other countries by contracting through a local
immigration agency (figure 1.3). Sometimes one framework is used in multiple circumstances, as
in 250 cm Line Tattooed on Six Paid People (1999), for which unemployed young men in
Havana, Cuba were each paid $30 for agreeing to be tattooed (figure 1.4) and 160 cm Line
Tattooed on 4 People (2000), for which four heroin-addicted prostitutes in Salamanca, Spain
were paid the price of a fix for their participation (figure 1.5). And Workers Who Cannot be
Paid, Remunerated to Remain Inside Cardboard Boxes has fielded participants with overarching
structural similarities from the very different specific situations in Guatemala (1999), New York
(2000), Busca (2010), and Berlin (2000) (figure 1.6). And yet other times, pieces that speak
through the seemingly neutral language of serialized geometrical forms could only be created
given more unique cultural circumstances, as in 21 Anthropometric Modules Made from Human
Faeces by the People of Sulabh International, India (2005/2006). Sulabh is an NGO that
advocates modern sanitation solutions for urban populations and lists among its goals the
liberation of “scavengers,” the lowest caste whose traditional job it is to collect and remove
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human waste. All these works create a peculiar mixture of site-specific sculpture and non-site
metonym; they all generate a portrait of social relations in a particular time and place. Or, as
artist and critic Dean Kenning puts it, “the participation of the remunerated persons becomes a
site-specific index of the existence of poverty and inequality.”7
Many critics and scholars have focused on indexicality in the construction of the works
by way of fixing and analyzing an originary moment: the action that left its mark. The
polyurethane casts are made on the backs of actual workers—as are all the works; often just as
literally. For many, the indexical trace of the action suggests that the meaning of the work lies
wholly in what has taken place in the most local and literal sense. Traces—whether the tattoo on
a young man’s back or the photograph that allows us to see it—are treated as transparent
documents of an act that Santiago Sierra has committed. While Sierra doesn’t appear in these
performances, for most critics the indexical catalog created by each one names him as its
motivating force. The common judgment that Sierra merely reproduces the social injustices he
would seem to want to critique is typified by performance theorist Shannon Jackson’s indictment
of his works as the “antisocial reductions of [an] international art star.”8 The counter-claim
advanced by some apologists—that the act of reproducing injustices exposes them to new
visibility—only offers more fodder for outrage. Writer Maggie Nelson describes such an
assertion as an “invented equation, in which the radical problems of the world neatly erase the
problems posed by his work, [which] is quite obviously a self-serving convenience.”9 On this
point, Sierra agrees with critics like Nelson: “If I thought about how to give real visibility to
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these people, I wouldn’t have chosen the art world as a platform to do it.” Reproduction does
not deliver revelation.
There are two problems, however, with the line of criticism that attacks Sierra for making
art that merely mimics the world. First, and in a more minor key, it only describes the work—
Sierra reproduces social injustice; nobody disagrees. Second, Jackson’s and Nelson’s references
to self-interest are not insignificant. For critics who attack Sierra, it is because the index seems to
point back to him, to his decision to subject his materials to harsh treatment, and to his own
ulterior motives. Polyurethane, on this reading, is just a cynical exploitation of a vulnerable
population. This is not only a critical cul-de-sac (how could anyone really ever know Sierra’s
intentions?), but it ignores a host of more fruitful questions. If this is a new kind of performance
art that reconfigures the location of authenticity, we should ask how this relocation changes the
relationship between author, work, and viewer. And why does it still look so much like art if it’s
just a reproduction of life? What happens when this reproduction becomes the starting point for
analysis rather than its conclusion?
A second group of critics takes more seriously the question concerning form (and the
ways it involves viewers and the act of viewing), but ultimately offers only a mirror image of the
first. For these other critics, considering the works “aesthetically” most often means a focus on
style. Sierra’s works feature two distinct, recognizable idioms: Minimalist and post-minimalist
sculpture and performance art documentation. We, the viewing audience, always confront
grainy, black-and-white photographs and videos that record installation shots of arrangements of
serial objects—one thing after another—except that these things are people. Confronting this
collision of minimalism’s interest in phenomenological viewing (invoked by the stark, repeating
forms) with the use of generically signifying people as demographic units, Klaus Biesenbach has
10
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coined the phrase “Political Minimalism” to describe the hybrid style of Sierra’s works and its
ramifications. 11
The ideal minimalist viewer becomes more fully aware of physical space (and one’s own
bodily relation to it) in experiencing what Robert Morris called “the entire situation” of
reception.12 Perambulating a sculpture, we apprehend the formal gestalt of the work, recognizing
the various elements that form a perceptible field, which also allows us to see ourselves seeing,
to perceive our own apparatus of perception. The minimalist work is comprised of its serial
elements, their arrangement in some actual space, and the act of viewing—all this gets pulled
into the work’s constitution and meaning. If people are used in Sierra’s works just like cubes,
cones, or L-beams, then the slow, contingently assembled gestalt realized by the viewer would
be infused by a sociological understanding. As a result, Sierra’s works are understood to reveal
to us that we play a role in creating oppression and injustice. The idea behind Political
Minimalism, then, is that the cognitive perception of forms—people as things—carries a
revelation, a political message about people as people. Our physical involvement in the works
redounds on a sociological plane through our cognitive assembly and, thus, points to our own
involvement in creating the world’s injustices. The works point not back to Sierra, but straight at
us, the viewers. On this reading, Polyurethane calls viewers into a heightened awareness, in
particular, of our own complicity in the political and cultural climate that precipitated the
invasion and occupation of Iraq that began in 2003. It becomes a vision of war, and what Sierra
has described as the “aggressive protection” of polyurethane foam takes on a decidedly pointed
valence.

11
12

Klaus Biesenbach, “Political Minimalism: Narrative Geometry.” Flash Art 37 (2004), 86-89.
Robert Morris. “Notes on Sculpture 2,” Artforum 5, no. 2 (October 1966), 20-23.

36
This celebration of Political Minimalism as an all-inclusive gesture of recrimination,
however, simply reverses the terms of the attack on Sierra’s authorial cynicism. Rather than
Sierra’s abuses being purely self-interested, they become almost altruistic, a necessary evil in the
service of the greater good. Political Minimalism might take as its critical mantra: “This hurts
me more than it hurts you.” These two readings are flip-sides of the same coin because each
wants to find the meaning of the work, as though it were planted there by an organizing author,
just waiting for an appropriate unveiling, a more or less sympathetic and erudite revelation.
Heads: Sierra is unjust. Tails: According to Sierra, we are all unjust.
Further, making the case that Sierra’s works reveal something about ourselves that we did
not already know by virtue of minimalism’s phenomenological reflexivity recapitulates
minimalism’s most cherished and most criticized fantasy about itself. The chimerical ideal
minimalist viewer is somehow both embodied and ahistorical. The nearly forty years’ worth of
art and theory that separate Morris’s writings from Sierra’s works have summarily debunked this
fallacy—not least of all the various incarnations of performance art that have staged the question
of identity. If we seek the meaning of Sierra’s post-minimalism elsewhere, and do so with
attention to the indexical strategies that look like performance documentation as well, we can
reframe his works and develop new analytical tools.
In “Notes on the Index: Part One,” Rosalind Krauss considers the indexical operations of
a self-portrait by Marcel Duchamp. The work, With My Tongue in My Cheek (1959), as she
discusses it, offers a view onto a signal facet of the index. The piece combines a drawing of the
artist’s profile with a cast of his cheek, tongue prominently in evidence (figure 1.7). Krauss
reminds us that the index is a “motivated” sign that refers to its own making in having a physical
relation to it, but this ability to refer does not carry the capacity to speak, to make meaning. The

37
13

index only points to what she calls a “meaningless meaning.” That meaning has to be fleshed
out by its position within a larger system of signification—that is, syntactically. A hole in a wall
could be evidence of either a misfired bullet or a missing painting that used to hang from a nail—
one deduction or the other would make more sense, depending on context.
Polyurethane demonstrates that the index is indeed mute, and what indexicality
ultimately describes is not a final meaning of the work located in the figure of the artist or the
work itself, but the system at a given interpreter’s disposal for apprehending significance from a
given element. The system of references that comes to bear on how the index generates meaning
then becomes the focus of Sierra’s works. The index points outward to the viewer, but not in
order to recriminate—not intentionally, at any rate. It does something subtler and more unstable.
The hybrid form we encounter with Sierra’s works—a mixture of minimalist serial arrangement
and performance-based indexicality—brings out the submerged elements in each of these
discourses. We have to think phenomenological experience in historical terms and performance
in specific sites of reception. The result is a form and mode of address that allows us to rethink
what it means for artworks to include the viewer in their composition and, in turn, how this
inclusion reshapes art’s political capacities. A re-appraisal of how the viewer’s role was first
conceived in relation to minimalism will set us on our way to seeing how Sierra’s works restage
it.

The Subject of Objecthood
The criticisms grouped under the name “Political Minimalism” make an important
gesture by searching Sierra’s link to minimalism’s reflexivity. Indeed, the sense that Sierra’s
13
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works have something to do with apostrophic accusation (cynical or no)—bolstered by the
artist’s own descriptions of art as “a narrow margin through which one can convey blame”—bear
a telling structural similarity to the initial debates that surrounded the work of his formal
predecessors.14 For Sierra’s defenders, the extent to which his works include the viewer varies in
direct proportion to their value (the resulting theorized ability to implicate). In the 1960s,
however, Clement Greenberg and Michael Fried reacted to the same feature of minimalism (its
reliance on the viewer’s presence and participation) in exactly the opposite way. For them, the
more the meaning of the work depended on the viewer as an external support or condition, the
greater its failure.
Reviewing the salient features of this debate will illustrate that what appears to be a polar
reversal (first, including the viewer = bad; then, including the viewer = good) is actually a series
of more complex exchanges, misinterpretations, and unidentified affinities. Centrally at stake is
the extent to which a particular notion of “aesthetic” value that imposed an opposition between
the “aesthetic” and the “social” has calcified into a critical bedrock that supports the ways we
tend to imagine the politics of aesthetics. These debates around minimalism have shaped the
terms of the disagreement we see swirling around Sierra—especially a category confusion at its
core concerning the difference between what art is and what we think it does.
Over the course of a few seminal essays written during the 1960s, Greenberg and Fried
each asserted that the problem with minimalism was that it was not self-sufficient, not
autonomous enough to be considered good art. Greenberg initiated this campaign, arguing in an
article of 1962 that “observance of… norms is enough to create an object that can be experienced
as a picture: thus a stretched or tacked-up canvas already exists as a picture—though not
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necessarily as a successful one.” Taking on board the ontological import of Duchamp’s
readymade thus registered with Greenberg as only making it more important that criteria for
evaluating art exist.16 In “Art and Objecthood” (1967), Fried elaborates on Greenberg’s fiveyear-old hypothetical tacked-up canvas: “This suggests that flatness and the delimitation of
flatness ought not to be thought of as the ‘irreducible essence of pictorial art’ but rather as
something like the minimal conditions for something’s being seen as painting.”17
Seeing the conditions that authorize, legitimate, or subtend art, however, is different from
seeing good art. Fried writes, “The enterprise variously known as Minimal Art, ABC Art,
Primary Structures, and Specific Objects is largely ideological.”18 “Ideological” here simply
means that it is cerebral; the criticism echoes Greenberg’s assertion that “Minimal Art remains
too much a feat of ideation, and not enough anything else. Its idea remains an idea, something
deduced rather than felt.”19 He continues, “What seems definite is that [the minimalists] commit
themselves to the third dimension because it is, among other things, a coordinate that art has to
share with non-art (as Dada, Duchamp, and others already saw). The ostensible aim… is to
‘project’ objects and ensembles of objects that are just nudgeable into art.”20 Greenberg sees that
minimalism is about the way we see, and he drives a wedge between the idea of art and the
personal experience of art.
He reflects on an early experience with the sculptural life of this new art: “[Anne] Truitt’s
art did flirt with the look of non-art, and her 1963 show was the first occasion on which I noticed
15
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how this look could confer an effect of presence.” Once he identifies this line of inquiry as
proper to minimalism, however, he dismisses it as “aesthetically extraneous” because, for him, in
thinking about how “the look of non-art” and “sheer size can produce an effect so soft and
ingratiating… the question of the phenomenal as opposed to the aesthetic or artistic comes in.”22
Greenberg draws a sharp divide between phenomenological questions and aesthetic ones, going
so far as to consider them opposites. For him, art is about art, and life should not interfere. He
banishes questions having to do with the variability of reception from the realm of the “artistic;”
even minimalism’s basic status as art (good, bad, or whatever) comes into question.
Fried avers, “Presence can be conferred by the size or by the look of non-art” before
hammering again at the wedge between minimalism (or, “literalism”) and significant art: “There
is… a sharp contrast between the literalist espousal of objecthood—almost, it seems, as an art in
its own right—and modernist painting’s self-imposed imperative that it defeat or suspend its own
objecthood through the medium of shape.”23 The polemical tone of Fried’s “Art and Objecthood”
is notorious, and he views this “contrast” as nothing short of a “war.”24 For him, the
confrontation provoked by minimalism is an almost Darwinian struggle for survival: “the
literalist espousal of objecthood amounts to nothing other than a plea for a new genre of theatre;
and theatre is now the negation of art.”25
The subtle difference between Greenberg’s and Fried’s positions, however, is that
Greenberg offers a theory of art while Fried posits something more like a theory of
subjectivity—at least insofar as he seeks primarily what it is people can expect from interactions
with art. This question of subjectivity comprises the root of Fried’s concern with objecthood. He
21
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writes, “[T]he experience of literalist art is of an object in a situation—one that, virtually by
definition, includes the beholder.”26 This inclusion of the viewer is what makes minimalism
“theatrical.” Indeed, this formulation is a pithier version of Morris’s celebratory description of
(his own) minimalism’s ideal viewer: “One is more aware than before that he himself is
establishing relationships as he apprehends the object from various positions and under varying
conditions of light and spatial context.”27 The problem, for Fried, rests in the viewer’s
heightened awareness of the vicissitudes of perception because this can lead to a kind of
spectatorial egotism. Theatricality—art’s new mortal foe—consists in a “distancing that makes
the beholder a subject and the piece in question… an object… The object, not the beholder…
remain[s] the center of focus of the situation; but the situation itself belongs to the beholder—it
is his situation.”28 According to Fried, minimalism’s relentless “espousal” of objecthood is
actually a subjectivist chauvinism. In other words, what bothers Fried is not just that the
perception and, therefore, meaning of a single work of art will vary depending on the prosaic
vagaries of one or another situation (layout of the gallery space, lighting, temperature, height of
the viewer, relative clumsiness, visual acuity, and so on), but that this emphasis on contingency
will lead to an unbridgeable disjuncture between subject and object. Art will lose its ability to
affect people, forfeit its intimacy, because people will become the subject of art, but only insofar
as they engage in a kind of narcissistic navel-gazing. Rather than becoming a challenge to our
ideas about ourselves, art becomes a prop we use to sustain a sense of our own insular
cohesion—‘From here, I see the object over there.’—a rugged individualism of the white cube.
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“Theatricality,” moreover, is not a term casually chosen. Fried models his critique of
minimalism on the criticisms of traditional theater made by Bertolt Brecht and Antonin Artaud.
Discussing the urgency of the war on theatricality, Fried writes:
This is perhaps nowhere more evident than within theatre itself, where the need to
defeat what I have been calling theatre has chiefly made itself felt as the need to
establish a drastically different relation to its audience. (The relevant texts are, of
course, Brecht and Artaud.) For theatre has an audience—it exists for one—in a
way the other arts do not; in fact, this more than anything else is what modernist
sensibility finds intolerable in theatre generally.29
Without digressing too deeply into these theories, both Brecht’s “epic theater” and Artaud’s
“theater of cruelty” sought to somehow unite a viewing audience with the scene before them, to
involve them directly. The way they figured this involvement differed almost diametrically. In
Brecht’s case, the Verfremdungseffekt (alienation or estrangement effect) achieved by various
means of anti-illusionism was meant to engage the viewer’s critical faculties, moving them to
interrogate the obviously false spectacle and become a more active participant in all other aspects
of life as a result; in Artaud’s, proximate sensory overload was meant to short-circuit habituated
manners and socialized behaviors, using a superflux of mediation to provoke immediate,
authentic reaction. Further, each of these theories experienced a new life in New York of the
1940s and 1950s in the “Living Theatre,” headed by Julian Beck and Judith Malina, which
attempted to fashion a form posed in stark opposition to both Hollywood narrative confections
and the meticulously controlled über-acting of adherents to the dominant Stanislavsky Method.30
The distancing that Fried sees at work in minimalism, then, is the opposite of the spectatorial
inclusion achieved through Brecht’s Verfremdungseffekt or Artaud’s “cruelty”—each of these
activates the viewer, removing the veil of ordinary stupefaction or habituation, and dismantles
the boundaries between an artwork and a viewer, between an object and a subject. The mode of
29
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removed, detached spectatorship is what Fried calls minimalism’s “theatricality” and is where he
locates its “latent or hidden naturalism.”31 This naturalism is why the mere “presence” of an
object that a minimalist viewer registers phenomenologically, like the “stage presence” of an
actor conveying a role, is something to lament.32 Fried states, “We are literalists most or all of
our lives;” he insists that encounters with art should deliver something more.33 Instead,
minimalism only reinforces our normal isolation, our ordinary ignorance of questions larger than
our individual selves.
Fried’s diatribe against “literalist” theatricality is not an indictment of the viewer’s
involvement in a work. Rather, it is an argument that the way in which minimalism achieves the
viewer’s involvement promotes, in perhaps unintended ways, a reactionary conservatism. To be
sure, subsequent commentators—Donald Judd, Morris, Krauss, and Hal Foster—all disagree,
each one more rigorously than the last. For his part, Judd insists that because minimalist works
are not pre-conceived, they are anti-rationalist, anti-Cartesian, and, therefore, that they work
against the notion of an individual who stands apart from the world.34 Morris’s “Notes on
Sculpture” (1966) details this same theoretical investment through gestalt theory. For him,
acknowledging the viewer’s phenomenological inclusion in the work is identical to erasing any
definitive distance between them, and emphasizing the same is less a way of making the viewer
the be-all, end-all of art than it is a way to make the object “less self important.”35 Krauss
supplements the language of gestalt with a semiotic attention to syntactic arrangement, playing
up how this destabilizes and de-centers the imaginary self-mastering subject through duration,
31
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the unfolding of meaning through sequence, and the constant friction between the expected and
the actually perceivable/perceived.
Foster, offering a pointed summary of all this argumentation, writes, “[J]ust as
phenomenology undercuts the idealism of the Cartesian ‘I think,’ so minimalism undercuts the
existentialism of the abstract-expressionist ‘I express,’ but both substitute an ‘I perceive’ that
leaves meaning lodged in the subject.”36 Foster, therefore—and contrary to the way we usually
tell ourselves this story—takes us full circle, agreeing with the central premise of “Art and
Objecthood.”37 Foster writes, “As an analysis of perception, minimalism prepared a further
analysis of perception,” paving the way for Institution Critique and feminist work of the 1970s
and ‘80s that took issue with minimalism’s ignorance of the “sexual-linguistic constitution of the
subject.”38 That is, according to Foster, the problem with the “I perceive” that constituted
minimalism’s greatest achievement (as a break with modernism) is that it also comprised its
greatest failure (in not already being postmodern enough to imagine the full range of possible
‘I’s and their contexts of reception). Minimalism, in taking only a narrow (ahistorical)
phenomenological tack, could not grasp all that goes into the act of perception, all the functions
of power or specific contingencies of identity that might frame and influence it. The way around
this shortcoming, Foster maintains, is to analyze to the fullest extent possible the conditions of
perception, to critique the “entire situation.” And as he lays it out, this work of analysis
proceeded along two lines: (1) investigations into the eco-systems of art’s institutions and (2)
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explorations of how “discourses adjacent to the art world” exert power to exclude persons on the
basis of their identities.39
These two avenues of analysis that proceed from minimalism’s typifying and disrupting
modernism have the effect of placing the phenomenological viewer in history. This is the
reversal with which we are so familiar, whereby “theatricality”—misunderstood as including the
viewer and conditions of reception (at all) in the work—becomes valued as “criticality” insofar
as such inclusion refers to those “discourses adjacent to the art world” and their informing
influence on it. But if I have lingered on this tortuous, decades-long debate, it is because
appreciating its ragged nuances allows us to see an unintended consequence of rounding the
corners. The reversal of (misunderstood) theatricality into criticality flips the antipodes of
Greenberg’s theory of art without addressing Fried’s search for the subject. That is, the meaning
of a work of art is no longer “in the work itself,” but now resides outside the work. The truth of
the work Greenberg prizes as its aesthetic value (which would be the same for all qualified
investigators) is revealed (by Foster et. al.) as the effect, the by-product, of those same real-world
discourses Greenberg sought to dismiss as mere particularized phenomenal experience. This has
the unintended consequence of solidifying the opposition between the collective and the
individual—the terms just switch places: It used to be that particular people knew that the
meaning of art is universal, but now it is universally known that the meaning of art is particular.
This new particularity has the ring of truth about it, but to follow through on this reformulation,
we would have to reconceive also how the artwork mediates, or appeals to, that particularity
rather than continually working to analyze how particularity determines art from without. With
the latter, we are left with a bad infinity of particularities, equally abstract and ahistorical as their
other, the universal. Without locating the collective in the individual—positioning them in
39
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dynamic interrelation—we are left only with a weakened theory of art (or a strong theory of art’s
weakness) and without a theory of the subject.
When we pay more attention to what Fried was trying to articulate, however, we can
glimpse that he was attempting to think through the social component of personal experience.
His invocation of avant-garde anti-theater as a model for the relationship between an artwork and
a viewer suggests that he was looking to rethink any easy dichotomy of individual and collective,
of aesthetic experience and social life, but he fails to work through the presumptive antimony
and get somewhere new. Indeed, part of why Foster can so successfully ‘straw man’ Fried as a
stodgy conservative obsessed with decorum and quality is that Fried’s writing about the
alternative to hold up in opposition to minimalist art reverts to a reactionary mysticism.
Denigrating minimal mere presence as theatrical (and, therefore, reifying of subject and object in
relation to one another by instantiating their definitive disjuncture), he advances the notion of
“presentness” as the preferable alternative offered by modernist painting and sculpture.
Fried’s descriptions of this concept, or effect, however, are evocative at best. We learn
that whereas presence “confronts the beholder, and thereby isolates him, with the endlessness not
just of objecthood but of time,” presentness “has no duration—not because one in fact
experiences… [the work] in no time at all, but because at every moment the work itself is wholly
manifest;” despite (or because of) the “instantaneousness” of this presentness, one is “forever
convinced by it.” Most famously, of course, “Presentness is grace.”40 A work that achieves
presentness is superabundant, full, whole; this richness smacks of a connoisseurial elitism
dressed up as a revelatory messianism—a nightmare vision of a snooty docent introducing
undergraduates to Malevich’s Black Square. This “presentness,” moreover, sounds similar to the
“presence” we encountered in the introduction. Fried all but makes the connection himself: “It
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may have been the desire for something like presentness that, at least to some extent, led Brecht
to advocate a nonillusionistic theatre.”41 Notwithstanding the fact that Fried has Brecht a little
sideways here—suggesting that anti-illusionism was a way to make “the work itself wholly
manifest”—what he keys into is the notion that there might be a way to conceive a work of art as
mediating the relationship between individual perception and collective life, a way of holding in
tension local phenomenal experience and social meanings that extend through and beyond
incidental variance. In the end, however, he is hemmed in by the terms he inherits from
Greenberg—just as everyone who disagrees with Fried’s diagnosis remains within his wake. The
problem lies in the categories employed, especially the initial conception of aesthetic experience
Greenberg promulgates.

The Object of Subjecthood
In the course of his own categorical archaeology, Thierry de Duve writes, “[M]ost critics
of Greenberg, from the conceptualists on, have taken his reading of Kant for granted and rejected
the Kantian aesthetics along with its Greenbergian misreading. This is the first element in a huge
misunderstanding.”42 He continues:
Greenberg’s… unwillingness to judge beyond taste was only matched by his opponents’
unwillingness to see that the judgment which has brought ‘art status’ to the readymade is
an aesthetic judgment, albeit not one of taste. In retrospect, the pop interpretation of the
readymade in terms of appropriation, its minimalist interpretation as an art of the real or
the literal, and its conceptual interpretation as concept and institutional status appear as
much fraught with naïveté as Greenberg’s rejection of the works legitimated by those
interpretations appears fraught with bad faith.43
According to de Duve, what motivates Greenberg’s bad faith and (apparently) everyone else’s
naïveté is a fundamental misapprehension of the nature of aesthetic judgment. It would seem
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that the two pieces necessary to comprehend the aesthetic in its full social dimension get split
amongst the two camps: taste (as something personal and subjective) on one side and an
attribution of “art status” (as a claim to a specific kind of public recognition—whether stolen,
assumed, or conferred) on the other. And it is certainly worth noting that de Duve’s diagnostic
admonition exactly parallels Foster’s teleology concerning the ongoing analysis of perception
inaugurated by minimalism; here, however, the separation between aesthetic and other concerns
is problematized rather than taken for granted.
Kant’s Critique of Judgment (1790) finds the solution to this bifurcation—a duality he
calls “the antinomy of taste”—in the dialectical interrelation of the private and the public that
motivates and comprises the activity of aesthetic judgment.44 Understanding how Kant sees this
antinomy—and how he resolves it—will help us to articulate what it would mean to think of art’s
significance as pointing beyond the personal, individualized register of reception while
simultaneously accounting for it, thus avoiding bad infinity. Kant begins more or less where all
our interlocutors do: “[A] judgment of taste is not a cognitive judgment and so is not a logical
judgment but an aesthetic one, by which we mean a judgment whose determining basis cannot be
other than subjective.”45 Further, he asserts that this statement is not the product of some
specialized philosophical knowledge, but a commonplace typified by the widely held belief that
“Everyone has his own taste” and its corollary, “There is no disputing about taste.”46 Because (a
judgment of) taste is a pronouncement motivated by a personal sensation (for Kant, most often
one of pleasure or displeasure), it is also indefeasible—we don’t “dispute” taste because there is
no transcendental, universal standard against which it can be measured, which means it cannot be
proven or disproven.
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No one ever argues, ‘No, in fact, you do like that painting.’ No one except Clement
Greenberg, whose 1973 Artnews article, “Can Taste be Objective?,” answers its own question in
the affirmative and, according to de Duve, belies the extent to which “he never understood
Kant.”47 For, central to Kant’s notion of the aesthetic is the fact that “the basis determining a
judgment of taste…cannot be brought to determinate concepts.”48 Further, such a line of thinking
would seem to ratify the (post)minimalist self-understanding described by both Foster and de
Duve—that art in and of itself has no truth (and that attempts to claim it does are exclusive
predilections propped up by duplicitous rhetoric alone), but is rather determined from without by
people and institutions.
Kant is quick to point out, however, that “even [if] proofs do not allow us to decide
anything about such a judgment…we can certainly quarrel about it, and rightly so.”49 That is, if
we cannot make a definitive, logically demonstrable and irrefutable case about our judgments;
we constantly argue about them nevertheless. And according to Kant, we should. We arrive at a
seeming description of nonsensical human folly—taste is beyond definitive proofs; we fight
about it all the time. Kant formulates this antinomy:
(1) Thesis: A judgment of taste is not based on concepts; for otherwise one could dispute
about it (decide by means of proofs).
(2) Antithesis: A judgment of taste is based on concepts; for otherwise, regardless of the
variation among [such judgments], one could not even so much as quarrel about them
(lay claim to other people’s necessary assent to one’s judgment).50
Taste seems at once to be something private and something public. Rather than allowing these
statements to cancel one another, suggesting that our ordinary experience of art and argument is
simply wrong and must be re-conceived, Kant synthesizes the two by asking how the terms of
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each influence and elucidate the meaning of the other. The resolution of the antinomy holds that
judgments of taste are indeed motivated by personal reactions (not rule-bound concepts), but that
our personal reactions are formed in relation to contingent, socially significant categories
regarding reality (and hence, can lay claim to universal validity, but not logical necessity).51
A judgment is a statement that makes sense (to oneself and others) of a tightly bound
knot of subjective experience and shared, objective reality. In a phrase that sounds almost like it
could be a commentary on any minimalist work, Kant writes, “[S]ensation… stands for what is
merely subjective in our presentation of things outside us, though in its proper meaning it [also]
stands for what is material (real) in them (that through which something existent is given), just as
[the term] space stands for the mere a priori form that enables us to intuit things.”52 In any
perception, there exists at once the subjective and the objective; in this way, Kant admits of no
split between a supposedly personal experience and the world it engages. He adds that “[w]hat is
strange and different about a judgment of taste is only this: that what is to be connected with the
presentation of the object is not an empirical concept but a feeling…though, just as if it were a
predicate connected with cognition of the object, this feeling is nevertheless to be required of
everyone.”53 We confuse our judgment of an object with an objective characteristic of the object
itself and, in so doing, assume that everyone should (or could reasonably be expected to) agree
with us (because the world is shared even if feelings are not). Further, our “individual” judgment
is always mediated by socially determined categories. We abstract from an object with which we
are presented and “compare our judgment not so much with the actual but with the possible
judgments of others.”54 In this way, private judgment percolates through public existence, and
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“the illusion [of objectivity] arising from our confusion between the two is natural and hence
unavoidable.”55
This inevitable illusion rests at the core of how Kant theorizes art’s relationship to the
wider world. He writes, “Nature, we say, is beautiful if it also looks like art; and art can be called
fine art only if we are conscious that it is art while yet it looks to us like nature.”56 When art
looks like nature, it fosters our pretensions to objectivity, allows us to exceed sensation (the only
works that cannot be beautiful are those that elicit disgust), and makes us more easily believe, in
fitting paradoxical fashion, that we are apprehending the inherent truth of the object itself. The
“beautiful is what we like merely in judging it.”57 Beauty here is not a sensation of pleasure, but
a judgment about a sensation that communicates with others. It is thus down to the artist to keep
the machinery of the illusion running smoothly. The artist is a “genius” if and when he or she can
conceal art perfectly executed: “the academic form must not show; there must be no hint that the
rule was hovering before the artist’s eyes and putting fetters on his mental powers.”58
These terms—taste, beauty, pleasure, genius—we usually think of as moldering in some
dusty wunderkammer (if we think of them at all) quietly course through the veins of artistic
discourse of the twentieth and early twenty-first centuries. But most often when we encounter
their modified forms (e.g., in the discussions around minimalism (Sierra’s included)) we don’t
realize how expansive and dynamic they can be. Principally at stake even in Kant’s comments on
beauty in fine art is the activity of judging and how this describes a relationship between an
individual and society. As Hannah Arendt puts it, “the nonsubjective element in the nonobjective
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senses is intersubjectivity.” Because Kant’s aesthetics never separate individual response from
59

social communion (which is more than social position given in advance by virtue of already
solidified individual identity—communion is about mutual formation, whether cooperative,
agonistic, or unknowing), a judgment about a work of art confers subjecthood on the judge rather
than the other way around. For Kant, this is the ultimate purpose of art: “Fine art… is a way of
presenting that is purposive on its own and that furthers, even though without a purpose, the
culture of our mental powers to social communication.”60 The aesthetic value in art is its ability
to force us into conversation because it makes us consider what other people might think about
what we see, which, in turn, promotes our own sense that our judgments are both personal and
correct. Art is for getting into ‘quarrels’ about the nature of reality.
Kant calls this ability to judge a sensus communis; he considers it a basic human capacity
even more universal than rationality: “I maintain that taste can be called a sensus communis more
legitimately than can sound understanding, and that the aesthetic power of judgment deserves to
be called a shared sense more than does the intellectual one.”61 Shocking though it may be for us
in retrospect—and given what later writers have made of him—the cornerstone of Kant’s
humanism is the proposal that we have language and society not in order to arrive at the best of
all possible worlds through shared rational discourse, but to be able to communicate aesthetic
disagreements. This should not be confused, however, with a sense of aesthetic judgment as
rooted solely in agonism. Such an assertion would switch cart and horse, suggesting that identity
precedes judgment; this would land us back in the trap of bad infinity. Rather, the social exists in
the aesthetic because an individual judgment that speaks as if it could claim universal validity
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does this by virtue of the sensus communis. Every individual judgment comes into being through
and contends with a delimited horizon of shared meaning. The aesthetic is therefore the ground
of sociality from which individuality emerges. This formulation of aesthetic experience holds the
individual and society in tension. Art is the place where life happens rather than either an
autonomous zone that can comment on life from without or an epiphenomenal repository for
life’s foregone conclusions.
Sierra’s works compound this complexity by putting into uneasy relation aesthetic
judgment, which is a social process of rendering individual judgment about mediating/mediated
objects, and political judgments, which are pronouncements about the proper conduct of society
itself. Recall the two critical approaches to Sierra’s works: On the one hand, he is a cynical
monster, reproducing as art the reality he would seem to want to critique. On the other, he is a
well-intentioned critical artist, sacrificing a few for the betterment of many. It is worth noting
that these criticisms conform to Kant’s comments on genius. Critics who find his art too artful
(they can see the rule of ‘criticality’ hovering before his eyes as a carrot opportunistically seized)
find the work disgusting. Those who value it for its presumed transparent depiction of the truth
of universal guilt think he’s a great artist with unique talents. That is, sometimes the works seem
too artful; at others, simply natural. These aesthetic judgments (bereft of their proper social
scope) imagine themselves to be apprehensions of the works’ own political intentions. They
remain, however, only theories of art (and how it should comment on society) rather than taking
up the more difficult question of how art structures and catalyzes relations between subjects.
This category confusion evinces the legacy of a distinct mode of approaching the relationship
between aesthetic experience and social life—ironically, one that maintains a disjunction
between the two realms even in their interaction (something more like billiard balls than
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conjoined processes). Sierra’s works, then, begin to describe a dark condition indeed for the fate
of political art. If his works “merely” reproduce the conditions they would seem to want to
critique, it is because we have imputed to art a magical transformative capacity while
simultaneously robbing aesthetic judgment of its social character. In misapprehending the scope
of our own judgments, we have insured that art cannot do anything, save reproduce the world as
it already exists.
Arendt’s (almost tongue in cheek) adaptation of the Critique of Judgment (and especially
the sensus communis) to construct Kant’s never-previously-written “political philosophy”
investigates how aesthetic judgment joins the private and public and can offer us a new vantage
onto the place of politics in a work of art. According to her, the difference between an artist and
a spectator is paramount, and, further, she tells us that Kant would have us all be spectators
rather than artists. In line with most of the philosophical tradition before him, Kant privileges
withdrawn observation over action.62 Writing of this relation in terms of theater, Arendt states,
“only the spectator occupies a position that enables him to see the whole; the actor, because he is
part of the play, must enact his part—he is partial by definition. The spectator is impartial…
withdrawal from direct involvement to a standpoint outside the game is the sine qua non of all
judgment.”63 The ideal of critical distance, the preference for contemplation over action, passes
from Pythagoras to Kant in an unbroken line; this ideal is precisely what modernism sought to
explode and what postmodernism decided was always already impossible in the first place.
Performance art’s two principal moments of critical self-understanding—first as immediacy
(presence); then as its unattainability (absence)—are exemplary in this regard.

62
63

Arendt, Lectures on Kant’s Political Philosophy, 55.
Ibid.

55
Kant’s notion of spectatorship, however, relies on a kind of constant, hydraulically
pressurized back-and-forth between mediation and immediacy. When we do the work of
considering what other people might say in order to formulate a judgment, this involves what
Kant describes as two separate mental operations: “imagination” and “reflection.” By
imagination, he means the ability to make present something that is absent—to make immediate
something given through mediated representation—which, in turn, motivates us to weigh (reflect
on) what other people might think about it so that we can communicate what we experience.
Imagination brings the object near; we can then reflect on it with some distance. As Arendt puts
it, “Only what touches, affects, one in representation, when one can no longer be affected by
immediate presence—when one is uninvolved, like the spectator…—can be judged to be right or
wrong, important or irrelevant, beautiful or ugly, or something in between.”64 Only those
representations that have the power to affect us personally (as though immediately) can become
objects of judgment because only these give us something we feel should and could be
communicated. The confusion Kant describes between private and public dovetails with this
confusion between representation and immediate reality. In the same way private reactions guide
judgments rendered through and for public life, representations of the world create opportunities
for immediate experience. This relationship is dialectical, as these immediate experiences
become represented in public judgments and so on.
Whether or not we go along with Kant’s play-by-play account or wish to adopt his
specialized terminology, what it helps us to see is how the world becomes significant through
representation—not simply because a given representation is personally affecting, but because
when it is we can expect that it will be meaningful to everyone. Arendt writes, “while one can
speak of a genius in the singular… one can never speak, as Pythagoras did, in the same way of
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the spectator. Spectators exist only in the plural.” Geniuses are few and far between—they
make art that looks like nature, which means they create representations that affect individuals
and, hence, start fights about how everyone should understand reality. But everybody is a
spectator, geniuses included, and spectatorship is primary. Even a genius can only be designated
as such by public judgment: “the very originality of the artist (or the very novelty of the actor)
depends on his making himself understood by those who are not artists (or actors).”66 According
to Arendt, the biggest problem with Plato’s parable of the cave is not that the spectators are
coded as “passive” in contemplating the shadows dancing on the wall—the hero of this story, the
philosopher who has seen the light, is a spectator too; he just gets to watch a different show, and
he gets to tell everyone about it. The captive audience members, on the other hand, cannot and
do not talk to each other about what they are seeing. For her (via Kant), such a scenario of
individualized reception has no bearing on what representations actually do.67
We arrive, then, at the final productive tension of Kantian aesthetic judgment as a shared
human capacity: If the publicity of taste functions dialectically, making collective meaning of
privately experienced representations of the world in a feedback loop, why shouldn’t we expect
(along with Greenberg) that one day taste might become objective? Arendt encapsulates this
suspicion:
This sensus communis is what judgment appeals to in everyone, and it is this possible
appeal that gives judgments their special validity. The it-pleases-or-displeases-me, which
as a feeling seems so utterly private and noncommunicative, is actually rooted in the
community sense and is therefore open to communication once it has been transformed
by reflection, which takes all others and their feelings into account.68
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One could hardly be blamed for hearing in this schema the future echoes of Rawls’s “veil of
ignorance,” Habermas’s “theory of communicative action,” or, more proximally, Hegel’s
“revelation of Absolute Spirit”—or any theoretical construct that posits an ideal, eventual
outcome as the result of an ongoing historical process. Kant, however, is more pragmatic than
this would allow—one can never take “all others and their feelings into account” even if one
consciously tried to, which is not how judgment works anyway.
As Arendt attests, “in Kant, progress [of the dialectic] is perpetual; there is never an end
to it.”69 Indeed, “Similarly, one can never compel anyone to agree with one’s judgments… [O]ne
can only ‘woo’ or ‘court’ the agreement of everyone else. And in this persuasive activity one
actually appeals to the ‘community sense.’ In other words, when one judges, one judges as a
member of a community.”70 We judge in terms of the social norms and practices that have
formed us. According to Arendt, “One is not overeager to express joy at the death of a father or
feelings of hatred and envy; one will, on the other hand, have no compunctions about
announcing that one enjoys doing scientific work.”71 But, then, are we right back where we
started, choosing between an idea of judgment that is private and one that is determined in
advance by social position?
Judging “as a member of a community” has another sense. Arendt writes, “By
communicating one’s feelings, one’s pleasures, and disinterested delights, one tells one’s choices
and one chooses one’s company.”72 In trying to think the political dimension of Kantian aesthetic
judgment here, Arendt fragments the universality of individual claims to validity, localizing
them. She transports the sensus communis from the realm of ideation into that of practically sited
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experience. For her, this delivers a method for understanding the relationship between subject
and structure in political debate. That is, we don’t simply mimic the ascendant mores of the day,
channeling “our” identity in some rote or predictable fashion—these (identities and values) are in
contest themselves. When we judge, we stake a position within the social field. True, the
positions we can recognize in the first place are determined by who and where we (in some sense
already) are, but the judgment uttered claims an association. The way we experience, interpret,
and communicate allows us to secure an identity, a mode of relating that signals our specificity
to others intelligibly, at least in relation to the question at hand. The social position that
determines our apparatus of perception is a component of this identity, and it is also all the ways
we overlap with others. And the judgment “chosen” is not so much the exercise of a free or
independent will as a gesture of association made within and through discrete boundaries. We
become significant—that is, socially recognizable—through our judgments by claiming a
particular set of values perceived to be at issue in an artwork as a representation of shared reality.
Further, seeing the public features and aims of private experience in this way, we can
begin to outline a new approach to the political character of our interactions with art. It gives us a
way to think the particularity of reception that minimalism insisted on, while also specifying that
particularity. Rather than being able to imagine art as an autonomous zone on which society acts
(or vice versa), we have to see it as a situated practice. Aesthetic judgment allows us to see how
the meaning of an artwork is larger than any one person (i.e., not ‘lodged in the subject’), but not
because it somehow strikes the viewer as revelation, transforming them and bringing them
outside or beyond themselves in a superabundant moment of grace. Neither is aesthetic judgment
simply social, a direct effect of a causal, pre-existent identity or an iteration of Roland Barthes’s
birth of the reader avant la lettre (i.e., not an effect of powerful discourses that determine
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subjects from without). These are flip sides of the same theoretical coin, and we could toss it
back and forth all day and never prove that either is more accurate. This flipping is precisely
what happens in the debate about minimalism (with Fried arguing that minimalism bolsters
subjective security and his detractors arguing that it is destabilizing). Kant shows us that
meaning happens in the space between these two. Subjects make meaning of objects motivated
by a personal reaction, but objects catalyze this process by somehow seeming significant already
(because other people think they are as well, and because they occupy the space of something we
call art). There is meaning in the work itself, and this is why we cannot agree on what it is.
Further, when we argue, we enact social scripts (the powerful discourses of which each of us is
an effect) and navigate amongst and between them.
While individual critics of Sierra’s works stake their own position, and therefore a
belonging to a community of thought, this quarrel belies an overarching conceptual similarity. In
both cases, Sierra’s interlocutors suspend the tension between the personal and the social in order
to posit a single inherent meaning in the work. As a larger community of aesthetic disagreement,
they recapitulate an intractable division between individual and collective, imagining the latter to
be the inert container for the former. The burden of changing the world falls to art and the extent
to which it can reveal to individuals a hidden truth. That is, in imagining that such a message
about individuals and collectives can reside in the work, these approaches obfuscate how art
allows the interaction between them to surface. To investigate the political value of Sierra’s
works, then, we must move beyond simply asking whether they involve the viewer. Rather, we
should ask how viewers become involved through the interpretive position they claim and how
that claim indexes the plural character of individual judgment in specific places.
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Spatial Relations
Even before Sierra turned to delegated performance, his works used (inert) objects to
examine relationships between people in particular places. Investigating the development of his
method will help to develop a sense of how his works seek to elicit the plural nature of
perception through experiments with space. Positioning Exercise of 4 Cubic Containers
(Hamburg, 1991) arranged human-sized blocks in four different ways, altering the layout of the
room and the ways it could be navigated. 4 Cubic Containers Measuring 250 x 250 x 250 cm
(1991) adopted the same strategy, but further specified the context of the experiment by
arranging the boxes inside St. Petri’s Church in Lübeck, Germany (figure 1.8). The first few
years of Sierra’s practice predominantly follow this mode of spatial exploration—placing a
container somewhere unusual, carving and rearranging an already ruined wall found near an
artists’ retreat (Cement Wall Measuring 300 x 300 cm and Facing Upward, Atelier del Sur,
Canary Islands, 1992), chiseling a rectangular border into the cement floor of an abandoned
warehouse (Madrid, Spain, 1993), and always photographing both the process of creation and
viewers’ physical navigation of the objects in black-and-white.
In works like these it is hard to miss the influence of Sierra’s sculpture professor, Franz
Erhard Walther. Sierra earned his bachelor’s degree in fine arts at the Universidad Complutense
in 1989; he went on to receive advanced training at the Hochschule für Bildende Künste in
Hamburg under Walther between 1989 and 1991. Walther’s own practice has been stylistically
minimal and conceptually-based; his works are designed to activate the body in manipulating or
creating an object, usually fashioned of cloth or paper, which both prescribes and proscribes
physical movement. This activity can be solo, as in work 68 (1962/63), which involves unstacking a group of prepared rectangular boards and arranging them into a five by five grid on
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the floor. Or, more characteristically, the work can involve some of kind of cooperation, as in
work 46 (1968), which involves two people, facing each other a few yards apart, their heads
tethered by a giant swath of black fabric that wraps around them from neck to crown and from
one to the other like a giant, soft rubber band. Walther and Sierra “demonstrated” this piece
together against the bucolic backdrop of the Rhön high plains in Germany in 2011 (figure 1.9).
All of Walther’s works are proposals for activities that (theoretically, although almost
never in museum practice) should be repeated; the object exists for its physical response. Hence
the need for demonstration and the documentation that accompanies the objects—deadpan,
black-and-white photographs that render actions, objects, and people schematic. More like a
home exercise manual or set of instructions for assemble-it-yourself furniture than the
Muybridge-like time-lapse grids that document works by Acconci or Abramovi&, Walther’s
photographs insist on repeatability—anyone can do what he does. Walther’s practice is
paradigmatic of the bare minimal/phenomenological approach to ‘including the viewer’—each
piece functioning as its own how-to guide in order that any viewer might have a heightened
experience of reality, a moment of being-with (oneself or someone else). Interacting with
Walther’s objects (in concert with other people) in the described fashion offers the opportunity to
step outside of ordinary context and ordinary time. He uses objects to produce new social
relations for participants, albeit social relations stripped of historicity and predicated on the
attempt to discover a truth in physicality.
Sierra’s style—relations between people ordered around objects and presented as blackand-white images—issues from Walther’s, but his works differ insofar as the images he produces
are not instructions for future participants. His images are more clearly contained records,
designed to witness rather than to coach. And already in the early works like Positioning
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Exercise, Sierra begins to point away from an emphasis on purely phenomenological
engagement to something more like sociological probing. The subtle shift from a solid or hollow
cube to a shipping container, an object of industrial use repurposed as an art object awaiting
activation by a viewer, clearly invokes spaces outside the gallery and a different sense of
duration—that of labor. Images of warehouses, men at work, and resultant roughly hewn cement
walls drive the point home. For 50kg of Plaster in the Street (1994) Sierra dumped the white,
powdery construction material at an intersection of busy roads in an industrial section of Madrid
so that cars passing through over the course of a day would create a spindly network of comings
and goings, shaping the spill into an indexical tracing of actions that would have occurred even
without its being there and which gestures toward a singular emblematic vision of disparate
workday commutes. Two photographs depict the work, one picturing a truck about to enter the
plaster zone and the second picturing just the dust on the street. And if the sequence weren’t
enough to let us know we should notice how the plaster records the day’s traffic, a street sign on
the left side of each image directs our attention to the plaster with a white arrow, tripling the
indexical action of each photograph by pointing to the way the photograph points at the dust that
points to the daily commute (figures 1.10, 1.11).
These not quite subtle, but fairly oblique references to labor, travel, and group behaviors
acquire more full-throated articulation beginning in 1996, the first year Sierra produces works in
Mexico. 15 Hexahedrons of 250 x 250 x 250cm (1996) is mostly the chronicle of Sierra’s
attempts to find a place to position fifteen stacked cubes on Mexico City’s bustling Calle Gante.
He contends with an organization of street vendors and other local authorities before being
allowed to set up his work; it stands for five days, functioning as shelter for people who would
otherwise sleep on the street and occasionally as a modicum of privacy for amorous couples on
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the move. It was eventually taken down when the weekend arrived and people needed the space
for parking. Reminiscent of Christo and Jeanne-Claude’s Running Fence (1972-1976, but
without the pastoral beauty or eventual sense of triumph) or Richard Serra’s Tilted Arc (1981,
but with a more self-conscious emphasis on process as opposed to product), 15 Hexahedrons
functioned as a node around which bureaucratic entanglements and arguments about land rights
and usage could collect, becoming part of the work. It held up a mirror to the neighborhood and
illustrated how it works on a day-to-day basis. Like many works that critique minimalism’s
narrow focus on ahistorical physicality, Sierra’s explore the ‘social dimension’ of art with
reference to what Foster called “discourses adjacent to the art world,” but, following the
discussion of Kant above, we should be sensitive also to the fact that the way Sierra does this
situates the art object as a node around which disagreements collect, or allows them to find
public expression. This kind of site specificity unsettles the repeatability of Walther’s
propositions, moving the authenticity of the art experience from revelation (an authentic moment
in time) to reproducibility (the condensed efflorescence of surrounding social reality). That is,
Sierra’s works put social relations on display.
In foregrounding the ability of an artwork to isolate and re-present social dynamics
through a minimal provocation, 15 Hexahedrons is a watershed in Sierra’s practice. It comes at
the end of a year of experimenting with similarly descriptive projects in Mexico: Collection of
Rotten Vegetables to be Suspended from the Entrance to the Subway (Mexico City, May) and
Polyurethane over Waste Vegetables for the Concentration of their Combustion Process, in Four
Containers (Jalisco, September) explore scavenger economies; Footbridge Obstructed with
Wrapping Tape (Mexico City, May) interferes in the physical traffic in and across the city; and
Floor Impregnated with 50kg of Asphalt (Mexico City, September)—for which Sierra offers a
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security guard a bribe to allow the artist to vandalize a country club with the sticky stuff—tests
the more personal aspects of income inequality in a sample size of one. The guard refuses the
bribe, but allows Sierra to dump the asphalt, stating that he is taking preemptive revenge for his
suspected impending dismissal.73 As the subject of Sierra’s works begin to cohere around lived,
personal experiences of circuits of value, waste, and exchange so too does a working method—
something we might characterize as a minimal gesture that amplifies an already extant social
condition, just nudging it into the space of art.
50kg of Plaster in the Street and 15 Hexahedrons of 250 x 250 x 250cm share this basic
procedure and describe the point of departure for what would become Sierra’s most infamous
works, his delegated performances. While Sierra had always employed fabricators of various
kinds to make his works, the payment involved in production emerges as the explicit theme for
the first time with Line of 30cm Tattooed on a Remunerated Person (1998), produced in Mexico
City. The description that accompanies photographs documenting the work’s creation runs as
follows: “I looked for a person who did not have any tattoos or intentions of having one, but due
to a need for money, would agree to have a mark on his skin for life. This person received $50
as payment.”74 Sierra garnered considerably more from the exchange, vaulting almost instantly
to the status of global artist. Over the next two years, he would add Havana, Paris, Los Angeles,
Pusan, Limerick, and San Juan de Puerto Rico to the list of cities where he had exhibited in
group shows and New York and Berlin to the list of cities that had hosted solo exhibitions.
What Sierra discovered in Mexico has to do with the plural character of reception and
how space appeals to it. According to him, “Mexico is a catalog of situations. It’s a miniature
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planet Earth. You can pass from Ethiopia to Switzerland in a second by taking the bus—that’s
what Mexico brings you. I don’t have to take long trips to see how everything functions.”75 For
him, “everything” is capital, economic relations of exploitation. And as Sierra puts it, “of course
extreme labor relations shed much more light on how the labor system actually works.”76 So
when we say that Sierra uses objects (including people) to describe social relations as they
already exist, this process demonstrates a basic Marxist analysis of value. The works he produces
foreground the extent to which surplus value, which accrues to Sierra in both status and financial
terms, derives from the direct expropriation of someone else’s labor power, which is
remunerated at a minimal rate. The lexical echo is no accident—Sierra insists that his works look
minimalist because “merchandise is cheaper and easier to transport when it’s cubic.”77 A work
like 586 Hours of Work (2004), a cement cube measuring 400 x 400 x 400cm, painted black, and
titled and physically labeled with the number of labor-hours required for its own production
corroborates this kind of by-the-numbers reading.
Whether or not we believe shipping costs prescribe the form of Sierra’s works,
transportation and networked movement are crucial themes not addressed by an accounting of
surplus value alone. Sierra’s art reproduces social reality, creating a “site-specific index,” but
these works travel, encountering new audiences in different contexts. Printed photographs are
flat, and the Internet, while not as dematerialized as we sometimes imagine, makes it possible for
images to move quickly and easily, regardless of Sierra’s insistence on cubic form. This
movement should change how we think about performance and exploitation in his works. The
variability of reception in different locations is paramount.
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Sierra himself traveled to Mexico to produce the key transitional works of 1996 just after
the nature of travel and labor in Europe changed dramatically. On March 27, 1995 seven of the
(then) fifteen European Union member states adopted the terms of the Schengen Agreement,
which dismantled their borders with one another. People could travel unrestricted between
Belgium, France, Germany, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain.78 Schengen was
a step on the path to a unified European administrative and market structure, to which most
member nations signed their assent in the Single European Act of 1987 and again in the
Maastricht Treaty of 1992, which stipulated criteria for the future adoption of the euro.79 Seen by
some as the beginning of what was to be a new, best possible world of economic efficiency,
world citizenship, and rational choice—further evidence of the end of history declared by Francis
Fukuyama and other acolytes of neoliberalism after the collapse of the Soviet Union—the
deregulation was, for others within the Schengen zone, impetus to increased anxiety,
xenophobia, and/or outright racism about foreign workers coming to steal jobs.80 And for still
others outside the free travel zone, Schengen was a reminder of how little had in fact changed in
European political economy—external borders around the zone tightened, reasserting supposedly
vanished differences between East and West Europe, for example. A headline from London’s
The Independent two days after the policy went into effect read, “Schengen Curtain angers
‘second class’ east Europe.”81 Unrestricted travel meant different things depending where you
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started—it could be either the end of history or just one more disaster destined for the inexorably
mounting heap.
In 1996, Sierra’s chosen terrain was no stranger to deregulation, and the same relation
between proclaimed fluidity and practical, intransigent difference obtained in the Americas as
well. The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) went into effect on January 1, 1994,
promising to liberate trade relations between Mexico, the United States, and Canada. While that
year saw $20 billion in new trade between the U.S. and Mexico, the peso suffered a 53%
devaluation, inflation leapt from a 10% annual rate to 50%, and the overall Mexican economy
contracted at an annual rate of between 6% and 7% rather than expanding the predicted 3%.82
The picture in the U.S. was comparatively better, but even so, what had been a trade surplus with
Mexico of $1.5 billion in the first months of 1994 plummeted below the red line, sinking to a $10
billion deficit by the end of 1995. And AFL-CIO estimates put American job losses for
NAFTA’s first two years at around 176,000—hardly enough to generate the “giant sucking
sound” of southward flight predicted by Ross Perot, but enough of a rustling to raise isolationist
hackles.83 Representatives of the multi-national conglomerates concerned, however, demurred:
“Yes, the U.S. is probably losing some jobs to Mexico in some sectors,” says Mexico
City-based George Clothier, senior manager at Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu
International/Mexico. But Clothier attributes the situation not so much to NAFTA as to
higher U.S. labor costs and some other structural differences between the U.S. and
Mexican economies.84
When Sierra arrived in Mexico, it was clear that NAFTA’s effects could in no way be separated
from these “structural differences.” Mexicans were working more, but had less buying power
and suffered decreased availability of staple commodities (like corn) than before NAFTA, and
the neighbor to the north was exporting some relatively low-skilled jobs south to increase the
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corporate profits of a few, decreasing the quality of life for many and, consequently, fomenting
anger toward a perceived foreign threat. Again, depending on where you were, deregulated
globalization could look like a rationally expanded marketplace, an external threat to a “native”
status quo, or an affirmation and extended exploitation of the same inequalities that antedated the
“new” world order.
Sierra’s works address this perspectival variability, offering a way to visualize and
comprehend globalization that can cut through what Pamela Lee refers to as “a certain fuzziness”
in “the art world’s account of the term.”85 Citing a 1990s trend of photographs depicting
freighters at sea (Allan Sekula), containers stacked on docks (Francesco Jodice/Multiplicity),
airport terminals (Andreas Gursky, Martha Rosler), and other spaces of transit, Lee describes a
tendency to seek the iconic generality of the issue, voiding potential insight by leveling all voices
in an ironic re-instantiation of globalization’s worst elements—a kind of non-discourse about
anonymous non-places. But if there’s a fuzziness to globalization that comes through these
images, it’s not because of the images themselves. One could imagine analyses of one of
Sekula’s freighter pictures that would elucidate the boat’s specific contribution to global
commerce as a participant in complex networks (and the techniques of imaging its global
position, along with what it means for art audiences to encounter such an image) just as easily as
one could call to mind less insightful, more generalizing commentary. The point is that
approaches to representations of the global vary in acuity according to how dynamically they
sustain its tension with the myriad ways the global can be understood depending on location.
Sierra’s performance works localize the global by foregrounding the way in which
exploitation can be seen and hence understood, ignored, accepted, rejected, or otherwise judged
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by people in different places. His works retread the ground of minimalism, hyperbolizing it with
self-performing and “indexically authentic” bodies, in order to foreground not only the politicaleconomic conditions to which they refer, but the variability of reception that it was minimalism’s
innovation to address. If Mexico is a catalog of situations, ranging across its different sectors
makes available a number of vantages onto the flow of capital that can describe the variety of
personal experiences of deregulation as it expanded across Europe and North America in the
mid-1990s. On one level Sierra’s works demonstrate the logic of exploitation, reproducing it so
as to thematize it and attest to its existence; on another level they perform a different kind of
class analysis—they elicit how people in different places see and understand it. Sierra’s
performance works attempt to do on an international scale what 15 Hexahedrons did for one
neighborhood, to describe all the different ways concerned parties can understand the ”same”
thing. The physically indexical records of his sociologically indexical experiments put groups of
people in different places into relation. The interpretive apparatus at one’s disposal derives from
a spatial relation.
In the end, then, Sierra’s works do share with minimalism an interest in reflexive
perception. But rather than this disclosing or revealing the universal fact that each of us is
involved in processes of exploitation, which amounts to a non-discursive generality that insists
every one of us has the same experience of an artwork because we are personally engaged by it,
Sierra’s works foreground how groups of people in different places see differently. The works
paint a political portrait of an entire network by eliciting the various positions to which people
can subscribe. Some of us may feel implicated by Sierra’s works; others might feel consoled or
vindicated by it to the extent that it reaffirms their own critical awareness of the issues at hand.
And the subjects of his works think their own participation is worth his money regardless of how
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we feel about it. In any case, the work describes the viewer and how each of us imagines our
relation to collective conditions. The variability of reception indexed by Sierra’s works, then, is
far more threatening to our ideas about art than anything over which Greenberg fretted. If
proponents of historical minimalism celebrated the de-centering effects of abstracted physical
difference and apologists of “Political Minimalism” welcome the opportunity to see how the
other half (or other 99%) lives, both of these still contend that art has the power to redeem our
particularity—that seeing ourselves seeing can make us better people because the momentary
experience of parallax can be somehow integrated into our perceiving “I” like a prosthetic
augmentation. Sierra’s post-minimalist use of people as things, however, demonstrates the
irreconcilability of the disparate visions it produces.
Because Sierra’s artworks travel globally like and as commodities, they compound the
commodity fetishism whereby, according to Karl Marx, a social relation between people
“assumes, in their eyes, the fantastic form of a relation between things” with the action of
aesthetic judgment that moves us to mistake our judgments about things for qualities of the
things themselves.86 The result knots together two types of projective definition; each one in its
own way conspiring to cloak the work’s heteronomy with the sheen of autonomy. This balled up
mass of congealed labor/aesthetic value underwrites both the reality effect of Sierra’s works and
a critique of the idea that art can forcibly transform individuals’ sense of reality. The commodity
fetish would hide the social relations of labor that produce the work; aesthetic judgment obscures
the situated nature of interpretation, making this complex and variable process appear as the
immediate, transparent apprehension of objective traits belonging to the work itself. With
Sierra’s performance works, however, it is impossible to ignore art objects’ exploitative
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character—the relationship between opportunistic interpersonal abuse and artistic/exchange
value figures front and center. They beg to have the slightest hint of fetishism attending their
commodity status unmasked as the result of those relations between people that usually remain
mystified by the workings of capital. And we are all only too happy to ventriloquize this implicit
auto-critique, whether we applaud Sierra for giving us the chance to unfurl its terms or hate him
for it.
In performing this first revelation, however, it becomes easy to think that the work of
interpretation is done. Yet there remains a second mystification specific to art, a second social
relation to be detailed that risks going unrecognized. No matter how cogently or convincingly
one can detail how a work of Sierra’s is about relations between groups (i.e., antagonistic
classes), such textual exegesis does not yet begin to account for its own mode of representing
these relations. That activity of perception is subject to another kind of negotiation between
public and private altogether, one that is itself situated in communities. The disagreement
amongst Sierra’s critics is proof of this if nothing else. Neither account of the work is wrong per
se, but each falls prey to mystification in universalizing an individual response to that perceived
content. These critics end up supplanting their own vision for any and every other, taking up
permanent residence in the ahistorical land of “I perceive.” In this place, they confuse the
political content of works for the social aspect of aesthetic perception, the irreconcilable
difference that obtains between different vantages onto reality. They unwittingly abstract the
very thing that art can concretize: how the social world has shaped us and the ways we see.
Polyurethane Sprayed on the Backs of 10 Workers renders this shaping process in plastic,
if not concrete (figure 1.12). The hardened polyurethane molds derive their form from the
workers who literally support their production. That these particular people, as a class, are
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willing to offer this kind of work indexes a site-specific political and economic climate. The
commodity is thus revealed as relations between people. But after the Iraqi workers have
departed, the casts remain (as do the photographs and the video); to think that the full function of
art consists only in recalling the local social condition that produced the objects is to confuse two
distinct modes of analysis. What each of us does with these traces, even if we can all agree on
their genesis, reflects our own position within this global field of interpersonal relations. Not
only can viewers mark their own distance and difference from the subjects depicted, recognizing
that they would never occupy such a position, but the arguments we make further index how it is
we are primed to perceive that presumed fact. The debates around Sierra’s works take for granted
that apprehending the political import of a work constitutes a transparent political activity in its
own right. This belies an approach to the global that imagines it to be a smooth, homogeneous
surface, capable of being apprehending entirely as an object of knowledge from a single still
point—that if one person in one place can understand the nature of labor or a work of art in a
given way, then everyone else should be able to see it in the same way. Our own critical
verbiage, however, is more like Sierra’s foam—it might take the shape of its target, but the
incidental crenellations and inconsistencies have to do with the angle of approach.
When we forget that our own judgments are contextual and contingent, we end up
ignoring the plural character of our own perception—that we speak as a product of a community
to that community—confusing an argument we make about the world with the objective
character of the world itself. This confusion, when disavowed, ignores the artwork’s ability to
index social reality (through our reactions to its representations). Sierra’s works, then, stage the
problem of revelation itself. Reflecting on how our judgments evince engagements with specific
communities of aesthetic disagreement, his works compound commodity fetishism with an
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aesthetic fetishism. The unmasking of the former is only trivialized by our failing even to notice
the latter (especially because Sierra’s works seem to contain their own critique to begin with).
The result is a withering riposte to art’s transformative pretensions. Even if one embarked on the
second explication, the one that would map and analyze the situated variations of what people
see when they see in relative spatial terms, it could not constitute revelation—only description.
Sierra closes the door on art’s capacity to reconfigure reality, but his insistence on indexicality
points the way to a different power. If we foreground the social, contextual nature of
interpretation (rather than its remaining a foil to best laid plans), how our processes of
understanding and interacting with art elicit the collective aspect of individual reception, how
might this descriptive capability reinvigorate art’s reflexivity with a political thrust? The next
chapter considers the works of German artist Christoph Schlingensief in asking after the political
prowess of art’s perceptual immanence.
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Chapter Two
Gesamtkunstwurst:
Christoph Schlingensief’s Multimedia Exorcisms

Our great redeemer and well-doer, Necessity’s vicegerent in the flesh—the Folk,
will no longer be a severed and peculiar class; for in this Art-work we shall all be
one.
--Richard Wagner, The Art-Work of the Future1

Everything comes to an end. Only sausages have two.
--German proverb (and leitmotif of Christoph Schlingensief’s film, The
German Chainsaw Massacre, 1990)

Inclusion and Extrusion
For Christoph Schlingensief (1960-2010, Oberhausen, Germany), art’s value lies in its
immanence—it’s more like a bratwurst than a Valkyrie. Rather than a rapturous thunderbolt
swooping down from ontological outer space to reorder the world with the force of revelation,
the work of art is a densely packed assemblage of familiar (often repudiated, disavowed, or
simply overlooked) elements—a bundle of would-be refuse trussed up as a unified totality. And
this seeming totality is designed to be dis-integrated in the process of its own consumption. Our
encounter with Schlingenief’s works is a process of ingestion (and elimination). Sometimes
appearing as elements of an ordinary media diet (a film, a play, or a television show) and at
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others as hors d’oeuvres that inflect those main dishes (as is the case with his controversial live
events that insinuate themselves into print, TV, and Internet journalism), Schlingensief’s works
trade in the boundary confusion between public and private, eschewing any rigorous separation
of media formats or intended audiences. Once inside us, they unfold—individuals bring to bear
socially conditioned judgments of taste, effectively detailing how this latest meal squares with
customary ones. Love it? Hate it? Heartburn? Strange dreams?
The multitude of reactions to a given work describes its inherent multiplicity. In this way,
this chapter begins where the previous one left off. The investigation into Sierra’s works—and
their refusal of art’s transformative capacities—left us wondering how we might further analyze
and account for the way our judgments about works of art describe our being situated in specific
communities, how the indexical function of art that points back at us and our perceptual
apparatus might afford some different type of political insight. Schlingensief’s works function to
make publicly visible these seemingly private experiences expressly in order to describe
communities of disagreement in terms of the political and historical baggage shared by each
member. Indeed, in different ways, Schlingensief’s works take their forms from this process of
collective divulgence. For example, Bitte Liebt Österreich (2000) typifies Schlingensief’s
amalgamating method: (1) Accept an invitation to make a piece for the international arts festival,
Wiener Festwochen; (2) select a central location in Vienna in which to design and stage a realtime participatory artwork on the model of the popular television game show, Big Brother
(replete with Web 2.0 technologies so that the audience can play along), and (3) add (in place of
the more typical reality show contestants with big personalities and exhibitionist tendencies) a
group of immigrant asylum seekers competing to “win” citizenship. The work initiated a
firestorm of public debate and, most saliently, became a rallying point for both anti-immigrant
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and pro-immigration activists, making any simple summary of the work’s political content
impossible and, I will argue, beside the point. After all, who could know which part of the
sausage upset one’s stomach? All perspectives and all people, it seems, are somehow included in
the work’s constitution. Ranging from Schlingensief’s feature films of the late 1980s and early
1990s to some of his later plays, TV shows, and live art actions, this chapter will explore how
selected works create perceived cultural microcosms in order that all viewers can feel themselves
somehow included or addressed.
The drive to artistic inclusion, then, results in a second sausage logic—the wurst’s other
end points at us. Instead of Gesamtkunstwerke, total(izing) works of art capable of uplifting and
unifying all who experience them, Schlingensief makes what I’ll call Gesamtkunstwürste—
interpretive gauntlets that function dialectically to wedge and split audience members one from
another by virtue of seeming whole and entire as representations of the social world.2 Seeing the
same thing, different people draw varied, even antithetical conclusions. That is, the seeming
smoothly ground consistency of disparate elements that go into Schlingensief’s works gets
undone, disaggregated, as viewers interact with them, identifying what they see before them.
While the contingency of interpretation is a mainstay of contemporary artistic production and
criticism, the difference with Schlingensief’s works is that this diversity is not only constitutive,
but somehow predictable and, therefore, a phenomenon worthy of scholarly attention and
interpretation unto itself. That is, the overstuffed microcosmos of a Schlingensief production
exists to make viewers identify its distinct ingredients. In turn, the selections people make reflect
what it is they are accustomed to or capable of recognizing—i.e., their own habits and limits of
vision as members of a cultural community.
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In the end, it is not the artwork that reflects or encapsulates reality, but reactions to it. The
reflected version of oneself that becomes visible is not a crystalline, seamless self, but an
amalgamated collection of influences and habits that only appears autochthonous. The subject,
too, is a sausage, and only when the artwork forces us to divulge the interpretive framework that
comprises our consciousness—to display our own insides on the outside—can we begin the work
of historical auto-dissection, to see how everything that makes us who we are comes from
somewhere else. By featuring denizens of society’s margins as performers (non-artist
participants who are immigrants, or developmentally disabled, or unemployed, or homeless, or
junkies, or ex-neo-Nazis), Schlingensief’s works aim to confront viewers with their own
prejudices and myopias—all the reflexive, basic means by which we separate self from other.
This reflection of the audience through the work becomes part of the artwork’s total
composition, which—along with Schlingensief’s use of non-artist participants in mounting his
performance-based events—signals a point of connection between his working method and those
of the other artists discussed in this dissertation. The previous chapter detailed how Sierra’s
living-sculptural installations develop the logic of minimalism, shrinking global forces to human
scale and allowing (or at least prompting) viewers to place themselves within transnational
economic networks, but could only gesture toward how aesthetic judgment further specifies the
social aspect of individual perception. This chapter will pursue how Schlingensief animates
anxieties about German national identity to demonstrate the extent to which it functions as a
nefarious, regulating fantasy in contemporary political debate—like a recipe that grinds
difference into identity, a spirit that animates corporate flesh. Gesamtkunstwürste prompt and
reflect the fragmentation of the public sphere; by working to detail this fracturing,
Schlingensief’s incursions into the expanded interpretive field allow us to discern patterns of
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judgment and how these might correspond to the contextual specificities of given social strata.
Say, how people from the Former East of Germany might differently understand an artwork
relative to those from the Former West. The consequences of history’s accidents manifest in
physical space, and in daily life.
For Schlingensief, this continuous process of splitting—first, a public sphere into
innumerable fragments; second, individual viewers from themselves—constitutes an
investigation into the unexamined persistence of the past in the present. A performance that
stages immigrants seeking asylum probes the modern face of Austrian xenophobia; a televised
talent show starring the developmentally disabled (Freakstars 3000, 2002) tests how far German
culture has progressed since the Holocaust in expanding its notions of personhood. Principally at
stake is the extent to which our everyday assumptions about what separates us from others stem
from a cultural inheritance that precedes us, makes us who we are, and which continues to
produce the social world. For Schlingensief, the most banal and instantaneous judgments we
make about who and what is normal—who is at society’s center and who its periphery—
demonstrate how individual consciousness is manufactured by historical context. Conceiving
each of Schlingensief’s performance works as a catalyst that elicits these judgments and,
therefore, as an efflorescence of cultural inheritance, I will draw on Jacques Derrida’s concept of
“hauntology” in considering German national identity (in its most terrifying blood and soil Volkish dimensions) to be a specter that haunts contemporary Europe.3 This hauntological approach
will help to describe how Schlingensief works undo the sausage of German identity, or at least
try to confront the way it renders distinctions.
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To this end, this chapter will investigate Schlingensief’s practical dispersal through
various forms of mass media—film, television, print, Internet—in analyzing how his works
conceive the relationship between media, history, and the social aspect of individual perception.
We will take as our point of departure Schlingensief’s films about German cultural memory of
the Third Reich and the developing experience of re-unification, discussing the films themselves
as well as the history of German broadcasting policy since the end of the Second World War.
Schlingensief’s notorious Germany Trilogy (1989-1994) joins a long line of German films that
treat the subject of German-ness, but our discussion will bring to bear the relationship between
Germany as a unified nation and the history of German broadcasting, which was chopped up by
the Allies (as part of or partner to disarmament) for fear of a too-powerful central media
authority. Pairing these two parallel lives of German (dis)unity will begin to illustrate how
closely tied are the relations between broadcast media, cultural notions of identity, and the local,
personal experience of geopolitics.
This examination will lead us to a second question: Why does Schlingensief expand from
film to begin making performance-based artworks that use people as a medium? Ultimately, we
will see that Schlingensief’s works posit viewers as coextensive with what we usually conceive
as the media that distribute content. I will argue that cultural inheritance is the inseparability of
content from form, of message from medium. In Schlingensief’s works people become a
medium like any other because it is impossible to separate a person from his or her media
environment. We contain history and the media through which it travels; these also contain us.
That his works so often focus on the expulsion of the inside onto the outside is, on the one hand,
an accurate representation of how interpretation works—what we see shows us (and anyone who
is watching) who we are. This expulsive maneuver, on the other hand, is also an attempt to live
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out a fantasy of getting outside of ourselves in order to attain some kind of clarity, to sever and
flatten this Möbius strip of mediated becoming. If Schlingensief’s works show us that the subject
is a sausage, a bundled collection of ground and bound elements, it is because, as Marshall
McLuhan has written, media are extensions of ourselves and each new medium acts as a
container for its predecessor.4 An artwork premised on the recognition of another person is an
opportunity to see ourselves, how history produces us with a quasi-industrial regularity, and the
ways our shared history persists in the individual judgments and decisions each of us make every
day.
Schlingensief’s works, however, confound art’s ability to represent social reality and its
potential to transform it. His performance-based events stage roiling social issues (Germany’s
reunification, unemployment, immigration, racism), but, unlike most art described as “political,”
advance no specific critical agenda. Hyperbolic, sometimes grotesque, and always offensive—to
different people in different ways—these artworks become multimedia spectacles as controversy
surrounds and suffuses them, quickening their dissemination through photography, video, print,
and the Internet. I argue that controversy is his method and, as such, both the mode of
representing social reality and the site of its potential transformation. The Gesamtkunstwurst
prompts and reflects the fragmentation of the public sphere; but, crucially, creates a new one—a
tiny, temporary one—composed of the collected historical material expelled by all viewers. The
artwork becomes the site for a séance; each of us is a medium, channeling and talking to the
ghosts we contain. Functioning as a collecting point for these spirits, the work exposes this
cultural inheritance to vision, but, more to the point, allows everyone to see each other doing that
same thing. The pain of our immanence made public offers an occasion for a special kind of
4
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transcendence. Casting collective demons out into the open, we gain an opportunity to overcome
and exceed what the world has made us by revealing our own interiors to public view and critical
evaluation. Working through Schlingensief’s multimedia spectacles gives us new purchase on an
old dilemma: How can we acknowledge that history has made us who we are—shaped us and
our present—but still imagine that things can change, that there might be a new and better
future?

The Reunification Follies, or Broadcasting 1989
Doubts as to whether the future can be different from the past find histrionic expression
in Schlingensief’s B-grade horror flick about German reunification, The German Chainsaw
Massacre: The First Hour of Reunification (1990). What lends the film an unexpected gravitas,
however, is its blending of ham-fisted allegory with incisive analysis. For all its seemingly
pedestrian irreverence, it treats political life’s symbolic dimensions with a rare sophistication.
Purporting to represent the emergence of a new society, the film unfurls a cultural logic
predicated on the symbolic economy of German nationhood as it was developed and promoted
through the political discourse and events of 1989 and 1990. In fact, Massacre begins with
archival footage of President Richard Weizsäcker’s speech delivered on October 3rd, 1990, The
Day of German Unity, in front of the Reichstag. So while one could never mistake the onscreen
carnage that follows that détourned television broadcast for anything but cinematic artifice, the
film insists on the permeability of the border between lived experience and its representations—
showing us what we know happened and then showing us what we should understand it to mean.
This insistence motivated the film’s sponsors to disavow it (they refused to distribute the film),
and earned it an official ban. (More on this controversy follows below under the next heading.)
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Further, this blending of historical fact and fiction not only prefigured Schlingensief’s approach
to performance, but tapped into an awareness of the connection between mediation and social
reality shared by East and West Germans—an awareness that had recently changed the course of
history.
Less than a year earlier, on the night of November 9th, 1989, the Berlin Wall came down.
Or, to be more precise, a garbled statement regarding new travel regulations for citizens of the
German Democratic Republic (GDR) delivered by spokesperson Günter Schabowski in the fiftyfifth minute of a one hour press conference led to the Bornholmer Street border crossing being
overrun by upwards of 20,000 East Germans seizing a perceived right to travel to the West
without a visa.5 Similar eruptions took place all over the city; Berliners of the former East and
former West embraced and drank champagne in the newly comingled streets. Historian Mary
Sarotte reports that in just the next three days as many as three million GDR citizens traveled to
West Berlin and greater West Germany.6 With the benefit of hindsight, we know that this was
the beginning of what would become Germany’s reunification, officially celebrated that next
October in front of the Reichstag. At the time, however, it was anything but clear that these eased
travel restrictions would lead to the restoration of a single, sovereign German nation. The Allies
who had carved the country as part of the peace of 1945 were of at least two minds on the
subject; East German citizens themselves held a range of ideas about what should become of the
GDR. Indeed, it was not even clear that the border opening had been intentional on the part of
the GDR Politburo and their counterparts in the USSR in the first place.
Moscow had not been consulted beforehand, and the East German administration had
made no overtures to Western powers to secure benefits in exchange for opening borders—as,
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for example, Hungary had done in securing credit from the Deutsche and Dresdner banks in
return for allowing East Germans free passage through its borders to Austria a few months
earlier in August.7 There were no East German officials poised for photo opportunities at the
borders. Instead, they were in their own meetings, removed from the Schabowski press
conference and completely unaware of what was unfolding on the streets until it was too late.8
There were only Schabowski, his gnarled stutter of an announcement, the international press
corps, and their communications networks.
Aside from the declaration that his comments would outline a “new” policy, the text of
the statement was unclear, to say the least, and included convoluted utterances like “Anyway,
today, as far as I know, a decision has been made, it is a recommendation of the Politburo that
has been taken up, that one should from the draft of a travel law, take out a passage.”9 But
reporters seized, as if by sheer will, on phrases like “leaving the GDR” and “possible for every
citizen.” American newscaster Tom Brokaw recalls the event as though “a signal had come from
outer space and electrified the room.”10 Others in the room pressed Schabowski to clarify—was
this new policy to go into effect immediately? Flummoxed by the sudden surge of questions,
Schabowski tried to walk back what everyone seemed to think he had said, adding: “The
question of travel, of the permeability therefore of the wall from our side, does not yet answer,
exclusively, the question of the meaning, of this, let me say it this way, fortified border of the
GDR.”11 He stopped short, however, of saying outright that the assembled journalists had
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misunderstood him or were trying to put words in his mouth, preferring instead (out of confusion
or exhaustion or maybe even hubris) to end the press conference abruptly at fifty-four seconds
past seven o’clock. It was only slowly, over the following hours and days, that Schabowski
would realize that he had “single-handedly” declared the border open.12
Without an explicit contradiction, the reporters heard what they wanted: The border was
open. Reuters carried the story first at 7:03pm; the Deutsche Agentur Presse at 7:04. Brokaw, by
far the most circumspect reporter on the scene, followed up with Schabowski in a one-on-one
interview after the press conference. Still, he couldn’t get Schabowski to confirm or deny that the
border was unconditionally open. For Brokaw and his team this prevarication served as
confirmation enough, and they beamed a live bulletin back to the United States. Local news
crews broadcast it as well, which meant Brokaw’s bulletin could be seen by people in both West
and East Berlin. And while Brokaw had gone whole hog, declaring that Germans “could” now
cross the wall, the 8:00pm (Berlin time) local news program—still mulling over the wire reports
that had come in under an hour beforehand—hedged its bets, asserting that Germans “should” be
able to cross the border.13 But by the 10:30pm broadcast, the team at ARD (Germany’s national
television network) had decided to double down; respected anchorman Hanns Friedrichs intoned,
“This ninth of November is a historic day. The GDR has announced that, starting immediately,
its borders are open to everyone.”14 Sarotte points out, however, that all these broadcasts “had
gotten out ahead of reality.”15 Cutting to field reporter Robin Lautenbach in front of the
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Brandenburg Gate, the ARD program didn’t depict “crossers or celebrants”—just Lautenbach,
alone, looking for some.16
Even so, people at home watching the anti-climactic footage of declared world-historical
events saw what they wanted, just as the reporters at the Schabowski press conference had heard
what they wanted. While the production of broadcast content was strictly controlled in the GDR,
reception was wide open. Much of what people watched came from the Federal Republic of
Germany (FRG) next door—Western movies, TV shows, news, and so on.17 Sarotte contends
that this illicit consumption of television programming explains why there was nothing to be
filmed as of 10:30pm on the Western side of the Brandenburg gate (which, it should be noted,
was not a border crossing), but a near-riot growing on the Eastern side of the border gate at
Bornholmer Street, just to the north.
This crossing became the first testing ground of East Germans’ new travel rights because
it was in the middle of a neighborhood already marked by dissent. The neighborhood around
Bornholmer Street garnered the highest non-participation rate in GDR elections (nonparticipation amounting to a protest vote). It was these East Germans who took to the streets and,
by their sheer mass, overran the checkpoint and its guards (who had been assured by orders
relayed via telephone that travel was, indeed, prohibited as always).18 These guards eventually
decided to let just a few of the assembled through to ease the pressure; when they did, the dam
burst. Georg Mascolo and Rainer März of Spiegel-TV were on the scene to record the tidal
transgression, and, as Sarotte puts it, “every opening meant more people flooding into the West
in front of cameras, which meant more images beamed back to the East, which in turn sent more
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people out on to the streets to see for themselves; it became a self-reinforcing feedback loop.”
“Television,” she writes, “transform[ed] reality.”20
But why hadn’t the guards violently repressed the masses at Bornholmer? Another

episode from then-recent television history holds the answer. Images from a protest in Leipzig
one month earlier, which were smuggled from the East back to the West—where they could then
be broadcast to both audiences—played a crucial role in creating the conditions of reception that
got those first 20,000 Germans to the wall at Bornholmer Street. Protests in Leipzig had become
a weekly fixture over the course of the summer and fall that year. Dissidents and would-be
reformers made use of a loophole in rules about the right to assemble by gathering in churches,
which guaranteed space and time, if not privacy (plain-clothed officers of the Ministerium für
Staatssicherheit (the Stasi), the East German secret police, brought their own furtive video
equipment to record goings on). As meetings grew larger over time they started to include
marches, which incrementally tested the limits of dissenting speech. Civil unrest mounting, GDR
higher-ups had a decision to make: Should protests be treated on the model of Tiananmen or
Warsaw? In Poland, free elections brought Solidarity into power and into cooperation with
central Soviet authorities. In China, dissent met brutal repression. East German leader Erich
Honecker made ready for a “German Tiananmen” the night of Monday, October 9.21 The Stasi
mustered a force of 8,000 to be on duty that Monday; Honecker sent out orders that every agent
should be armed and that hospitals should be fully staffed with gunshot specialists and have their
blood supplies at the ready; foreign journalists were expelled.22 But the massacre never
materialized. Instead, an estimated 70,000 demonstrators (around 14% of Leipzig’s entire
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population) protested the regime, chanting “Wir sind Das Volk [We are the People]!” Sarotte
lays much of the credit for the night’s peaceful outcome with the careerism of Egon Krenz,
Honecker’s second in command. According to her, Krenz’s keen sense of which way the wind
blew in Moscow stymied the night’s potential calamities and assured his own temporary
advancement as Honecker’s replacement—Gorbachev did, after all, support non-violent reform.
Krenz also unwittingly authored his own ultimate obsolescence. A video camera in the
hands of East German resistance “stealth photography team” Aram Radomski and Siegbert
Schefke, who filmed the tremendous crowds and the lack of police response, registered a
shocking reality. By the next day, the tape had made it back to the West, and this “first
uncensored film of Leipzig protests” hit the airwaves.23 There would be no German Tiananmen,
and now everybody knew it. The video’s broadcast was a major victory for reformers and a
contributing factor beyond measure to the next month’s events in Berlin.
The broadcasting arc that began in Leipzig on October 9th and climbed the Berlin Wall on
November 9th landed on the steps of the Reichstag on October 3rd, 1990, the Day of German
Unity. The cameras were there to witness re-unified Germany’s smiling rebirth. Chancellor
Helmut Kohl presided over an evening of speeches, proclamations, and fireworks (figure 2.1).
To see the waving black, red, and gold German flags, the cheering crowds, and the satisfied
leadership on the dais, one would never know that the notion of German unity had only a few
decades before become something more fearsome and shameful than worthy of celebration. And
neither would one have known that even over the course of the previous year unity had been
vehemently opposed by parties foreign and domestic. A patriotic speech delivered by President
Weiszäcker braided national pride expertly with Cold War gamesmanship, proclaiming the role
of a unified Europe in the promotion of global peace. Homily concluded, he whispered to Kohl,
23
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microphone mistakenly still on, “Now the national anthem should start.” This broadcast bit of
24

something we should not have heard appears as the first shot of Schlingensief’s filmic meditation
on reunification and all the parts of it we were not supposed to see.

Obscene Onscreen
It took Schlingensief just twenty-four days to pen, produce, and premiere The German
Chainsaw Massacre; it opened in the town of Hof on October 27, 1990. A mixture of gross-out
horror and high-concept camp, the film finds it stylistic home somewhere between its namesake
(Tobe Hooper’s 1974 cult classic The Texas Chain Saw Massacre) and Paul McCarthy—it’s
grainy grindhouse meets self-ironizing oral stage Actionism. The story is equally gruesome and
silly: On making it to West Germany after decades of disenfranchisement and quasi-captivity,
East Germans are murdered by the locals and turned into sausage. As the film’s commercial tagline would have it, “Sie kamen als Freunde und würden zu Wurst [They came as friends and
ended up frankfurters].” The cartoonish slasher style of the film led to charges of “the
glorification of violence,” an offense that meets with censorship in Germany; Schlingensief’s
film was banned. Though it was produced in collaboration with the television studios NDR
(North German Broadcasting) and WDR (West German Broadcasting)—each of which is a local
branch of the national television network ARD—both studios disowned the film, vowing never
to air it.25 (This close connection between television broadcasting and experimental film receives
more attention below.)
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The apparent disjunction between the film’s buffoonery and its official censure has made
it the object of some scholarly attention already. German Studies scholar Kristin Vander Lugt
argues that the film “is an act of visualization, a mapping-onto-the-body, of a history that has not
yet been made visible, of the hidden negotiations and behind-door bargains that took place
between the fall of the Wall… and the official reunification.”26 Looking past the obvious offense
of the film’s ketchup-and-oatmeal artifice and connecting the stern popular reception to
Massacre’s political analysis, she argues that the film’s “obscenity” derives from its showing us
all that has taken place offstage. That is, the film is disagreeable not because it’s gross and
violent, but because these are means used to demonstrate the cruelty of contemporary politicaleconomic reality, thus exposing to vision hidden activities.
And this argument is not without merit. Schlingensief seizes the cannibalistic impetus
from the original Chainsaw Massacre, replacing the Texan farmers of the 1974 version with
West Germans, or Wessis. The transposition makes for prescient critique. As Vander Lugt puts
it, “The family, having come on hard economic times (occasioned by new machinery in Texas /
new cheap labour in West Germany) will have turned to human butchery and cannibalism as a
way of life (chili for the original Sawyer family / sausages for the Germans).”27 At the most
obvious level of interpretation, then, Schlingensief opposes the widely circulated images of
German unity (flags on high, the Reichstag wrapped in cheering crowds and the national anthem)
with a tooth-and-nail fight for survival rigged in favor of the West.
The plucky blonde heroine of the film, Clara (Karina Fallenstein), travels to the West
(from Leipzig, no less); the establishing shot of her East German apartment fixes on a television
airing footage of teeming masses, potentially reunification parades, but placing Clara and her
26
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television in Leipzig also conjures the protest movement that took root in that city. She’s
watching these images when her husband (played by Susanne Bredehöfft in East German blue
collar drag, complete with smeared-on five o’clock shadow) comes home, declares he’s found a
job in the West so they’ll be moving there together. He, like so much else in the film, is gross—a
lumbering mass of uncouth emissions and sexual come-ons—and we get the sense that Clara’s
attachment to him is based on convenience or habit. Newly freed to be German and not just East
German, Clara dispatches him in a Psycho-like blur of butcher’s knife and screaming faces.
Despite the nod to Hitchcock, there’s no mystery here. Clara did it; free of all East German
trappings, she goes west to claim her destiny.
She strikes out on her own in a beat-up blue Trabant and reaches a border gate
(superfluously) staffed by long-lost lovechildren of Fellini and Kafka, a bedraggled crew
suffering from a kind of East/West split personality disorder that leaves them screaming
contradictory demands: “Travel papers!?” one minute; “We are the people!” the next. Our
heroine snarls that they should listen to the radio or watch TV once in a while and speeds
through. She drives on to a clearing where she meets her Wessi lover, Artur. She’s made the
journey to be with him, but her joy at their meeting soon sours. Overeager to consummate their
reunion, Artur’s embrace devolves into sexual assault. Clara, however, is saved from the wouldbe rapist by the demented youngest member of the cannibalistic and incestuous clan that will
pose the most consistent danger to her throughout the film. This man-child—an enormous, puttyfaced maniac played by Volker Spengler in a full-length yellow raincoat and metal helmet with a
sausage strapped to either side—bludgeons her assailant, but proves a threat himself in turn. She
manages to escape him only to end up in the arms of his equally dangerous mother/sister and
grandmother/aunt who run the nearby motel.
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Eventually, Clara will kill most of these aggressors (though maybe not enough of them
(sequel?)), but extras who appear in interspersed vignettes aren’t so lucky. In one scene, a couple
from the East, an emaciated man with a hermit’s beard and a gaunt, but more cheery female
companion, get run off the road by the cannibal clan when the couple’s decrepit Trabant gets
outstripped by the Wessis’ red convertible (figure 2.2). The Ossis brandish Coca-Cola bottles
and chant, “Deutschland, Deutschland, Vaterland!” to no avail (figure 2.3). The gang’s alpha
male, Alfred (played by New German Cinema mainstay Alfred Edel) answers with meat cleaver
in hand, “Jetzt beginnt der Markt! [Welcome to the free market!]” The Ossis end up sausage
(figures 2.4, 2.5).
These appetitive Wessis, from Artur to Alfred and the rest, present an allegory of
capitalism as an amoral Hobbesian nightmare. Their self-regard vitiates any semblance of the
reality principle. As several of their number put it at different moments, “In times when
everything is possible, it does not matter whether something is good or bad.” Rape, incest, and
cannibalism feed unthinking desire in a way designed to exaggerate and typify the logic of the
market and the fate the East met at the West’s hands. Vander Lugt describes how this film
metaphorizes the collision of societies precipitated by the fall of the Wall as the violent
subsumption of the East by the West. In this connection, the Trabants that repeatedly break down
or get overtaken by speedier Western models are no innocent set pieces. The Trabant was a
status symbol and the most popular automobile in the GDR. It was inefficient, slow, and a heavy
polluter, but the factories in which they were produced employed thousands. And given that
there were no other cars readily available, Trabants were luxury items—people waited upwards
of seven years for one of the clunkers. Once the Wall came down, the factories were run out of
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business by competition, laying off many of those in their employ, and the cars themselves fell
rapidly out of favor. Abandoned Trabants on the roadside were a familiar sight.28
Discussions of the film that focus on the West’s pillaging of the East seem satisfying
enough, and they find corroboration in statements made by Schlingensief himself. Narrating the
movie along these lines during an interview from 2004, he closes in saying, “When you look at
what’s become of the East, it’s not even sausage. It’s mincemeat.”29

The Geist in the Machine
So far, however, we have only addressed the film’s plot; leapfrogging how the film looks
to get at what its plot means leaves much to be discussed. Namely, the meat—why all the gore?
Why the saturated palette, and why the depiction of Wessis as demented, grotesque monsters?
The West German sausage factory makes more than a critique of capitalism. There is another
kind of Expressionist shriek we should hear in the cacophony of chainsaws and non sequitur
koans, and it issues from deeper in the German past.
After all, it’s not only Ossis who meet messy ends. The film delights most of all in the
gruesome eversions visited on the Wessis. Clearly, some of this has to do with the visual and
affective pleasure of seeing these villains get their just des(s)erts, not to mention the comedic
value of such excess. Artur spends much of the film running around, half-flayed and screaming
pursued by spark-throwing weapons (in a nightmarish burlesquing of the archival footage
fireworks that begin the film (figure 2.6)); when the cannibal matriarch’s body is severed at the
waist in a car accident at the film’s end, the camera fixes on her torn body and exploded entrails
as she continues to yell at her co-conspirators as though nothing has happened (figure 2.7). The
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film closes with her singing the German national anthem from this position. Her maiming—and
Clara’s temporary escape—only comes to pass as the full depth of the family’s pathology comes
to light. Arguing over how to handle our heroine, whom each of the Wessis finds exciting in a
different way, the irreconcilability of their polymorphous perversity devolves into accusations
and revelations of past deeds they’ve visited on one another—murdered lovers, incest,
infidelity—that set them at each other’s throats. Worst of all, the quarreling leads them to consult
“Father,” the patriarch sequestered in the attic who only Alfred knows is no more than a skeleton
in a moldering Nazi uniform (figure 2.8). As the arguments come to blows, Alfred rescues Father
from his perch, bursting through the attic doors cradling the bones and lams in a pickup truck,
recapturing Clara and driving off into the never-made sequel. Moreover, this scene of reanimated remains echoes an earlier nightmare sequence, in which Clara imagines her captors as
circling ghosts decked out in Nazi regalia, lunging at the camera as they obtrude into Clara’s
unconscious—Udo Kier appears as Hitler with a painted swastika for a mustache (figure 2.9).
Even ancillary characters like “Johnny” (also played by Kier), a veteran turned policeman, seem
to combust as soon as the camera settles on them—Johnny bops into a bar only to set his hair on
fire and chop off his own hand. It’s Johnny who introduces the German proverb (and title of the
most popular West German pop song of 1986) into the film’s collection of aphorisms: “Alles hat
ein Ende. Nur die Wurst hat zwei. [Everything comes to an end. Only sausages have two.]”
So if the Ossis become forcemeat that feeds the capitalist Western maw—freed from the
East, but then contained by the West with extreme prejudice—the Wessis suffer an opposite fate.
They explode—past traumas resurface, and bodies open and spill forth. And even before Clara
visits any violence on them, the Ossis seem to have a conspicuously difficult time containing
themselves—the film features several close-ups of them licking their lips, as though their own
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tongues were trying to escape the too-limiting confines of their bodies. These shots play up the
maintenance required to keep dissolution at bay—the villains are elaborately made-up and
usually set against blank skies or abandoned buildings (figures 2.10, 2.11). This close interlacing
of decay and bodies gives us a different way in which the movie “is an act of visualization, a
mapping-onto-the-body, of a history that has not yet been made visible.” History, from this
vantage, concerns the legacy of Nazism and its mania for shaping Germans into “Ein Volk, Ein
Führer, Ein Reich”—one which has even deeper Romantic roots. It’s a drive the movie shows us
is untenable. And it is folly not simply because immoral or illiberal—in fact, this homology
drawn between the physical charnel houses of Nazi Germany and the metaphysical ones of
capitalist, one-world-minded West Germany suggests that liberalism offers no defense against
domination, even if its power has a different face. The film makes a much stronger claim:
German identity cannot be because there is too much difference; it will always disintegrate under
its own demands, which in turn only excites renewed, dangerous attempts at unity. And reading
The German Chainsaw Massacre along these lines, to the extent that there is a German identity,
it consists in its continual attempts at establishing itself—with the category of ‘the German
people’ reappearing at these two moments of nation building—and this wrong can only be
righted by reversing the motive to make sausage, turning attempted consolidation into forcible
dissolution. The desire to make the Many into One animates the ‘German’ corporate body, and
that body must be eviscerated to deflate this desire and to divulge the heterogeneity it would
disavow. For all its puerile clowning, Massacre’s investment in viscera sets in motion a complex
dialectic. The film concerns the embodiment of history, and the bodies gesture toward a scary
historical propulsion, a disembodied, revenant spiritual drive to de- and re-form Germans into
One People.
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All three installments of Schlingensief’s Germany Trilogy dramatize historical moments
in the search for German identity by means of debased embodiment. Massacre, the second film
chronologically, concerns reunification, 100 years of Adolf Hitler: The Last Hour in the Führer’s
Bunker (1989) depicts the demise of Hitler and his inner circle in grainy black-and-white as a
narcotics-drenched stupor, and Terror 2000: Intensive Care Unit Germany (1994) imagines a
resurgent Nazi party of the not-too-distant future (whose falsetto-voiced, pathologically clumsy
figurehead is played by Schlingensief himself) raining havoc on recent immigrants and benighted
“natives” alike in rural Germany. Nazism haunts 100 Years and Terror 2000 in a more
straightforward fashion than it does Massacre. The latter’s (barely) subtextual Nazism is what
makes Massacre the most instructive focal point. It is in Massacre that the uneasy inheritance of
German history—as the drive to render difference into identity—finds its most articulate
expression. It points to the spirit of the sausage. The film makes the Third Reich’s “Ein Volk”
reverberate through Leipzig’s “Wir sind das Volk” and makes of this categorical instability and
translation a conceptual lesson regarding the quest for German national identity. At the same
time, Massacre is the most insistent of the three movies on filmic gore—constantly showing us
blood and guts, its conceit the production of human sausage. Immersion in flesh becomes the
method for wrestling with a transcendent spirit.
Or, as Jacques Derrida might have it, a specter. In Specters of Marx (1993), Derrida
grapples with the meaning of Karl Marx’s works in the wake of 1989. A lucid and poetic
analysis of what Marx has come to mean in the interrelated realms of political activism and
academic theory in particular, for our purposes here I will focus on Derrida’s insights into how
one inherits a cultural legacy in general. Inspired by Marx’s formulation of communism as a
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specter haunting Europe, Derrida contends that, in the early 1990s, the signifier ‘Marx’
comprises a slew of specters haunting the contemporary intellectual and political landscape.
According to Derrida, a specter haunts “because it begins by coming back.”30 A specter is
an event or idea—a figure—that both resurfaces as from some historical deep and shapes the
present moment’s path into the future. It is a peculiar kind of return that is always both
“Repetition and first time, but also repetition and last time, since the singularity of any first time
makes of it also a last time.”31 The figure of the specter offers a novel approach to thinking
historically (a method on which Derrida bestows the name “hauntology”) in this interlacing of
repetition and uniqueness. A specter comes back from the past insofar as it can be recognized in
its iterability—as a new version of some old phenomenon—but is singular insofar as what this
familiar thing means and, crucially, does in any re-apparition finds unique expression based on
the specific place and time of encounter. People see ghosts and recognize them as such. The
conduct of this comprehension (from recognition to interpretation) makes history significant.
Specters of Marx might be described as a primer for how to speak with spirits. Derrida
turns to Hamlet’s meeting with his father’s ghost in order to concretize his discussion. He writes,
“the spirit comes by coming back [revenant], it figures both a dead man who comes back and a
ghost whose expected return repeats itself, again and again.”32 The ghost appears four times
throughout Shakespeare’s play, each time portending something different depending on who is
there to see it. It is only Hamlet who receives the full import of the haunting: King Hamlet’s
untimely demise, the identity of the guilty party, and the justice this knowledge should
precipitate. Even so, as Derrida points out, the space between the dead man and the ghost gives
rise to Hamlet’s famous inaction. Even when the macabre letter arrives at its destination,
30
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transparency is anything but guaranteed. Hamlet cannot be sure that the spirit before him is his
father’s; even if it is, he bridles at what is to be done. Hamlet curses this inheritance, which “is
inborn in him, given by his birth as much as at his birth.”33 For Derrida, the play tells the story of
Hamlet’s arriving at “the singularity of a place of speech, of a place of experience, and of a link
of filiation, places and links from which alone one may address oneself to the ghost.”34 Hamlet
comes to see what the ghost means to him and for the path his life must take as he decides how
to connect the spirit that appears before him with the memory of the man it represents. That is,
the ghost’s becoming the true extension of his father is the result of Hamlet’s decision to finally
take action against Claudius, rather than the cause.
So what does any of this have to do with Marx, let alone the problematics of German
national identity and any commentary made by a B-grade slapstick slasher movie? Derrida
writes, “That we are heirs does not mean that we have or that we receive this or that, some
inheritance that enriches us one day with this or that, but that the being of what we are is first of
all inheritance, whether we like it or know it or not.”35 We can recognize a specter because it
interpellates us. We see a new iteration of an old phenomenon because we are immersed in and
formed by a context that has given rise to both—language and everyday experience, the larger
forces that shape individual biography. For Prince Hamlet, this means the Danish Middle Ages
(c. 1400) and the culture of the royal court. For Derrida in his revisiting Marx, this would entail
something like the modern history of political economy and philosophy and his experience of
these as a scholar living through a so-called end of history near the close of a long career as a
theoretician and critic. For Schlingensief confronting the idea of German unity, it includes
growing up in Oberhausen in the aftermath of World War II and witnessing a supposedly new
33
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moment in his country’s history of self-reinvention. In each case, an individual life comes into
being with respect to the limits and possibilities established by overarching social forces, which
create consciousness (irrespective of whether any one person is aware of that informing power).
Inheritance is not any thing in particular, it is everything—our whole way of seeing, feeling, and
understanding.
At the same time, however, Derrida points out:
An inheritance is never gathered together, it is never one with itself. Its presumed unity, if
there is one, can consist only in the injunction to reaffirm by choosing… if it did not call
for and at the same time defy interpretation, we would never have anything to inherit
from it. We would be affected by it as by a cause—natural or genetic.36
While we recognize a specter because of who and what we already are, what we make of it
consists in acting within those given limits. This action can be executed with more or less selfawareness. It is worth noting that this way of conceiving inheritance as a non-genetic process
lands Derrida’s understanding of the relationship between subject and structure on a terrain
similar to the one described by Kant’s mode of conceiving the social component of aesthetic
judgment addressed in the previous chapter. For Kant, especially as explicated by Arendt, a
judgment is a way of navigating a situated horizon of available meanings. For Derrida,
responsible inheritance necessitates speaking with the specter when we think ourselves
addressed. Such a ghostly conversation gives us the chance to learn how the past can guide us in
the present—not only what lessons we might learn from events that have already transpired, but
how those events have not yet ceased to unfold. Prince Hamlet eventually executes his perceived
duty. Derrida trumpets the return of Marx’s specter by proclaiming interpretation’s power to
transform society. Schlingensief, for his part, shows us the force exerted by the drive to
nationalist renewal by picturing the violence needed to render people into the Volk.
36
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This injunction to choose, to act by interpreting the past, runs counter to our ordinary
sense of temporality. According to Derrida, “At bottom, the specter is the future, it is always to
come, it presents itself only as that which could come or come back.”37 So when he describes the
neo-liberal, triumphalist version of 1989 (typified, for him, by Francis Fukuyama) and its
attempts to inter Marx, he sounds like he might also be describing the anxiety I argue animates
Schlingensief’s filmic bloodlust: “the specter would represent a threat that some would like to
believe is past and whose return it would be necessary again, once again in the future, to conjure
away.”38 Is it the case, then, that Schlingensief attempts to do to the Volk what neo-liberalism
tries to do to Marx—bring about its end by decrying its specter? Derrida’s point is that such
finality is impossible, that specters persist and can always be revivified. He continues, “it is… a
matter of pretending to certify death there where the death certificate is still the performative of
an act of war or the impotent gesticulation, the restless dream, of an execution.”39 Massacre is
this kind of restless dream. Because it is the future, a specter cannot die. Instead, what we get are
attempts to publicly pronounce death, hoping that such “performative” gestures might gain
enough traction to achieve their intention. Identifying a specter in order to defeat it “means also
to exorcize: to attempt both to destroy and to disavow a malignant… force… a specter, a kind of
ghost who comes back or who still risks coming back.”40 Massacre knows it cannot kill the
specter. The film revels in gore, figures the sausage as flesh that comes back (to have a second
end), and eviscerates its villains—all as a means of depicting how history suffuses us, is
somehow interior to and constitutive of each of us. The film dreams of exorcizing that history, of
bringing the spirit out into the open for public rebuke and final annihilation. As such, it ends with

37

Ibid., 39.
Ibid.
39
Ibid., 48.
40
Ibid.
38

100
a cliffhanger—Clara, Artur, and Alfred screaming off into the sunset—because this is only the
beginning.

Heavy History, Mass Media
As Hamlet (and Derrida) could tell us, getting the specter out into the open is just the
beginning because then one has to decide what to do. We know what Hamlet does, and Derrida’s
hauntological reading of 1989 leads him to advocate continued engagement with Marxism(s), to
insist that Marx is most alive exactly where and when he is pronounced dead. But Schlingensief,
or the agenda I am attributing to his works, occupies a different position. He shows us that the
Volk lives, that its spirit animates flesh, and he wishes it did not. If he announces a specter, it’s
not in order to give it voice or attest to the promise it might hold for the future. Rather, this
encounter with the specter would aver its persistence only to decry it, to warn the world of the
harm it portends—to wish it away in the same fashion that Derrida’s neoliberal exegetical
enemies will Marx toward the grave. Unlike Derrida’s, Schlingensief’s ghosts are not friendly.
And yet Schlingensief knows a spirit cannot be killed. If this filmic hauntology looks to raise a
public alarm that the Volk walks again, it sits squarely on the horns of a dilemma: How to
acknowledge that history persists in the present—indeed, that it is the present and cannot be
ignored or defeated—and simultaneously work toward surmounting it. According to Derrida,
such a project is impossible. Schlingensief might well share Derrida’s aim of promoting
responsible conversations with a ghost “some would like to believe is past,” but his adversarial
stance toward the specter means he must advance different tactics.
Schlingensief opens Massacre with archival footage of The Day of German Unity. In
addition to evoking a reality effect by specifying the context of the movie’s action and invoking
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the spirit of the Volk by re-framing the flags, crowds, and speeches within the ominous diegetic
confines of a slasher flick, this move gestures toward the imbrication of representation and
German political reality. First, it refers to the television events of 1989-90 discussed above;
second, it implicates mediated, mass images in the construction of Germany’s (and Germans’)
sense of self, and, third, it invokes a filmic tradition of “antagonistic realism” built on such
considerations of audience reception.41
According to Eric Rentschler, a film historian and German Studies scholar, such
practiced collision of “staged fiction and found reality” is a hallmark of West German films
produced under the capacious aegis of “Young German Film” (more often known to
international audiences as “New German Cinema”).42 On Rentschler’s telling, the earliest of
these films “abound with documentary footage and counter-information” because the directors
sought to position their films against the depictions of political and social life available in
popular press organs like the daily newspaper Bild-Zeitung.43 Outrage at Bild-Zeitung and other
outlets owned by media mogul Axel Springer fueled student demonstrations throughout the late
1960s. In fact, many blamed Bild-Zeitung and Springer for the 1968 assassination attempt on
student leader Rudi Dutschke. Young German Film was always less about film and more about
imagining (or creating) a young Germany. (And it’s worth noting, along with Rentschler, that
once New German Film had firmly established itself circa 1971 “the term replicated a certain
Cold War mindset, the assumption that one could say ‘German’ when one meant West German,

41

Miriam Hansen, “Cooperative Auteur Cinema and Oppositional Public Sphere: Alexander Kluge’s
Contribution to Germany in Autumn,” New German Critique, no. 24 / 25, Special Double Issue on New
German Cinema (Autumn 1981 / Winter 1982), 49.
42
Eric Rentschler, West German Film in the Course of Time: Reflections on the Twenty Years since
Oberhausen (New York: Redgrave Publishing Company, 1984), 42.
43
Ibid., 18.

102
acting as if the GDR did not exist.” ) This emphasis on counter-representation meant the young
44

filmmakers saw their works as part of a larger media ecosystem, engaging in localized battles of
signification by experimenting with how the interrelations of fact and fiction affect the
experience and conduct of social reality.
Rentschler points out, however, that these claims to representing the present and
imagining the future (of young Germany) comprised above all “a search for history.”45 Young
German Film was conceived when twenty-six filmmakers attending a short-film festival signed
the Oberhausen Manifesto—so named for the city of its signing—on February 28, 1962.46 This
timing had as much to do with a mounting fatigue with the predictable and rote productions of
the larger commercial film industry, which had as yet failed to recover from its close association
with Goebbels’s ministry of propaganda, as it did with the reactionary air of censorship
surrounding Konrad Adenauer’s government. By the close of 1962, Adenauer had forcibly
resigned from power because of a scandal involving the unlawful arrest of journalists working
for Der Spiegel.47 Oberhausen would thereafter take on a mythical sheen as the origin of
contemporary German film culture, and it was also where Christoph Schlingensief had been born
in 1960 and would attend his first film festival and shoot his first 8mm movie (both at the age of
seven) in 1968.48
The manifesto is unremarkable both in terms of its actual text and, for the most part, with
regard to its signatories. From what would later become the pantheon of New German Cinema
(which includes figures of international renown like Werner Herzog, Rainer Werner Fassbinder,
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and Wim Wenders, among others) only director, writer, theorist, and attorney Alexander Kluge
was an original Oberhausener. The manifesto is already terse, but could be (and often is)
summed by its penultimate sentence: Papas Kino ist tot [Dad’s cinema is dead]. The
ramifications of this performative murder were various. For most, it meant establishing new
relations to the means of cinematic production; for some, effecting Dad’s death entailed seeking
a specifically feminist approach to new form and content. It’s beyond the scope of this project to
follow anything close to all the paths of New German Cinema, but what ties them together is also
what makes them relevant to our discussion of Schlingensief’s specter. In Rentschler’s words:
The Oberhausen signatories had announced their intention to create the new German
feature film. To do so, they would have to do more than to proclaim their elders’ cinema
dead. They would have to come to grips with a problematic film tradition, to understand
not only the past abuses of the medium under fascism and Cold War politics, but to
rediscover points in that past which would allow a possible cultural continuity.49
Because these filmmakers understood fact and fiction to be equal participants in lived reality,
they saw creating a new German cinema not only as the pursuit of new kinds of movies produced
in different ways, but as a method for building a new audience—read: a new German people—
one wiser for engaging its unresolved and still unfolding history.
Rentschler avers that Kluge in particular saw “history as something not simply given, as a
sequence of events fixed for all time, but rather as something that must be reflected upon and
confronted in the present if the future is to look any different.”50 And for Kluge this persistence
of the past in German film extended beyond the simple fact that people like Veit Harlan, the
director of one of the Nazis’ most viciously anti-Semitic propaganda films, Jud Süss (1940),
were still making movies.51 Kluge explains his own “materialist aesthetics” as “a way of
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organizing collective experience” and grappling with history; he contends that “collective social
experience exists with films or without them. It has existed for about three-hundred-thousand
years, and been ‘actualised’ for only about three-hundred of them… The invention of film, of the
cinema, is only an industrial answer to the film which has its basis in people’s minds.”52 For
Kluge, consciousness (like film) works by means of “a stream of associations which is the basis
of thinking and feeling;” what he adds to this mainstay of film theory and criticism, however, is a
counterintuitive conclusion:
You could understand film history as merely the collected ideas of different auteurs or
entrepreneurs. But it’s not the basis, it’s an abstraction… Whereas the real mass medium
is the people themselves, not the derivatives like cinema or television. And if you have a
conception of film which means that it’s the spectators who produce their films, and not
the authors who produce the screenplay for the spectators, then you have a materialist
theory.53
To think of “the people,” the audience, as the real mass medium is to theorize a complex and
dynamic spectatorship. For it would entail conceiving viewers as (1) always already active in
consuming media (rather than passive receivers; in fact, this binary evaporates into
obsolescence), (2) individually and collectively containing history—as the medium through
which it is transmitted—and (3) as a material that can be shaped, that can take on different
forms. People simultaneously contain history and are contained by it, and the act of viewing
somehow not only functions as a result of this condition, but can bring it to the fore, can
externalize the public character of seemingly private spectatorship the same way industrial film
offered one form for the basic mode of consciousness.

that would inspire tolerance (perhaps of Harlan above all), but, as its very title suggests, in actuality was
so condescending and patently heteronormative that it provoked outrage and protest—no small
achievement in 1957. That same year it was released in the U.S. under the title Bewildered Youth.
52
Kluge quoted in Jan Dawson, “An Interview with Alexander Kluge,” in Alexander Kluge & The
Occasional Work of a Female Slave (New York: Zoetrope, 1977), 31.
53
Ibid. Emphasis mine.

105
But what does it mean to say a spectator produces the very film being watched? Film
historian Miriam Hansen writes that “Kluge insists on montage as the locus of filmic
production.”54 She continues:
The minimal unit of this kind of montage is not the individual shot, as for
Eisenstein, but its negation… the empty space between shots. Consequently, the
effect…is not a dialectically pre-determined third meaning, an abstraction resulting from
the juxtaposition of separate representations, but rather an indeterminacy of meaning, a
suspension of traditionally fixed associations. Thus the locus of signification is
programmatically shifted from the screen to the spectator.55
This notion that the viewer makes the film upon its reception, what Hansen refers to as “the trope
of the film in the head,” enjoyed wide circulation during the 1960s and ’70s. In a 1975 interview
with Film Comment, Fassbinder links this theory of spectatorship with his own mode of
amalgamating (what Rentschler called above) “staged fiction and found reality.” Another article
in the same issue describes the mise-en-scène of The Bitter Tears of Petra von Kant (1972) as
“proto-artificial and always trying for the emblematic joined with the rich effect of a sausage
bursting its casing.”56 Fassbinder’s interviewers ask him why he pairs such garish staging and
over-the-top performances with a fly-on-the-wall, “observation”-driven cinematography. He
replies, “The reason is that I don’t want to create realism the way it’s usually done in films, but
rather that a realism should come about in the audience, in the head of the viewer. It’s a collision
between film and the subconscious that creates a new realism.”57 Such a definition of realism is
indeed expansive—it is anything that transpires in the interaction between a viewer and a film.
But it is also specific: realism is not a style or an ethics of representation, but rather the field of
reception. Like we saw in chapter one, the artwork functions like a mirror—it offers a mediating
term through which audiences can see themselves based on what they see when they look.
54
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Further, this realism can be heightened by calling attention to the act of watching itself. The
more obviously artificial the artifact, the more real the “film in the head.”
Fassbinder refers to the viewer’s contribution as based in the subconscious, and Kluge
echoes, stating that “every [filmic] cut provokes phantasy.”58 These are two very different artists,
and I am not suggesting that Fassbinder’s “subconscious” is identical to Kluge’s “phantasy,” but,
again, what these notions share is what makes them important to the current discussion. After all,
Schlingensief received his first formal training from experimental exponent of New German
Film Werner Nekes and befriended Kluge at Alfred Edel’s funeral in 1993 (where each delivered
a eulogy on the actor who had been a leading man for both of them). Schlingensief and Kluge
would go on to collaborate on twenty-nine televised film programs.59 As late as 2007,
Schlingensief was still insisting on the importance of the blank interstice as the active ingredient
in montage:
According to Godard, a film consists of twenty-four pictures per second. He says,
“twenty-four truths per second.” But Godard is wrong, that is at least six pictures too
many, because humans begin to see fluid movement at eighteen pictures and even almost
at twelve pictures per second… But with twenty-five [sic], that’s already superfluous, no
dark phase intervenes at all anymore, and the dark phase is decisive. Eighteen pictures
per second is right.60
The blank space is important to all these filmmakers because it is the site of reception, the place
where the viewer makes the film and, hence, potentially where they can see their own habits of
vision and understanding. This happens physically, as retinal after-images stitch still pictures into
“fluid” sequence—an idea that Schlingensief pursued through a series of Happening-esque
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installations featuring walk-in “Animatographs,” hedge maze-like collections of screens—and
psychically because truth is not what is shown, not what is represented, but rather what is
understood. Further, this close relationship between filmic blankness and truth cannot be equated
to the function of ‘absence’ discussed in the introduction because, here, the viewer’s projection
of themselves into the space of art functions not to reveal a purported habitual mystification, but
rather to externalize the film that is always already in the head. That is, externalization does not
result in revelation, only further expression of workaday reality.
To be sure, however, such an idea of montage and its emphasis on the interstice of
interpretive participation derives from a Brechtian tradition of alienation. Especially in
Fassbinder’s account, the obvious facture of the work is meant to point up the viewer’s distance,
to engage the viewer’s critical faculties. There are, however, two signal differences between the
New German Verfremdungseffekt and the old. The viewer of New German Cinema is presumed
always to be active, always already stepping into the blank space; they do not have to be
activated by alienation or shock. Kluge goes so far as to say “It would be wrong to…shock the
viewers—this would restrict their independence and powers of perception. The point here is the
surprise when you…understand something in depth.”61 Second, and as a result, understanding
‘something in depth’ then translates not into radical knowledge or revolutionary action, but a
‘deepened’ sense of one’s place in the world, a feeling of location in collective society and
history. As Kluge puts it, film’s mission is “increasing the possibilities for a public articulation
of experience.”62 Films are conduits through which people express themselves more fully, not
lessons through which they can attain enlightenment as to why the world is as it is. To borrow
(and mangle) a phrase, the machine becomes the idea that makes the art.
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Neither is it the case that—because the viewer makes the film, that it happens in the
viewer’s head—spectatorship becomes a relativist, private enterprise. On the contrary, film is the
externalization of the “three-hundred-thousand-year-old” condition of civilization; both thought
and cinema trade in collective experience. A viewer occupies the blank space of the film because
their social position leads them to fill out the film in one way or another. According to Kluge,
then, “The real product is thus neither the single shot nor the combination of shots in one film,
neither the relationship of the filmmaker to the spectators nor even the reception by the
spectator—but rather the production of a public sphere.”63 Kluge, along with philosopher Oskar
Negt, published a book on the subject, The Public Sphere and Experience (1993), but for our
purposes it will suffice to focus on this notion that the public sphere is something that must be
produced rather than something that simply exists.64 The public sphere is paramount because it is
the place where sociality happens—where people talk about their experiences of daily life; it’s
also the space where films are made, shown, and discussed. Kluge writes, “The public sphere
is…the factory of politics—its site of production.”65 Films contribute to the shape of the public
sphere, and the public sphere produces politics. The way in which people are enabled to imagine
their collective life, the relationship between their unique subjectivity and society as a (spherical)
whole thus determines how they can imagine their own relationship to history—how they got
where they are and what they might be able to do about it. Crucially, however, if social change is
to come about, it is not because the artwork conveys a special, otherwise ungraspable
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knowledge, destabilizing viewers. Rather, it stabilizes them, which theoretically could lead to
change as the result of other processes, though not as the effect of an art-driven cause. As we saw
in chapter one, the artwork provides a descriptive service, but now we are developing conceptual
and lexical links between the aesthetic work of description and the social work of politics.
For Kluge and his peers, the media ecosystem that consisted in the public productions of
Germany’s largely nationalized television system, the commercial dreck of Papas Kino, and the
skewed vitriol issuing from Springer’s empire comprised a “pseudo-public sphere,” one against
which New German Cinema mobilized. This sphere was inadequate because only “representative
in so far as it involves exclusions. Television, for example, following its mandate of providing a
universal representation of reality (a concept which its monopoly and its pluralistic authority are
based upon) could never… show films that… call attention to whatever scope of reality
television does not include.”66
A slight digression is in order here to spell out the irony Kluge identifies in the exclusive
nature of television’s “universal” mandate. Knowing in their own way how media apparatuses
produce public spheres (modes of sociality) that produce politics, the Allies dismantled
Germany’s broadcasting system in 1945. The world had seen Hitler and the Nazis marshal media
to the dissemination of a worldview and the production of the Aryan Volk. The German system
had been centralized during the Weimar Republic, with the Reich Ministry of the Interior
assuming a monopoly over programming and licensing by 1932. Before this, the landscape
featured a mixture of private enterprises, each espousing its own political agenda and offering
regional programs that reflected traditional cultural differences obtaining between Germany’s
different Länder (like states or counties). The Ministry consolidated the system in the interest of
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economic rationality and quality control, equating dispersal to inferior production value.

Communications historian Christian Potschka writes, “This arrangement allowed Hitler to take
over the state and broadcasting at the same time.”68 The regime pursued centralization while
expanding dissemination so vigorously that by April 1934 there was only one radio signal,
Reichssender, and by March 1935 “the world’s first regular television service commenced in
Berlin.”69
The powers occupying West Germany reorganized broadcasting, each using its own
home system as a model, but the goal shared by all was the de-politicization of the media. In the
American sector, this meant creating a federation of four broadcasters based in different cities; in
the British and French, creating a central authority, Nordwestdeutscher Rundfunk (NWDR (akin
to the BBC)), independent of political parties and designed to be responsive to the desires of
different constituencies—that is, to be multi-vocal by design.70 The Allies handed control of the
system back to the Germans in 1948, and it grew in fits and starts over the years leading up to
Kluge’s condemnation of television (in ways too Baroque to discuss here). But centrally at issue
in what became the relationship between the three television channels operating by 1982 was the
issue of including all (West) German cultures and viewpoints in programming. Kluge says as
much in reminding us that its monopoly is premised on the mission of “universal representation.”
The irony, according to Kluge, is that even as broadcasting slid back into a Weimar condition—
struggling to maintain the new postwar independence (against incursions of politicians like
Adenauer who attempted to start his own, second television station in 1960) and to safeguard
equal representation in the face of burgeoning privatization (à la Springer)—its own claim to
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legitimacy precluded showing stories and images that detailed the realities of contemporary
disenfranchisement. In order to demonstrate that everyone in the new (West) German society had
a voice, they couldn’t air anything that suggested otherwise.
Exclusion thus became a major concern of New German Cinema. As Kluge puts it, “it’s
always the suppressed element in society that has to be described… the dominant element
describes itself.”71 The artifacts of the pseudo-public sphere provide inadequate blank space for
the “suppressed element” of society to fully inject itself into the public sphere through
interpretive participation—i.e., self-description. Elegantly extending how tools of selfdescription relate to understanding and limning larger systems, Kluge clarifies this limit to the
audience’s interpretive prowess through an unlikely metaphor rooted in marine navigation. I
quote this passage at length as it draws together all the threads discussed under this heading and
holds the key to understanding Schlingensief’s performance-based practices as we move
forward:
If a sailor such as Odysseus, for example, is sailing on the Mediterranean, he can
determine his location by taking the measurements of two stars; calculating the distance
between the two stars and between stars and horizon with the help of a sextant, he can
figure out his position.72 Montage involves nothing more than such measurements; it is
the art of creating proportions. What is decisive in this case is that Odysseus does not
measure the location itself, but rather the relationship; it is this relationship which is
contained in the cut, at exactly that point where the film does not show anything.
Whatever is shown, on the other hand, is both the insignificant part of the message and
yet, to a certain extent, the condition of its communicability.73
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The viewer works in the cut, in the blank space, but is dependent on the materials provided.
Because this Odysseus knows the earth is a globe and also knows his star charts, he can find his
position relative to the sphere of the planet by taking stock of a series of relationships and his
own vantage onto them. Odysseus places himself in a system and can do so because he has a few
crucial markers that can be interpolated. New German Cinema wanted to offer these markers to
its audience, believing that the ones that existed already offered no guidance for people adrift on
open water. The spectator needs similar polestars, a variety of stories and images that can be
discerned as different, but interrelated in order to have a sense where they themselves fit into the
picture. Without the right beacons, we’re lost.
Everyday stories of people trying to navigate the postwar economy, for example, would
be better than escapist comedies or weepy melodramas. Films that attempt to address the war
directly would be even better—not because they would show the world as it is, capturing truth or
reality, but because they might offer a more useful benchmark against which one could articulate
one’s own position. This need to communicate on the basis of what audiences would readily
recognize, according to Rentschler, motivated New German Cinema’s interest in revisiting
traditional German genres such as the Heimatfilm.74 Heimat does not translate directly into
English, but “homeland” is close, granted strong connotations of pastoral innocence, naturalness,
and spiritual and ancestral belonging. New German Cinema started inverting the logic of the
traditional Heimatfilm, which filmmaker Alf Brustellin describes as the only uniquely German
film genre, in the late 1960s and early ’70s.75 Whereas the Heimatfilm “can be described as a
clash between an ‘open’ and ‘closed’ world, as the depiction of an ostensibly self-enclosed
societal and value system and its confrontation with other systems lying outside its confines,” the
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anti-Heimatfilm depicts the crushing effects of such insularity or sympathetically portrays the
appeals of accessing the wider world.76 In the traditional films, “Heimat becomes an elaborate
system geared to ward off outside intruders,” and the anti-Heimatfilm redoubles these mechanics
while reversing the implicit values—centripetal sentimentality and mystical belief in oneness
(with the land, with family, with tradition) are dangerous while centrifugal searching and
openness to difference represent hope and freedom.77
These efforts to retread and subvert familiar genres are crucial, according to Kluge. He
maintains that revisiting the past is the only way to change the future and that it entails not only
enabling spectators to more acutely measure their own relationship to society (to each other), but
also to the very process of shaping the world. Again, however, we should note that this aided
measurement departs from more familiar ways of conceiving the political impact of art in not
attributing to art the ability to reveal truth or change viewers’ minds. Even with the antiHeimatfilm, viewers do not simply absorb these images, suddenly realizing that insularity might
not be salutary. Rather, the films can reflect different facets of individual perception as it already
functions with, we should add, no guarantee of any particular outcome. Imagining this bridge
between aesthetic activity and political life, Kluge insists that confronting the past this way can
achieve “a different kind of change.” He continues, “I don’t believe you really achieve change by
decisions, or by killing the past, or by killing people…It’s trying to establish virtue on earth that
gives capitalism, or Napoleon, the chance to develop. A better way to change things is to accept
the past and complete it. The only way to change history is to regain it.”78 Kluge gestures toward
a genealogy of what he calls “the typical European mentality” that attempts to change the world
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by modeling it on abstract ideas. The point is that thinking we can “kill” history by fiat is the
79

quickest way to give free rein to the specters that always threaten to come back again. In order to
chart a new course, then, we have to know from where we have come. As Schlingensief puts it in
talking about his own representations of Nazism, “We haven’t yet digested Hitler since 1945. No
one has thrown him down in front of us and said ‘Read this crap. Use it. Chew on it until it’s
total mush, and then no one will want to wear this tattered old rag.’”80 Schlingensief inherits a
mode of conscientious antagonism toward history’s ghosts based on one central tenet: The only
way to keep history from repeating in the future is to consciously keep it in view as a guiding
star against which one can maneuver in (relation to) the present. If getting the ghost out into the
open—forcing the sausage to burst its casing—is the first step, then realizing that this perpetual
re-apparition is a necessary component of imagining social change is the second. Keeping the
specter always in view and in mind—conjuring it, in Derrida’s sense—is a crucial ingredient in
constructing a representative public sphere, a citizenry with a sense of its own modes and forms
of social relation.

From the Public Sphere to the Exorcist’s Séance
It is in the years around 1989 that Schlingensief delves into history, and as I’ve argued
above it is The German Chainsaw Massacre, the film produced immediately after the fall of the
Wall, that most fully captures the double bind of the reborn Germany’s life with the ghost of the
Volk. This film shows us how the spirit animates flesh, and how it always threatens to come
back again. Reunification seemed to necessitate a historical perspective. After Schlingensief
completed the third film in the Germany Trilogy, Terror 2000 (1993), dramaturge Matthias
79
80

Ibid.
Schlingensief in “Interview with Frieder Schlaich.”

115
Lilienthal of the Berlin Volksbühne asked him if he would make works for that stage. It would
make for a nice, neat narrative if we could report that Schlingensief was overjoyed at the
thought, convinced he would be able to get at the ghosts in a new and more effective way
because theater involves real bodies and live events, direct participation, and so on. On the
contrary, he says he started working in theater reluctantly and only because he was no longer
getting adequate funding to make films. Governing boards and the public in general had both
been disgusted by his recent forays—his work wasn’t being shown in any appreciable way, and
prospects for the future were dim.81
Indeed, Schlingensief has remarked that a chief difference in the reception of film and
theater is one of “rhythm”—films stick around while plays have their run and disappear. Because
films can be viewed at great temporal and spatial remove from the moment of recording, critical
judgments about them have higher stakes.82 Whether we agree with this is beside the point. The
comment is instructive because it clues us in to the fact that we should think about
Schlingensief’s career in theater (and then in performance art) as an overcoming of ephemerality.
Operating well beyond the purview of what traditional performance studies can handle,
Schlingensief worked to create a performance practice premised on reproducibility.
The ultimate goal of this pursuit was the invention of an action-based art practice that
could have blank spaces, intervals into which viewers could insert themselves as producers so
that spectatorship could contribute to the construction of the public sphere. An odd thing
happens, though, in the hybrid space of this amalgamated art practice, this film-infused live
performance. As we will see, Schlingensief’s performance art disrupts the celestial navigation
model of spectatorship he inherits from New German Cinema and enacts through his Germany
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Trilogy. The viewer of a Schlingensief action no longer places him or herself in relation to a
public sphere, a supporting globe already firmly underfoot, but rather contributes to the
production of a temporary and provisional field of social relation collecting around the focal
point of the work. Instead of looking to facilitate the asymptotic expansion of the public sphere
toward “universal representation,” Schlingensief performances involve spectators in producing a
work of art that comprises a temporary embodiment of the public sphere populated by ghosts—a
synchronic political snapshot, or a contemporary spirit photograph. This temporary embodiment
is what I earlier referred to as a séance where each viewer is a medium.
Schlingensief’s first plays at the Volksbühne, 100 Years of Christian Democratic Union:
Game Without Limits (1993) and Kühnen ’94: Bring Me the Head of Adolf Hitler (1993) probe
events of the very recent past—the center-right politics and policies of the CDU, a party founded
in 1945 and which has held the German Chancellorship almost continuously since 1949, and the
life of prominent neo-Nazi Michael Kühnen, respectively—by extending the timeline backward
and focusing on media representations of politics. These are familiar tactics. Theater scholar
Sandra Umathum reports that “In an effort to recreate the state of chaos in which Germany found
itself…Schlingensief put it all on stage…[H]e and his protagonists zapped through the German
TV landscape... [and] served up a mixed bag from which the grimacing visage of the mediagenerated fun society stared back at the audience.”83 The important element in this description is
the suggestion that, transformed into theatrical representation, the tried and true filmic collision
of “found reality” and fictional staging no longer read as a boundary confusion. Even though
borrowed from “real life,” life outside the theater, snippets from television and political

83

Sandra Umathum, “Theatre of Self-Questioning: Rocky Dutschke, ’68, or the Children of the
Revolution,” Forrest and Scheer, Christoph Schlingensief, 59-60.

117
speeches, and so on simply came across as more representation, more spectacle, snugly
contained by the theatrical frame.
Umathum recounts that in an effort to create a moment of frame transgression at one
performance of 100 Years of CDU, Schlingensief ran out on stage (as himself), popped a bag of
stage blood, and spoke about the death of his grandmother.84 He apparently hit his mark—
Umathum tells us one “could have heard a pin drop” as the audience struggled to discern whether
this was part of the play or a breakdown in earnest.85 More importantly, however, the experiment
gave way to more tests involving not the subject matter of representation, but the roles of
representing and watching and the potential for reality effects within this economy—understood
as gaps in the work into which viewers must work to create continuity and, therefore, might
inject themselves into the action. Rocky Dutschke, ’68 (1996) pursued this line with a vengeance.
Still replete with favorite tropes of media superflux, doppelgänger, and corporeal difference and
vulnerability, this play broke new ground for Schlingensief in staging the audience’s own act of
watching. The seats had been removed from the theater; viewers mingled with actors as they
wandered between scenes. Further, spectators were often literally pulled into the action.
Umathum relates that at one performance her boyfriend was bound at the ankles and dragged
across the floor. Afterward, as Umathum worked to undo the fetters, members of the troupe
berated the audience for being so compliant.86 No subsequent performance by Schlingensief
would suggest that there is a correct way to behave in the face of art, but the crucible of these
early theatrical experiments locates the blank space of performance.
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In the New German Cinema theory of Realism (as espoused by Fassbinder and Kluge),
reality consists in how the viewer creates the artwork in relation to his or her own life. In theater,
however, this is accessed not through the literal dark passage between film frames, the obvious
contrivance of film language, or greater narrative variety, but by locating the boundary of the
representational frame, by forcing the issue as to how one should understand the activity in front
of them—is this part of the show, or is it something else, and how can I tell? In making us limn
representation, performance can reproduce our own sense of reality. In this way, again,
Schlingensief follows in Hamlet’s footsteps. Performance becomes an elaborate mousetrap,
wherein one can catch the conscience of the spectator if he or she is moved to confuse the
onstage action for events beyond the frame and, in so doing, see themselves reflected in the
artwork before them. In Zurich in 2001—two years after the conservative and anti-immigration
Schweizerische Volkspartei [Swiss People’s Party] became the largest party in Switzerland’s
government following federal elections—Schlingensief mounted a production of Hamlet,
recruiting ex-neo-Nazis to play the players Hamlet hires. Scandal ensued, largely because
audiences and Swiss officials alike felt insulted, accused. The performance is in the viewer’s
head—and that is the part that’s real.
But when a performance (rather than a film) is in a viewer’s head something strange
happens. Chance 2000 (1998) might be Schlingensief’s action that would seem most to fit with
the mission of New German Cinema to offer new subject matter to audiences in order to increase
inclusiveness in the public sphere. It also directly takes on the ghost of the Volk that arises in the
wake of 1989. 1998 was a federal election year in Germany. Distrust of the sitting CDU—
especially in response to mounting unemployment—eventually led the Social Democratic Party
of Germany to acquire more votes and form a coalition with the Green party, shifting control of
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the government from center-right to definitively left wing politicians. During the long months of
the election campaign, Schlingensief established his own political party that would stand for
those who were ignored even by the establishment left. It was meant to muster its ranks primarily
from those who society generally does not recognize and to whom government fails to be
responsive, the wretched excess still excluded from the new German society—the unemployed
and physically and mentally disabled. “Chance 2000, The Party of the Last Chance” took as its
mottos “Vote for Yourself” (figure 2.12), “Prove You Exist,” and “I am One People.” This last
especially, in its inversion of the chants issuing from both the Third Reich and Leipzig, gives the
lie to the idea of unification.
The party garnered just over 28,500 votes for itself / themselves in the September
election.87 While not a high enough tally to win any parliamentary seats, the number beat out
several other down-ballot contenders, including the Humanist Party, the Marxist-Leninist Party,
the Social Equity Party, the Christian Center, and the derivatively named “Alternative Citizens’
Movement 2000.” Chance 2000 all but disbanded thereafter, but not before taking a stab at
becoming its own micro-nation, The State of Chance, by founding embassies in Sarajevo,
Johannesburg, and Namibia that November.88 It seems nothing much came of the State of
Chance, aside from one action undertaken for the 1998 arts festival, Steirischer Herbst, in Graz,
Austria. Members of the Graz audience were invited to “sponsor” a local homeless person,
giving them time and/or advice while Schlingensief reportedly showered all in attendance with
7000 Austrian schillings, or roughly 500 euros.89
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But if Chance was a failed state—and in chapter four we will focus very closely on a
successful foray into the utopian fields of artful statecraft in the form of the NSK State in
Time—we would nonetheless be misguided to ask the project for concrete results. Both the
parliamentary bid (itself always set to auto-destruct—who would have populated the legislative
seats acquired by such a party anyway?) and the gesture toward statehood both bring us back to
the question of the blank space, where such a space might exist in performance, and how its
mechanics relate to the question of the public sphere. It would be tempting, then, to read Chance
2000 as a feat of symbolic reordering, to sum the whole project and its recursively folded matrix
of art and politics as a call to recognize the shortfalls of supposedly representative democracy.
Certainly, this would gel with the genealogy thus far described—that Schlingensief follows in
the footsteps of his New German forebears in working toward a more perfectly spherical public
realm. And this symbolically focused reading also fits well with our discussion of history’s
ghosts, suggesting that Chance 2000 conjures the remnants of Nazi notions of personhood and
how these exclude difference from narrowly defined German identity.
Such a reading of Chance 2000—one that imagines it as an act of critique offered for
public consideration—fails, however, to account for the model of participatory, “realist,”
viewing we derived from Kluge and Fassbinder and found at work in Schlingensief’s fantastical,
filmic attempts to exorcise history. That is, that reading does not locate the blank space. We
could imagine Chance 2000 as a critical act in and to itself, but this would be a gross
oversimplification of both the work and its audience, positing a single meaning buried
somewhere in its manifold structure that could be correctly or incorrectly identified by attuned or
benighted receivers in turn. But thinking of the work as “in the head” means that whatever the
work itself might seem to say, what it is about, is less important than what the viewer makes of
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it. That the work is about something recognizable—some question, idea, issue, some terrain in
particular—is indispensable. Kluge calls this aboutness the work’s “condition of possibility.” But
the work then subsequently comes to exist in the space between it and the viewer. In the world of
New German Cinema, this meant that the viewer was somehow catalyzed by the work of art to
locate him or herself on the social seas by triangulation, comparing their own experience of the
world with the one on view, and hence gaining a greater capacity for self-expression and a
purchase on their own situation within a larger totality. For Chance 2000, this means we should
see how the work not only claimed visibility for marginalized demographics (and individuals),
but sought to mobilize the results of that visibility. That is, Chance 2000 impugned all onlookers
by apostrophe, by direct address—“Vote for Yourself”—provoking everyone who encountered it
to stake a position in relation to its subject. Again, the work is a mousetrap sprung by the action
of interpretation; the edge of its represented content (as either a work of artful politics or political
art) is the blank space we populate and suture with our own sense of reality. It’s like the
readymade, except that instead of making you decide whether something is or isn’t art—and
hence, instantly fall into the trap of subjecting an object to artistic criteria—once you argue either
for or against Chance 2000’s platform, you’ve already entered a political debate. You’ve
effectively already voted for yourself, no matter what box you tick or lever you pull.
Pulling that lever, moreover, becomes part of the work. First, this is true in a simple,
mundane fashion—my own description of Chance 2000 includes vote tallies for the party and
several others. It’s a measurable, demonstrable facet of the project’s life. But more interestingly
it means that the “work in the head” model functions differently when it moves into the world of
performance than it does for film. In a performance unfolding in real time, the untold works
unfolding in and through untold heads get channeled back into the collectivized aggregate of
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Chance 2000. There exists a kind of feedback not unlike the one initiated by illicit West German
broadcast waves on the night of November 9th, 1989. The total work within the frame is fed,
continually inflated, by the reactions to it beyond the frame, which are then readmitted within the
frame, and so on. If Kluge’s viewer uses a film to auto-locate in social space, Schlingensief’s
viewer does the same, but then feeds that self-understanding back into the work. Every viewer
becomes the work’s medium—they are both the material that gives it its shape and the conduit
for the specters it conjures. The work is a séance, a convening of inhabitants and shapers of the
public sphere, who together channel the ghosts of history and project them into public view.
Stripped of any suggestion of straightforward political engagement, Schlingensief’s most
famous work of public performance, Bitte Liebt Österreich [Please Love Austria] (2000), will
help to elucidate how reactions to a work can become part of its composition and how the totality
comprises such a collective séance. For six days in the spring of 2000 at the Wiener Festwochen,
Schlingensief answered an invitation to present work by mounting a sort of performance art
game show. As his website recounts, “Amid intense public interest, twelve participants
introduced by Schlingensief as asylum-seekers spent one week in a cordoned-off, CCTVed
shipping container complex next to the Vienna opera house. Blue flags representing Austria's
far-right populist FPÖ were hoisted on top of a container;” another banner featuring the phrase
“Ausländer Raus” joined the flags atop the container (figure 2.13).90 The FPÖ, or Freedom Party
of Austria, led by Jorg Haider had earlier that year been voted into office, just nudging out the
also right-wing, but somewhat less protectionist and nationalist Austrian People’s Party, with
which it then formed a coalition government. “Ausländer Raus,” a slogan with a Third Reich
pedigree, had been mobilized by the FPÖ in its campaigning, before being disavowed. The
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participant asylum-seekers were broadcast 24 hours a day on the Internet (figure 2.14), and
viewers could vote them out of the container in the style of the television show “Big Brother” by
pointing and clicking (figure 2.15).
But when these asylum-seekers were voted out, they weren’t just kicked out of the house
or off the show, but sent back to the immigration and deportation center. The last asylum-seeker
in the container “could look forward to a cash prize and the prospect, depending on the
availability of volunteers, of Austrian citizenship through marriage.”91 After every morning’s
ouster very publicly took place, excerpts from speeches by the FPÖ were read aloud, through a
megaphone. Schlingensief himself also engaged the crowd that amassed around the container,
provoking responses with outlandish rhetorical flourishes, alternating between far-left slogans
and those of the far-right. He was often joined by celebrities, like author Elfriede Jelinek or
philosopher Peter Sloterdijk, who made pronouncements of their own about Europe,
immigration, the state of culture, and so on. And Schlingensief himself went on televised news
programs to engage spokespeople for the FPÖ.
The work managed to operate simultaneously as a critique of xenophobia and the
institutions and policies in which these manifest and as an instantiation of that same racist
power—corralling, surveilling, and expelling foreign bodies. It was no longer the excluded who
proclaimed their own worth, but those watching who appraised them. The always already active
viewers described by Kluge showed up in scores, both physically and virtually, and filled the
blank space at representation’s edge with their own take on reality. Some simply agreed with the
work’s seeming premise that immigrants do not belong (figure 2.16); others also thought this
was the work’s point, but protested against it for that reason, and still others saw it as a diabolical
work of satire, taking it for a critical sendup. That is, no one could agree as to whether the work
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was racist or critical of racism, and then whether it was great or horrible if it was one or the
other.92
The debate consumed Austrian print and television journalism, and the container complex
drew combative crowds day after day. The work reflected back at people their own vision of
immigrants, immigration, Austria, and personhood (not to mention political process, art, and the
relation between the two) and put all these images into recursive circulation. Rather than
attempting to break the logic of exclusion, the work described it. It brought viewers’ interior
thought processes, values, prejudices—their modes of relating to cultural inheritance through the
work of making sense—out into the open. The work seemed to have no politics of its own, but
allowed political reality to express itself. It created a vast field of disagreement within a horizon
of understanding organized around the central point of national identity. Please Love Austria
shrunk the abstraction of the public sphere down to a visible, mass-mediated event both fueled
and shaped by its own controversy; the intensity and concentration of conflicting understandings
of reality animated and conjured historical demons.
The scalar shift from thinking about art’s relationship to the public sphere to how art
convenes a séance allows us to reconceive how we imagine where to find the politics in art.
Rather than thinking of art’s politics as residing in either its intentions or its outcomes (its spirit
or its flesh) and hence the extent to which it deforms or reforms some already extant society, the
séance allows us to see politics as that which manifests around a work of art through its
interaction with audiences. But neither does the séance’s ontological emphasis (conjuring what is
the political climate into which a work is thrown, as opposed to what it should be) abandon the
notion that art can yield social transformation. The séances’s publicity makes it both a
representation—we could almost call it a reproduction—of political reality and the site of its
92
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potential mutability, provided we talk with the revenant ghosts and know that channeling them is
why we’ve gathered.
Humanity has inhabited and been inhabited by a great many forms throughout this
chapter—hopefully, a variety replete with color and pitch suited to its subject. First, we were a
sausage stuffed and spiced with cultural inheritance. Then, this inheritance revealed itself, on
flying its mortal coil, to be the specter of history—a ghost we needed to engage in regular
conversation because it constantly comes back to speak through us anyway. These first two
formed a dialectical pair that described the visceral sense that each of us is “the real mass
medium.” With each of us working as a medium, we convened séances in the space of art, filling
it with our expelled spirits. The ghostly menagerie that is the artwork as séance, I contend, was
not only Schlingensief’s ultimate aim and innovation—although he never used those words—but
also the problem that drove his relentless production.
The point of this exorcist model of the artwork is a new way to think about the interaction
between an artwork and a viewer—new to art history anyway, as it comes to us via Schlingensief
from the world of New German Cinema. First, this model refocuses our interest in contemporary
artworks onto how they conjure history and, second, refocuses political questions about the
function of artworks onto how viewers engage their own ghosts in judging the object before
them, both exposing themselves and gaining a chance to see their subterranean propulsions,
however fleetingly, projected on the outside—as an inheritor and agent of a particular cultural
legacy. And each of these facets exceeds entrenched disciplinary approaches to performance art,
which to date have revolved around questions of presence and absence, favoring quasi-mystical
genuflections over performance’s nebulous medium-specificity over historically situated
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analyses of how performance works interact with audiences, their histories, and their interpretive
apparatus in relation to particular times and places.
Schlingensief’s work was organized around these two foci. He was reportedly upset with
the success of Please Love Austria because it was predicated on critics condensing the work to a
single proposition: that he had designed it to satirize the workings of xenophobic state. Their
reducing the work to a single meaning, and one that hinges on an imputed intention, no less,
moved Schlingensief to strike back. The title alone of his next Volksbühne project should be
enough to demonstrate what he thought critics had missed: Quiz 3000—You Are the Catastrophe
(2002). The onstage quiz show featuring Schlingensief as host, asking contestants questions such
as, “Order the following concentration camps from north to south: (A) Auschwitz (B) BergenBelsen (C) Dachau (D) Ravensbrück,” or “The rape of members of which minority group are,
according to the German criminal code, less heavily penalized?: (A) Men (B) Animals (C)
Children (D) People with Disabilities [the answer is D].”93 The interpellating index finger of
Chance 2000 wags definitively here.
And at nearly the same time, Schlingensief redoubled efforts at creating spaces for
collective exorcism, as if trying to concretize and codify the form of the séance produced by our
confrontations with our own catastrophic historicity. For the 2003 Venice Biennale,
Schlingensief founded The Church of Fear, a church for non-believers. At the Biennale, seven
would-be saints of this new church sat atop makeshift stylite columns in the giardini, putting
themselves and their terror on public display (figure 2.17). (Stylites are spectacularly ascetic
Christian monks who spend years atop columns in contemplation; the practice developed some
time in the fourth century.) These new acolytes were afraid because they had lost faith in
93
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government to responsively represent or effectively protect and in world financial systems to
function at all, let alone rationally. All of them were long-term unemployed, competing to stay
aloft longest and win a cash prize. Along with the game show format of the endurance columnsitting (and the processional march he included when the work reappeared in Frankfurt), a small
white church with a peaked roof and vinyl siding stood as an architectural embodiment of this
latest intangible social movement (figure 2.18). Inside the church was an unstaffed confessional
booth emblazoned with the phrase, “Habt Angst,” or “Be afraid.” Over the next few years the
church would be reiterated over and again, and one version won Schlingensief a posthumous
Golden Lion at the Biennial in 2011. But in every version, the central gospel remained, “Zeige
deine Wunde [Show your wounds].” Schlingensief said he didn’t know that Joseph Beuys had
used the phrase, even though he never shied from referring to Beuys as an influence. At any rate,
the phrase carried a similar impulse, suggesting that demonstrating vulnerability is somehow the
first step toward health.
For Schlingensief, however, we have to remember that showing one’s wounds means
something very particular, and he had sought this definition at least since The German Chainsaw
Massacre. It means finding some way to publicly display one’s own relation to history, to
catalog with others how one is composed by cultural inheritance in order to strike a more
conscious pose in relating to those ghosts that always come back again. And equally important is
the notion that the demonstration of the wound, the self-exposure occasioned by interacting with
a work of art produces a collectively created space. In this church, then, each of us stands at the
node where two axes intersect. First, we stand at the threshold of the past and the future, and by
engaging our ghosts we might be able to finally separate the two. And second, each of us, as an
inheriting individual, has the chance to acknowledge our role in the collective fabrication of
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social reality. Schlingensief’s Gesamtkunstwurst ultimately challenges and invites us to
transcend the filth and muck of our disastrous past by wallowing in it together. By conjuring our
collective spirits (and helping us to describe ourselves to ourselves), art can help us to navigate
the social world. But navigation and transformation are two different things; only by constantly
repeating the work of exorcism—because specters always come back again—can we hope to
forge links between the two.
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Chapter Three
Repetition / Compulsion:
Artur !mijewski, Autonomy, and Individuality

None of these things can have produced pleasure in the past, and it might be
supposed that they would cause less unpleasure to-day if they emerged as
memories or dreams instead of taking the form of fresh experiences… In spite of
that, they are repeated, under pressure of a compulsion.
-Sigmund Freud, Beyond the Pleasure Principle1

The history that lives in people and can flow from them as a cry, terror, weeping,
a sigh, or recurring horror and grief… a history that can really wound—and the
witness is the least secure. But such testimony is irresistible.
-Artur !mijewski2

Tabula Rasa
Artur !mijewski’s works are governed by a desire to understand how an individual might
take responsibility for history’s tragedies. In the scheme of this dissertation, however, traveling
to the former East and onto the terrain of contemporary Polish art might best be conceived as
walking through the looking glass. That is, while Sierra and Schlingensief create situations
designed to wrest from individual consciousness an awareness of collective life—by shrinking to
human scale the dispersed class relations of global commerce and by conjuring historical demons
1

Sigmund Freud, Beyond the Pleasure Principle (1920), trans. James Strachey (New York: W.W. Norton
and Co., 1961), 23.
2
!mijewski quoted in Joanna Mytkowska, “Too-True Scenarios,” in Artur !mijewski: If it happened only
once it’s as if it never happened—Einmal ist keinmal (Hatje Cantz, 2005), 15.
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through never-ending exorcism, respectively—!mijewski proceeds in the opposite direction. His
performance videos, which portray social experiments organized as multi-player games, examine
what it takes for people to disaggregate themselves from groups, to rebel against roles and rules,
and become self-governing, rational animals. There exists in these works (and the way
!mijewski positions them) a yearning for independence, itself figured as a pre-lapsarian
humanism. For !mijewski, we are born free, and everywhere we are in chains.
Words like “rational” and “humanism” might clang in the inner ears of readers already
familiar with !mijewski’s oeuvre—and with good reason. His approach to art (i.e., his apparent
commitment to discomfiting his experimental subjects and viewers alike) rivals Sierra’s in its
unflinching aggressiveness. This violence will not go unremarked; yet it is not my intention to
mount a teleological apology by ascribing to !mijewski’s method lofty philosophical pursuits.
Such an aim would miss the mark, most of all, because this interest in individualism—what
!mijewski calls “extreme subjectivism”—is theoretically regressive, not to mention fantastical.3
That is, in this chapter I will not be entertaining (as a theoretical proposition worthy of
consideration in its own right) the notion that some reserve of private selfhood buried within
each of us holds the key to overturning or breaking from our historical inheritances. (My
personal thoughts and feelings on the matter tend toward those elaborated over the course of the
previous chapter, but this is beside the point as well.) But neither do I make this case about
!mijewski’s works just to make of them a bad object to serve my purposes simply through
contrast.
Rather, this chapter will explore !mijewski’s investment in subjectivism in historicizing
and theorizing the political stakes of artistic autonomy within the cultural horizon of post-Soviet
3

Artur !mijewski, “Artur !mijewski in Conversation with Sebastian Cichocki,” in Trembling Bodies:
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Poland. I will argue that !mijewski uses a strong stance (a binary one, in fact) in relation to the
dialectic of individuality and collectivity as a prop or fulcrum in engaging the relationship
between the autonomy of art and its instrumentalization for political ends. While a theorist like
Jacques Rancière might be happy to live with elegantly crafted contradiction, declaiming a new
world order in which “there is no conflict between the purity of art and its politicization,” such
an acknowledgement of art’s necessary duality as “autonomous/heteronomous” would represent
to Polish artists struggling with their history, at best, tautology, and at worst, glib ignorance of
that duality’s practical articulations.4 By entering !mijewski’s works from this angle, obliquely
through questions of subjectivity (rather than taking on the question of art’s autonomy directly),
we will achieve a unique vantage onto the recent history of Polish art and how it was formed by
and continues to shape discussions about art’s social role. As a result, our sense of how each of
these terms (individual, collective, autonomy, politics) operates in context will be sharper, and
!mijewski’s most difficult works will come into focus.
I will split !mijewski’s delegated performance works into two types: Analytic
Subjectivism and Synthetic Subjectivism. Less periodizations than formal classifications for
concurrently executed works (though the first works are Analytic), these types describe the
performance-based video works !mijewski has made with non-artist participants. Under
Analytic Subjectivism come the works that focus on the physical body’s boundaries and
in/capacities—e.g., Temperance and Toil (1995), An Eye for an Eye (1998), Singing Lesson
(2001), or Blindly (2010). In analyzing this class of works—through close readings of An Eye for
an Eye and Blindly—I will discuss how they approach the question of individuality by limning
how one person’s experience of the world departs from a presumptive norm. The distance from
that reflexive standard is indexed through an incapacity pushed to its limits. In binary fashion,
4
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typical values reverse—perceived disability becomes a mark of celebrated distinction, an
outward badge of inner qualities that viewers representing the norm (the so-called abled) cannot
begin to comprehend and, hence, a space of freedom. In these works, the disabled, by virtue of
their difference, have a wholeness the rest of us should envy. Reference to Freud’s conception of
ego instincts (and the death drive) will augment the analysis of these works, helping to describe
the peculiar tack !mijewski takes toward the relationship between the experience of
embodiment, repetition, and psychic mastery.
Confronting difference and subjectivism in these terms will lead to a discussion of
!mijewski’s training in the studio of Grzegorz Kowalski. The atelier’s focus on non-verbal
means for achieving and communicating one’s inner life engages the vexed and idiosyncratic
political history of conceptualism in Poland’s artistic and ideological landscape. We will thus
travel back in time to see how Polish conceptual artists of the 1960s and 1970s sought to engage
their own aesthetic and political horizon in carving out for artistic practice a space of freedom
beyond the grasp of the state. It is in this crucible of post-medium-specific production that the
particular formation of artistic autonomy and anti-collectivism that guides !mijewski’s thinking
took shape.
Prepared by this contextual reconstruction, we will then consider !mijewski’s works of
Synthetic Subjectivism—e.g., The Game of Tag (1999), 80064 (2004), Repetition (2005), or
Them (2007). In these works, !mijewski deploys more recognizable forms of repetition, asking
people to revisit traumas and/or recapitulate their understanding of social reality by playing
games, the rules of which (either more or less allegorically) bear clear analogy to sociological
dynamics. Through close readings of these works, and again with recourse to Freud’s
observations about the role of repetition in the psychoanalytic relationship, I will discuss how
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!mijewski posits re-enactment as an opportunity for consolidation of the self. His experiments
offer participants clear rules, hoping above all else that subjects will break with prescribed
patterns of behavior. Following the rules of these games, authentic, liberated subjectivity
emerges in direct proportion to the extent people can capitalize on repetition, seizing from the
experience critical distance.
!mijewski sites the threshold of autonomy and heteronomy in the human body. The
individual is thus not only a pry bar that can effect art’s autonomy through will, but the
battleground where art can serve politics without becoming totalitarian and dominating. The
restoration of individuality to collectivized people functions as a necessary precursor (and a
theoretical exercise) for restoring to art a meaningful social role that avoids repeating its history
of subservience. For !mijewski, re-enactment is far from mere rehearsal—his repetitions chase
mastery and the chance to make what has been made partial by history and habit whole again,
complete. This fantasized original state of self-sufficiency sought through repetition can never
actually be achieved, but it can inspire one to action—as if one could begin anew. That is,
!mijewski, in marked contrast to other artists discussed in this dissertation, does believe that
performance—even as repetition—can provoke rupture and transform perception. But belief
doesn’t make it so. Instead, the way he imagines the conditions for rupture indexes how his
works further immerse participants and viewers alike into contextually-derived modes of
perceiving the relationship between individual and collective and, in turn, the constitution of
social reality. His own notion of individual integrity stems from the local historical development
of art’s relation to politics. As such, his attempts at rupturing collectivity only continually turn
the screws that anchor this worldview in a particular place shaped by a specific cultural
inheritance. By approaching !mijewski’s work as a theory of subjectivity (a rugged
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individualism) in antagonistic relation to ideology (as unthinking collectivism) rather than as a
theory of art, I will offer historicizing interpretations of his method and make plain his
convoluted demand that art should “instrumentalize its own autonomy.”5 In the end, we will see
how his performance-based works require an analytic language rooted in repetition rather than
ephemerality and, despite his best efforts, offer further evidence of, and new conceptual tools for,
history’s persistence in the present.

Analytic Subjectivism, or Fantastic Privacy
“There was no reason for compassion. She manages splendidly. I’m impressed by the
autonomy and sheer brutality of the world of disabled people.”6 Signaling most obviously his
own fallible, exoticizing vision and tendency to project personal preoccupations (on which I will
attempt not to dwell in moving forward), !mijewski’s recollection of a trip to the beach with a
friend with a prosthetic leg also stages front and center the impacted conflation of subjective
experience and self-determination that it is my task to disentangle and historicize. Further, his
dismissal of compassion sets us on our way toward an analysis of An Eye for an Eye (1998). The
eleven-minute video, shot partially in color and partially in black-and-white, features in turn two
subjects with missing limbs engaging in simple, often whimsical movements, sometimes on their
own, sometimes aided by an able-bodied person. It opens with a static black-and-white view of a
stairwell. Shot from a landing and angled downward so that the flight of stairs below, another
landing, and the top of the next flight down are visible, a man’s shadow slowly comes into view
on the wall opposite the camera. He is climbing the flight just out of view, taking one stair at a
time by hopping. As he mounts, rounds the bend to the flight fully in view, and continues his
5
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climb right up to the lens, we can see he is naked, middle-aged with black hair and a full beard,
and strong, with muscular arms and shoulders that support his ascent, filling in for a right leg
missing below the pelvis (figure 3.1).
A jump cut takes us to a room where another man, !mijewski, is lying down on a yellow
foam mattress (now there’s color, but in this spare, dimly lit interior, it doesn’t make much of a
difference). We see !mijewski’s feet from a camera placed on the floor, perpendicular to the
bottom edge of the mattress. We also get sound for the first time—a rhythmic, but muted, meaty
thud as the hopping man circumnavigates the foam. The camera cuts to the side of the bed as our
protagonist takes a seat and then lies beside !mijewski. From this angle, the missing leg so
painstakingly imaged in the first sequence—by both the ascent of the staircase and the full
frontal nudity—appears restored (figure 3.2). !mijewski is entirely eclipsed by the other man’s
mass, save for his right leg. The two men play with this optical illusion, !mijewski repeatedly
propping his right leg on the other’s left and removing it as the camera toggles between a view
from the side that shows us one uncanny body and a view from above that displays two bodies
engaged in an absurdist supine ballet reminiscent of the ritual bedtime drama familiar to anyone
who has ever slept next to another person (figure 3.3). Next the two are men standing—seen
from the front !mijewski is again eclipsed by the larger man, save for his right leg and his arms,
which wrap around from behind to brace them both for a three-legged march. They walk around,
!mijewski’s whole body functioning like an improbable cane. As a unit they make some
revolutions around the room; then head back out to the staircase, this time descending together
and, it seems, with considerably more difficulty. It would be wrong to describe !mijewski as
helping the other man—he’s as much an anchor as a support.
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In the next scene we have a new duo. A young man and woman, both slim with closely
cropped brown hair and again both naked, share a large shower stall of white tile, water rushing
over them. In a tight close-up, the camera pans down the woman’s body—face, torso, arms,
legs—until it reaches the floor. The young man sits on the ground in a modified all-fours
position—he rests atop the backs of his thighs (his legs end at the knees) and on his palms; we
see that one hand has no fingers, the other only three. The woman reaches around from behind,
and the man places his palms on her hands as she soaps and scrubs his body. Again, as though
we might miss the visual point, a black-and-white slow motion close-up thematizes the man’s
missing parts as the four hands wash his face in slow, caressing circles, her fingers extending
from his palms (figure 3.4).
The video comprises a set of encounters with corporeal difference. There is no dialogue,
only occasional ambient noise, and the camera emphasizes what does not exist (absent body
parts) through slow-motion, attenuated color, and most of all the oscillation between
fragmenting, dissecting close-ups and medium and long shots that feature the paired human
assemblages and their prosthetic gestures. Even the first shot of the staircase lingers long enough
that viewers can project themselves into the diegetic space only to have that unconscious
assumption disrupted by the figure of the hopping man. It would be tempting to think of the
piece’s interplay of whole and part as a plea for awareness of interconnectedness or
interdependence, or of the fundamental sameness of all people no matter how different we may
seem, but we should remember that compassion has no quarter here.
Contrary to what we might initially imagine, the title, An Eye for an Eye, is not offered
ironically. It is not meant as an inverted form of the Hammurabic injunction (e.g., someone who
takes an eye from another loses their own as punishment) that would change its sense into
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something more altruistic (e.g., if someone needs a hand, you should lend one). Instead, the piece
follows the subtractive spirit of the law. Attempting to help someone without a hand (or a leg),
snatches away one’s own. In !mijewski’s words, “the healthy… are reduced to the role of a limb
storehouse.”7 The “healthy,” the able-bodied, are disassembled in their attempts to augment the
other. Not only are they reduced to the function of whatever limb they contribute while the will
of the other remains dominant, but their very gestures are rendered moot by inefficacy. The
“human hybrids” are nothing if not awkward.8 For !mijewski, the video catalogs “the failure of
healthy people’s efforts to cause the disabled to become like them.”9 In the end, the “healthy”
people are eclipsed as subjects, and the amputees remain irreducibly different. What we
encounter, then, is the completeness of the Other—an orientation to the world radically unlike
our own—and the partiality of a worldview that would seek to assimilate that difference into our
own identity.
!mijewski’s interest in detailing the resilience of the Other’s body has an earlier
precedent in the work Temperance and Toil (1995), for which he and a classmate, Katarzyna
Kozyra, videotaped themselves prodding and poking at each other, trying to reform masses of
flesh into new shapes (figure 3.5). Each fails; the other remains resilient and beyond control. We
might productively compare both of these works to similar performance videos by Vito Acconci.
In Pryings and Conversions (both 1971), Acconci engages in analogous activities. The former
features him trying to manually pull open his collaborator Kathy Dillon’s eyes as she fights to
keep them closed (figure 3.6). In the latter, he attempts various methods for transforming the
apparent sex of his body—e.g., burning off chest hair and pulling his skin to simulate female
breasts. Acconci’s manipulations speak to the limits of his own authorial capacities (and contend
7
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that this role entails violence); !mijewski’s do the same, but go one step further in suggesting
that the failure to transform the other indexes the other’s self-sufficiency and the viewer’s
complicity in discounting it. What we might have wanted to read in An Eye for an Eye as
compassionate help, !mijewski wants us to see as a will to dominate. Further, his stance is
militant and instrumentalizing—equality is not the message. For him, the disabled are better than
everyone else because they can show us the philosophical violence of our habituated, reflexive
assumptions. It is not only the author/manipulator who is shown to be wanting, but the viewer
who wishes for the assimilation of unlike to like.
The same conceit operates in all of !mijewski’s works that feature people with
disabilities. In Singing Lesson (2001), which he describes as “a metaphor and at the same time a
direct message,” a group of deaf schoolchildren sing Bach cantatas in a church.10 But their
singing isn’t what we usually think of as singing, and Bach doesn’t end up sounding much like
the Bach we know. The impossibility of the task, however, is also its success. !mijewski asserts,
“The deaf are not wanting in sound; their world is complete, whole. It is the hearing who regard
it as deficient.”11 So when we watch the video and wince at the choir’s disarray—even if it’s not
because it offends our ears, but strains other sensibilities by making us feeling embarrassed for or
protective of the children put on display in this most unlikely of scenarios— !mijewski wants us
to notice in that moment how our hearing is not our comprehension of their disability, but our
incomprehension of their experience.
But clearly !mijewski is not a theorist of disability, and his pronouncements ignore both
the emotional and philosophical complexity involved in the experiments he devises.12 His
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rhetorical envelopes are not robust enough to contain the volatile affects he catalyzes; these come
to an instructive head in Blindly (2010). In this work, shot with multiple cameras in a studio,
!mijewski asks six blind people to paint landscapes, animals, bugs, and self-portraits. The video
purports to show us the whole process: laying out the large pieces of paper on the floor (with
!mijewski’s help), finding the edges of its surface by feel, organizing paints by the texture of the
bottles (again with !mijewski’s help—he tells them the color of the container held), painting the
images with hands, arms, feet, brushes, and the nozzles of the paint bottles, and, finally, washing
up. A sense of the painters’ different personalities emerges in the running commentary they
provide as they work, much of it prompted by questions from !mijewski. A middle-aged man
criticizes a young woman’s technique: “She was painting with her feet, which she shouldn’t do.
Grass is fine, and if you paint it with thick toes, then it’s not grass.”13 That same woman smiles
subtly, like Mona Lisa, in another scene as she describes the zebra she’s just painted (figure 3.7):
“Yes, I can see it in front of me…It’s black with blue stripes.” We get these little hints as to the
quality of their inner lives, expressed by their negotiation of the task at hand and the interview
process running alongside. Such glimpses of the tip of the psychic iceberg serve !mijewski well
in this exercise in analytic subjectivism, again confirming for him how the other remains apart,
unknowable, an autonomous mass impervious to the normative “ordinary,” and visible only at
the moment of its deviation.
The video, however, exceeds such a reading and, it would seem, !mijewski’s purported
aims. The paintings these people create demonstrate more than the untranslatability of their
experience. They also display shame, frustration, and the desire for approval. It’s not just that
Truthfully, devising this chapter has been a unique exercise in distrusting an artist’s thoughts, trusting that
same artist’s works, and treating the whole complex as both unfortunately and richly, generatively
symptomatic.
13
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we, the sighted, project embarrassment onto the painters as we watch them struggle to represent
in an alien medium—they feel it too. And to the video’s credit, it shows us this dynamic as well.
One man, after painting what (for a sighted audience) is a spectacular feat of accuracy—a wellcomposed landscape of sun, clouds, trees, and a river—describes it to !mijewski: “That’s how I
see it…It’s a landscape from my head.” !mijewski asks, “And nothing’s missing?” Visibly
upset, the man replies, “There is… It’s the sight.” (figure 3.8) !mijewski makes us wait four and
a half minutes, during which two other participants detail losing sight late in life—one of whom
describes the experience as like being “locked up in a coffin”—but eventually shows us the
landscape painter spiraling: “There are those moments…If I had some instant poison, I’d just
take it. Because I’m here, and life walks right past me. I’m not painting anything more.” The
weight of incapacity reveals itself as such and becomes overwhelming. The game is over; fade to
black.
!mijewski’s insistence notwithstanding, these people do experience their blindness, at
least on occasion, as a lack. But then, !mijewski knows this. Why else would he have them
paint, if not to elicit such feelings? And perhaps more to the point, why else would he put those
scenes in the video? The work is not rendered in a single take, and it does not purport to be a flyon-the-wall style documentary. The artist’s hand is obvious, both diegetically and in the
sometimes rapid editing. But neither is it because !mijewski feels some fealty to unvarnished
truth; he’s often thought of artworks as pointed messages and muses that “it would be interesting
if a work of art were ‘defeated’ in the course of a genuine discussion, a clash of arguments.”14
That we see the subjects’ discomfort in Blindly would seem to constitute a theoretical shift from
Singing Lesson, but as we will see it only further fleshes out the logic that undergirds
!mijewski’s approach to individuals, collectives, and mastery and that operates through all of his
14
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works discussed so far. That these scenes of vulnerability remain in the video—that the work
seems, in fact, to build to them—points up how these experiments with the margins of capacity
are not only straightforward metaphorical essays on the self-contained integrity of the Other, but
compulsive repetitions.

Repetitive Stress
According to Sigmund Freud, repetition is the riddle at the heart of every enigmatic
psychology. In Beyond the Pleasure Principle (1920), Freud considers how psychoanalysis can
make sense of why people repeat un-pleasurable, or even traumatic, episodes in the form of
dreams, games, neurotic symptoms, as well as the transference that arises in the course of
psychotherapy. Until the late 1910s, Freud asserts, the psychoanalytic framework had “no
hesitation that the course taken by mental events is automatically regulated by the pleasure
principle”—roughly, that people behave in ways that deliver the most satisfaction of instinctual
urges possible in keeping with the “reality principle,” the fact that we live together in “civilized”
society, which demands some amount of instinctual renunciation in the mutual self-interest for
our collective survival on Earth.15 Seeing how Freud responds to the riddle of recurring unpleasure will show us why considering Blindly a compulsive repetition sharpens our
understanding of !mijewski’s treatment of the relation between individual and collective.
Famously, Freud raises the issue of children’s play, citing the case of a one-and-a-halfyear-old boy who plays a game that Freud interprets as a response to his mother’s occasional and
inevitable disappearances from his company and to which he gives the name “Fort/Da”
(“Gone/Here”), after its constituent utterances. The toddler would throw a wooden reel with a
piece of string attached to it out of his field of vision, saying “fort,” or, an “expressive ‘o-o-o15
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o,’” as Freud actually transcribes it. Pulling the reel back, he would greet it with a “joyful
‘da’…This, then, was the complete game—disappearance and return.”16 Flummoxed, Freud
notes that “The child could not possibly have felt his mother’s departure as agreeable or even
indifferent.”17 He is able to recuperate the game to the pleasure principle, however, advancing
the hypothesis that this repetition affords the benefit of mastery: “At the outset he was in a
passive situation—he was overpowered by the experience; but by repeating it, unpleasurable
though it was, as a game, he took on an active part.”18 Here, Freud finds the germ for why “the
artistic play and artistic imitation carried out by adults, which, unlike children’s, are aimed at an
audience, do not spare spectators (for instance, in tragedy) the most painful experiences and can
yet be felt by them as highly enjoyable.”19 For Freud, repetition, even of difficult events, within a
circumscribed frame transmutes un-pleasure into pleasure.20
It is tempting to see !mijewski’s inviting a one-legged man to climb stairs or a blind
woman to paint a self-portrait along these lines. Encountering one’s own limitations within the
freely elected confines of a game might afford an analogous experience of mastery. Indeed, such
a reading would accord with !mijewski’s proclamations of disability-supremacy. Yet, we do not
pursue here the psychological motivations of individual participants; nor !mijewski’s. (His error
in ascribing such interior states has already been remarked.) Further, such an approach cannot
account for the game resulting in renewed feelings of inadequacy, as it clearly does in Blindly.
Only a full understanding of the repetition compulsion, whatever might lie beyond the pleasure
principle, will comprehend that.
16
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Prompted by observation of the “war neuroses” precipitated by The Great War just
concluded, Freud notes that “dreams occurring in traumatic neuroses have the characteristic of
repeatedly bringing the patient back to the situation of his accident, a situation from which he
wakes up in another fright.”21 He adds, “This astonishes people far too little.”22 Along with these
night terrors, in which the mind relives traumatic experience without transforming it into
pleasure, Freud describes the transference that arises in therapy as the reproduction of negative
affect. With transference, the repressed memories and instinctual renunciations that surface in
neurotic symptoms come to govern the relationship between analyst and analysand. As the result
of an unresolved Oedipus complex, for example, a male subject would “transfer” repressed rage
toward his father onto the person of a male analyst, or repressed desire for his mother were the
analyst female. Freud writes, “He is obliged to repeat the repressed material as a contemporary
experience instead of, as the physician would prefer to see, remembering it as something
belonging to the past.”23 He continues:
Patients repeat all of these unwanted situations and painful emotions in the transference
and revive them with the greatest ingenuity. They seek to bring about the interruption of
the treatment while it is still incomplete; they contrive once more to feel themselves
scorned, to oblige the physician to speak severely to them and treat them coldly.24
Transference differs from masochism because it results in un-pleasure—masochists enjoy;
compulsive repeaters do not. Freud is so astonished by these considerations that he announces
“there really does exist in the mind a compulsion to repeat which overrides the pleasure
principle.”25
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If I linger on Freud’s wrestling with this notion, it is not only because it helps to describe
the formal and emotional world of !mijewski’s works. It is also because at exactly the moment
when Freud perceives psychoanalysis to break down in the face of mental life and the very
process of therapy, he is forced to consider anew individual subjects in their relation to collective
life—and this is the key to understanding !mijewski’s works in their full historical character.
Plainly at a loss, Freud warns, “What follows is speculation, often far-fetched speculation.”26 He
continues, “The manifestations of a compulsion to repeat… exhibit to a high degree an
instinctual character and, when they act in opposition to the pleasure principle, give the
appearance of some ‘daemonic’ force at work.”27 The compulsion is both “daemonic” and
instinctual (or in some translations, a drive) because it seems to work against the subject and,
somehow, from within and beyond our control. Further, that the compulsion expresses through
repetition suggests to Freud that this “instinct is an urge inherent in organic life to restore an
earlier state of things which the living entity has been obliged to abandon under the pressure of
external disturbing forces.”28 The demons we encountered in the previous chapter have come
back again, but this time, rather than being historically inherited specters, they are genetically
pre-programmed impulses, located at the seam of intertwined physical and mental life.
Freud’s demons personify what he will come to call the “death instinct.”29 That is, the
demons push living flesh toward its own annihilation following a compulsion to reclaim the
ultimate original condition: nothingness, submersion and dissolution in the undifferentiated
matter from which life emerged geological ages ago. In this way, the death drive opposes Eros,
which impels us toward survival, complexity, and combination through sexual reproduction and
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which itself is what sets the pleasure principle at odds with the reality principle in the first place.
The existence of a death drive working in tandem with Eros, or the life drive, moves Freud to
rethink the whole situation. Suddenly, death is everywhere; even sex bears its traces. He writes,
“We have all experienced how the greatest pleasure attainable by us, that of the sexual act, is
associated with a momentary extinction of a highly intensified excitation.”30 For him, the little
death at the heart of biological life signals that “The pleasure principle seems actually to serve
the death instincts.”31
Expressing acknowledgment of the limits of his powers in an idiom that speaks the
heterosexist flight from death and Otherness characteristic of his own historical situation, Freud
laments, “Apart from this, science has so little to tell us about the origin of sexuality that we can
liken the problem to a darkness into which not so much as a ray of hypothesis has penetrated.”32
Feeling himself at the edge, he makes his own repetition and goes back to what, for him, is the
origin of this cognitive impasse. He revisits “the theory which Plato put into the mouth of
Aristophanes in the Symposium.”33 The theory is a fable of an original state of nature in which
humanity looked very different. “Everything about these primaeval[s]… was double: they had
four hands and four feet, two faces, two privy parts, and so on.”34 And there were three sexes:
(double) women, (double) men, and women-men. Zeus split these double people in two (making
us), and love, so says Aristophanes, is the desire to reunite and relinquish singularity in
immersive embrace. Freud endeavors to “follow the hint given us by the poet-philosopher, and
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venture upon the hypothesis that living substance at the time of its coming to life was torn apart
into small particles.”35
In doing so, however, the active/passive binarism of his biological determinism
transforms Aristophanes’s love into death. The pleasure principle serves the death instinct in
compelling us to repeat our original state of ego dissolution, self-abnegation through submersion
in collectivity. This is also why all repetitive actions that fail to deliver pleasure (via some
version of mastery) can be understood as the “myrmidons of death.”36 When trauma returns in
our sleep or we fall into thinking our analyst is our mother (instead of the person with whom we
should talk about our mother), we reproduce the experience of subjection. For Freud, this
repetition is the recreation of passivity and, hence, expressive of a demonic compulsion for
nihilation. Each fleeting extinction of the ego is akin to physical death, a vestigial tail linking us
to the originary state of humanity’s prehistory in primordial muck. For all its complexity, Freud’s
framework rests on a tenuous, universalizing, binary logic that equates individual selfhood with
active mastery and collective life with self-denial and passive subjection, which makes it wellsuited to considering !mijewski’s works.
To think of Temperance and Toil, An Eye for An Eye, Singing Lesson, and Blindly
through the logic of the compulsion to repeat gives us a way to hold in productive tension
!mijewski’s triumphalist proclamations regarding the aloof integrity of persons with disabilities
and the renewed un-pleasure the portrayed exercises produce for their subjects. What gets staged
over and over again in these works is the drama of disaggregation, deviation from collective
belonging. Each piece focuses on what it is that separates people one from another, and across
the works the human body is split, fragmented, along the lines of its sensual apparatus. Touch is
35
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the subject of An Eye for An Eye and Temperance and Toil (which also engages smell and taste
as !mijewski and Kozyra nuzzle each other’s various bodily regions and manipulate each other’s
mouths (figures 3.9, 3.10)), hearing in Singing Lesson, and sight in Blindly. !mijewski’s
insistence on the wholeness of the disabled Other is meant to lambast any projected (or
internalized) sense of incompleteness, the idea that unlike must be completed by becoming like
“the rest of us.” This is of course not to say that the Other never desires to assimilate. The
project, rather, is to assign value to each position of the binary, to put forward an argument about
the nature and stakes of individuality. Remaining different, separate, aligns with mastery and
creative life; wishing to integrate with the collective normatively labeled “healthy”—i.e.,
presumptively original because in the majority—entails acquiescence, an internalized sense of
inadequacy, ego death. And this operates for both viewer and subject. We’ve already seen how
the works address viewers’ expectations, but the logic applies, too, to the difference between
painting a blue-striped zebra and seeing it in the mind’s eye and rendering a landscape, but
wanting to swallow poison because you think it still remains secret. The body is analytically
dismantled; individual subjectivity develops from knowing and exercising ownership over one’s
own unique composition.

Real Life and Anti-Realism, or Escape in Poland
I do not mean that !mijewski is a strict Freudian, or that Freud is absolutely correct in
this formulation of individual and collective. Rather, !mijewski’s method and his interest in
restaging this drama of difference (with these particular values assigned to the two positions
described) stem from his artistic training and the way that training was situated within the
political-aesthetic horizon of postwar Poland. Between 1990 and 1995, !mijewski attended the
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Warsaw Academy of Fine Arts, earning his degree in the studio of Grzegorz Kowalski, a
program also known as the Kowalnia, or “smithy,” because of its apparent power in molding
artistic talents.37 (Along with !mijewski, a number of other artists of national and international
renown have emerged from Kowalski’s studio, including Katarzyna Kozyra and Pawe(
Althamer.)38 Kowalski, in turn, got his training at the same institution between 1959 and 1965,
under the direction of Oskar Hansen and Jerzy Jarnuszkiewicz. And it is !mijewski’s (post1989) reaction to Kowalski’s (post-1968/70) crisis of faith in Hansen’s (post-1945) theory of
“Open Form” that has shaped his understanding of the location and value of individuality.
Briefly, Hansen’s theory of Open Form, formulated in 1959, was born of his study and
practice of architecture in Poland and Western Europe in the aftermath of the Second World
War.39 Hansen positioned Open Form against Closed Form; each of these characterized an
understanding of how art and design relate to viewers and users. According to art historian and
curator #ukasz Ronduda:
[The theory] rejected modernist anthropocentrism in architecture, with its universalistic
idea of the ‘mass man.’ Open Form focused on identifying and interpreting the processes
determining the diversity and uniqueness of individuals... He argued that Closed
Form…subordinated the individual, reducing him or her to a passive element in a greater,
dominant, and hierarchical structure.40
Such an emphasis on diversity (as an antidote to passivity and domination) should be understood
not only as a riposte to the Modernist style that would become “International”—Hansen attended
CIAM in 1949, where he had occasion to publicly criticize Le Corbusier—but as an antiauthoritarian stance that had special resonance in Poland. After that conference, in his third year
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of study at the Warsaw University of Technology, a plan for the interior design scheme of a
temporary Warsaw City Hall earned Hansen a trial and official reprimand. According to the
city’s then-chief architect, Józef Sigalin, the plan did not accord with the dictates of socialist
realism.41
According to historian Norman Davies, between 1944 and 1948 “the Soviet Union
forcibly imposed a Soviet-style communist system on Poland, regardless of the people’s wishes
or the country’s independent interests.”42 Stalin reportedly described the process as “like fitting a
cow with a saddle.”43 Along with assuming a monopoly over the discourse and interpretation of
public life in strict Marxist-Leninist terms and instituting a centrally planned economy, the
enforcement of socialist realism as a set of regulations governing artistic production and
rendering it subservient to needs of state became part of the new postwar Polish reality.44
Although the Constitution of 1952 claimed to vest power in the people, Davies argues that Poles
were in fact “its helpless victims. They had no right to put up their own candidates for central
and local government, and no voice in the workings of Party… Reality lay in the dictatorship of
the Party over the people.”45 Socialist realism, as an imperative exported from the Soviet center,
was the order of the day, but the way this mandate played out practically on the ground in Poland
took on its own forms. Art historian Andrzej Turowski writes that “political power held culture
in its sway for many years, but the means implemented to uphold this monopoly varied over
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time.” Describing the political-aesthetic climate that saw Hansen reprimanded, “the so-called
46

culture of Socialist Realism in Poland during the 1950s,” Turowski states, “The artist was
compelled to choose between negative options—to abandon his artistic position or to dissimulate
it... Artists thus were either turned into political agitators merely carrying out decisions by the
political ideologues, or they were led to abandon all public activity.”47 Following his trial,
Hansen opted for the latter, shifting his efforts to exploring Open Form and its ramifications in
the studio and the classroom.
This strategy, the “refusal to participate,” sits on the fault line between autonomy and
heteronomy, and debates as to its value would characterize Polish art for the following decades.48
Even after Stalin died and stylistic policing in Poland relaxed to some degree in the late 1950s
and into the 1960s, discussion about art “had its roots entirely in the Stalinist period
and…focused on the traditional Marxist opposition between realistic and abstract pictorial
styles.”49 The terms of the argument pushed artists interested in refusing participation toward
abstraction, but the state was flexible, all consuming. Any work that could be marshaled to the
state’s ends met with appropriation. Turowski writes that “on the one hand, the geometricism of
abstractionism was assimilated by industrial design. On the other hand, the painterly base of the
Informel made it possible to launch the ‘Polish School’ of the poster.”50 And if debate (still) rolls
along in the U.S. as to the sphinxlike potential complicity/criticality of Pop Art, in Poland, the
government attempted to promote the style, looking for an “aesthetic wrap” that could herald
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products of the planned economy. According to Turowski, “artists responded to this attempt to
51

realign the entire avant-garde under a realist banner with increased ‘anti-realistic’ attitudes.”52
Anti-realism thus meant more than just leaning toward formalism, realism’s usual antithesis,
because formalism itself was so relentlessly co-opted. Anti-realism entailed a withdrawal from
traditional technique and often from the production of objects at all. The inescapable equation of
the slightest intimation of realism—anything that could become practically useful—with
ideological capture painted artists looking to evade recuperation into a theoretical corner. The
only way that art could exceed the state’s grasp, retaining some amount of formal and conceptual
freedom, was for it to retreat further into itself and away from everyday life and the broader
public sphere, which comprised, Turowski remarks, “a development that greatly suited the
authorities.”53
In Hansen’s studio at the Warsaw Academy of Fine Arts, where he taught first as a
member of the Faculty of Interior Design and then of the Faculty of Sculpture, anti-realism
meant an emphasis on the variability of human experience and a rethinking of “artistic
communication.”54 Conceived as dismantling the top-down model of information transmission
that Hansen saw at work in Modernist architecture and in the state’s monopoly on interpretation,
Hansen’s methods promoted “a symmetrical, dialogue-based, communication
relationship…[T]he Hansenian artist-engineer designed contexts and ‘backgrounds’ to aid
expression, but not of himself—rather, of the former recipient, now a partner in the creative
process.”55 The answer to the problem of co-optation, so it seemed, to Poland’s first
Conceptualists—who emerged from Hansen’s studio—was process and dematerialization,
51
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making the content of the work the multiplicity of its meanings. In another (inverted) echo of the
previous chapter, anti-realism is in the viewer’s head. That is, by making the process of reception
the site of art, art practice could remain meaningful to practitioners and audiences as a form of
communication and exchange while keeping form-devouring ideologues at bay. For the theorists
of New German Cinema surveyed in chapter two, thinking realism (through the film) in the
viewer’s head was a way of conceiving how individuals could express themselves in terms of
their position within a social totality, but for Polish Conceptualists, locating the work of art in the
viewer’s head became anti-realism because it was a way to sequester art, its audience, and it
makers from the coercive power of a totalitarian public sphere. In Poland, privacy (rather than
publicity) was the aim—concepts elaborated amongst initiated co-creators could never become
anyone’s “aesthetic wrap.”
A work produced by a number of Hansen’s students—Przemys(awa Kwiek, Zofia Kulik,
Jan S. Wojciechowski, Bart(omiej Zdrojeski, and Ursula Kwiek—is paradigmatic of the
approach. In November 1970, they embarked on Open Form, a film, or compendium of “camerabased activities,” that, theoretically, will never be complete. The structure is complex: They
filmed themselves engaging in various actions—like “Game with the Actress’s Face,” for which
the artists trade increasingly Baroque facial expressions, each one building from and adding to
the previous, or interacting with public sculpture. They also filmed themselves filming, so that a
(35mm) long shot of the studio could later be intercut with (8mm) images of the team required to
make that first image. The resulting film of all these episodes would then be screened for an
audience; during projection, the film would be interrupted, the lights turned on, and the
interruption itself filmed by the artists armed with cameras and “provoking” reaction from the
audience. This footage would then be spliced into subsequent versions, and this last game with
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the audience repeated ad infinitum. The process of facture would always be on display, and the
audience would always become part of the work itself. As Ronduda sums it, “In this model,
everyone is an artist, or there are no artists at all.”56
The worry that perhaps no one could be an artist under Poland’s Party dictatorship—or
that becoming one was of no use to anyone—proved more resilient for other of Hansen’s
students. After witnessing the failure of protest movements internationally in 1968 and the Polish
government’s repression of striking workers in the Gda)sk shipyards in 1970, Grzegorz
Kowalski felt the isolation of the artist’s position acutely. Even if the calculated anti-realism of
Open Form process had found a way beyond recuperation and created works that emphasized the
multiplicity of interpretation, this achievement was, by design, all but illegible to the uninitiated.
Kowalski launched headlong into this double bind, making it the subject of his work. He states,
“I chose a position of deliberate alienation, positioning myself to one side, observing rather than
participating. It is a position of doubt in the artist’s capacities, of which we once had such a bold
notion: that you can change the world. It was a crisis of Hansenian concepts, which had failed
the reality test.”57
At the same time, however, Kowalski’s crisis did not deter him from thinking about how
art speaks to individuals, or even from imagining that it can create communities. His turning
from Open Form was more subtle than that. Ronduda argues that “Kowalski tried to imbue
Hansen’s quasi-scientific (objective and rational) discourse… with a human element that was
strongly existential, sensual, subjective, irrational, psychological, even spiritual.”58 In his
teaching and his own practice he produced works and situations that “initiated subtle
relationships between people. They made the individual sensitive to the existence of another
56

Ibid., 176-180.
Ronduda, Polish Art of the 70s, 189.
58
Ibid.
57

154
person, taught mutual curiosity, and presented the other person as an undiscovered, fascinating
mystery.”59 These works still bear Hansen’s stamp, but there is a marked difference in the quality
and tenor of the mystery of the other before and after 1970.
For a work called Join (1972), several viewers would look at a single image both
separately and together. That is, everyone simultaneously saw the same photograph, an image of
a May Day parade in Warsaw, but viewers were individualized, each looking at the photo
through a separate viewfinder. The work mobilized aspects of Open Form theory in privileging
the process of reception—it consisted in viewers’ reactions to the image. However, Join struck
out in a new direction, or at least accentuated the impulse to privacy, by creating unease and
suspicion amongst the assembled—depending on one’s visible reaction to the photograph in the
viewfinder, one could be adjudged to join (or to have already joined) one of two groups.
Ronduda writes, “Dissident-minded viewers in particular tested their ‘neighbors’ very closely,
analyzing their gestures and grimaces—anything that might reveal their attitude (critical or
affirmative).”60 The work functioned to test a person’s political loyalties, prompting these to
surface for public view. In the previous chapter we saw how filmmakers of the New German
Cinema had similar ideas about how viewers integrate art into their understanding of the world.
But where they were interested in how new works could aid viewers in describing a social
totality, Kowalski wanted to discern the lines that separated social groups in order to know who
could be trusted, who could be admitted to the fellow-traveling inner circle and who should be
kept out. Ronduda describes this as “Kowalski’s characteristic interplay of inclusion and
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exclusion, of a division of the audience into different ‘audiences’: that with whom the
artist…feels an emotional bond…and that with whom no such bond exists.”61
Seeking security this way, Kowalski withdrew further and further from making works of
art for the larger public sphere. The audience with whom he felt a bond and for whom he made
work came more and more to coincide with a small coterie of like-minded artists. He became an
active member of a small group working in and around an independent gallery, Galeria
Repassage. Ronduda states this self-imposed exile “was an attempt to subordinate the public
sphere of an oppressive state to an alternative public sphere, the community of the artist’s
friends.”62 The works produced in this milieu—photographs or sculptures with hidden messages,
Happening-like actions thick with reference—always maintained a “margin of secrecy,”
comprising an esoteric dialogue; “The gallery’s artists shunned [artworld] competition,
preferring instead to build their own, independent community, focused on its own development,
strengthening the authenticity of its own statements, and its own community relationships.”63 In
this coded cloister, Kowalski thought he found the way beyond the state’s reach to what he
called “real life,” which differed from the subjection facing artists in the public eye precisely to
the extent that it was “limited to your family or circle of friends.”64 Only behind such
fortification could one find authentic self-expression and finally be alive.

Synthetic Subjectivism
All through this period (since graduating from Warsaw Academy in 1965), Kowalski had
also been working as a teaching assistant to Hansen. In 1981, a year in which the Polish
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government declared martial law in reaction to the growing popularity and power of Solidarno"#
(Solidarity), Kowalski introduced his approach to free expression in hermetic community to
students at the Academy as the head of his own studio. The centerpiece of his pedagogic practice
is a studio exercise, Obszar wspólny, obszar w$asny [Common Space, Individual Space], or
OWOW. OWOW is like a days-long, improvised Happening performed by and for Kowalski, his
assistants, and his students. While it does not happen every year, it is repeated often enough that
all sculpture students participate at least once. Through OWOW, Kowalski imparts to new
generations his “didactics of partnership,” in which “purely formal material-spatial operations
[are] far less important than people, with their unique, complex personalities.”65
The rules of the game are several, but designed to insure freedom of expression within
the framework—in summary: Everyone is equal. Everyone has their own space apart from the
common space; it’s the cooperative project of all to determine the interrelation of these in
interactive communication. No words are permitted, only “visual signs,” broadly construed. Preplanned actions are prohibited. Similarly, “destructive activities” are not allowed, as these work
at cross-purposes to communication. Finally:
Participation demands being open to unpredictable situations and to the individual
expression of others, the ability to improvise, the readiness to undertake dialogue.
Manifesting one’s personality takes place together with others but not at others’
expense…The process is not directed towards some compositionally adequate or correct
ending.66
Practically, what this means is that Kowalski and his students are sequestered in the studio, with
only their bodies and whatever is on hand—paints, clay, tables, paper, food, fabric, chain-link
fencing, cigarettes, plastic, markers, buckets, cameras, light bulbs, chairs, and so on—with which
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to communicate about themselves in relation to the others. The community is securely sealed and
its own composition and functioning its sole concern.
Art historian Karol Sinkiewicz writes that visually “OWOW may be reminiscent of a
performance… a Happening, or even a theatrical play.”67 He can say this (without having
participated) because documentation of the exercise through photography has occurred since its
inception. In terms of OWOW’s own logic, any of this material would be purely secondary to the
experience of being there. Indeed, these documents have sometimes been used in the process of
group debriefing that always takes place after the fact.68 In these cases, the way the presence of a
camera affects one in the moment is more significant than what will become of any image
produced. It is worth noting, however, that since the victory of Solidarno"# in Poland’s first free,
multiparty elections in 1989 and Lech Wa(*sa’s election to the presidency in 1990, it has become
common for OWOWs to be committed to video in anticipation of public presentation. OWOW
VIII (1992/93) was the first, and OWOW XIII (2011) was conceived from the beginning with
knowledge that it would be shown at the Prague Quadrennial of Performance Design and
Space.69
!mijewski was at the Kowalnia from 1991 to 1995, during this period of (at least)
technological opening toward a notional wider audience. At first, he was excited to have found
Kowalski’s studio. Having already been enrolled in the sculpture program for a year, he says, “If
it hadn’t been for that studio, I’d have certainly dropped out…I learned there existed something
else besides the meticulous recreation, in clay or on paper, of the human figure. There was
hope.”70 That something else was “learning to communicate using signs, forms, and actions with
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materials.” But he soon bumped up against the limits of this communication. Considering his
71

response to an assignment in 1993 will close the loop on this genealogy, bringing us back to our
beginning. Answering through performance a task that consisted only in a two word prompt, “I
Am,” !mijewski found his teacher and classmates sipping coffee at a communal table. He
proceeded to dump a kilo of sugar into the cup before him so that it spilled over the sides and
produced a vertical, inverted cone. He then spit into Kowalski’s coffee and that of his assistant,
licked his finger, and then stirred everyone else’s with the dripping digit.72 !mijewski says his
“intent was to hurt the comfort of the agreement that is art… In my opinion, art is often a shelter
in which some people hide or take cover… [I]t was a desire to construct (on a minimum scale) a
situation analogous to those we often encounter in everyday life.”73 In two years in the
Kowalnia, !mijewski seems to have absorbed its entire philosophy. And to him, the need to keep
the world beyond the studio at bay no longer made sense. What is more, protecting the cloistered
community from disruption seemed to !mijewski to interfere with making meaningful art.
Noting that the atelier community was “created by the line that separated it from the world
outside, which did not know its secret,” he wondered, “How far is this beneficial to education,
though?”74 This strict separation precluded artistic practice from confronting situations in which
“we are physically or mentally kicked around, manipulated and unable to provide an adequate
response to wrongs suffered.”75 Kowalski’s vision of life now seemed partial, inadequate—the
path to authenticity shaped in the recent past’s political-aesthetic climate seemed to !mijewski
only to offer waking death in this new geopolitical moment. !mijewski doesn’t formulate his
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critique in these terms; he never fully confronts the specter of that history, though he makes
some gestures in this direction.
Along with Althamer, !mijewski restaged the OWOW exercise in 2005 at the Center for
Contemporary Art in Warsaw. In repeating it, however, they made two significant changes to its
format. First, many more people were allowed to participate: all students from the years 19881996 were invited, along with any guests they wanted to bring. In the end, these included
preschoolers, middle school students, escort agency workers, and cosmetology students.76 They
also lifted the ban on destructive activity. According to !mijewski, “Making sure our actions are
protected from destruction handicap[s] our knowledge about [its] mechanisms… We repress
anger and aggression but obviously they always come back, this time as demons.”77 No
community could be formed, furniture was smashed, and electronic equipment totaled—the
demons had their day.78
The lesson here, however, is not that communication is so fragile that it (still) needs to be
protected from deleterious external influence. Rather, in order for the individual (and art’s
communicative capacities) to survive one must confront these forces that would ‘kick us around.’
By acknowledging that the destructive impulse is always present and only more or less
successfully repressed, !mijewski suggests that the fault lies in the rules of the game. According
to !mijewski, “the potential of games lies in shifting the attention from artistic activities [to]
activities on social relations…[W]e are corroded by the uncontrolled group process.”79 For
!mijewski, OWOW is not a respite from society, but a model for how group behavior controls
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individuals, depriving them of authentic life. It is up to individuals to supersede the rules and,
thereby, claim the life they should have.
According to this logic, which results in its tortuous fashion from the history (sketched
above) of Polish art’s attempts to create a space of freedom beyond ideological control, the man
in Blindly who laments his disability does not do so because there is something missing from his
life. Rather, !mijewski would have us think that his misery results from his own inability to
master his circumstance, his internalization of the victimhood the “healthy” world imposes upon
him. But Blindly does not set out to render judgment of this person (and one would have to be
psychotic to walk away feeling anything but compassion for this man, save maybe anger or
disbelief at !mijewski’s putting him on trial this way). Staging this struggle for life and death of
the self within the structure of a game offers him one specific way to rise above social rules, but,
more than this, it offers all of us a chance to see those rules in action—and to see how they can
destroy.
So if !mijewski says that art should instrumentalize its autonomy, he does this by
converting OWOW into a tool, a sociologically expanded version of the Fort/Da game, whereby
people are subjected to external pressures in the form a regulated framework and can either reject
these powers or capitulate to them.80 He harnesses OWOW, exaggerating its own logic; changing
it from a place where normal social rules are supposedly suspended into a laboratory where they
can be isolated. This notion that it is the rules themselves that have a deforming influence on
individual subjectivity is probably most evident in Repetition (2005) and The Game of Tag
(1999). Repetition restages the infamous Stanford prison experiment of 1971, devised by
psychologist Dr. Philip Zimbardo. In the initial experiment, twenty-four male college students
(verified by a panel of doctors to be clinically sane) were randomly assigned to be either inmates
80
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or guards in a simulated prison constructed in the basement of the Stanford University
psychology building.81
In Zimbardo’s version, inmates were picked up in mock arrests at unannounced times,
transported to the facility, and assigned prisoner numbers and uniforms. The guards were told to
insure the inmates adhered to guidelines for comportment, but were prohibited from using
physical violence. To heighten the simulation, participants were informed in advance that they
would not be able to quit the experiment once it began, save for health reasons should any arise.
The study intended to see how long it would take for participants to identify with their assigned
roles and what would happen once they did—in short, to see how long it would take average
people (with no prior correctional experience of any kind) to start behaving like prisoners and
jailers, and how they would inhabit the positions assigned by the experiment.82 The prison was to
operate for two weeks, but the situation rapidly deteriorated. By the second day guards had
quelled a riot by spraying inmates with a cold stream of carbon dioxide from a fire extinguisher
and punished them by making them clean toilets with their bare hands, do push-ups to
exhaustion, and use buckets instead of the bathroom.83 And prisoners had begun addressing each
other by assigned numbers. Fearing serious psychological (and potential physical) harm to
participants, Zimbardo pulled the plug after just six days. On the basis of the experiment,
Zimbardo argues for a “situationist perspective” on evil—people conform in scary ways to
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contextual dictates. The study is also sometimes regarded as definitive proof that people are not
innately good.84
!mijewski filmed Repetition for inclusion in the 51st Venice Biennale; his version of the
experiment closely follows Zimbardo’s. In fact, despite the transposition across decades and
continents, the seventy-five minute video recapitulates the original experimental goings-on to an
eerie degree, buckets and all. A stylistic mixture of reality show steady-cam close-ups and
surveillance-style long shots from high, oblique angles works to impart the physical
verisimilitude of the designed prison space to the viewer (3.11). We get some sense, visually, of
what drives the behavior we see. Some of the escalation in the guards’ tactics this second time
around, however, is due to !mijewski’s meddling. The video shows him having frequent
conferences with one of the guards—the most zealous (who also happens to be a trained actor),
whom he promotes to the status of “warden”—telling the man he’s being too lenient in his
punishments. Along with this interference, there is one other significant difference: Individuals
can quit at any time by uttering the phrase, “I withdraw. No reason given.” Along the way, a
couple inmates opt out this way, giving up the wage of forty dollars a day and their commitment
to the experiment, besides. (Filmed entrance interviews with participants tell us that some
mixture of financial need and intellectual curiosity has enticed them into !mijewski’s web). But
when this experiment ends—also on its sixth day—it is because the remaining inmates and
guards have a round-table discussion about what is happening to them and speak in unison their
performative refusal to participate.
The warden calls for this final assembly, having grown increasingly uncomfortable with
his own willingness to dominate the inmates. Repetition makes plain this spiritual wrestling as
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we see him oscillate between demanding ever more obedience from inmates and his disbelief at
his own capacity for cruelty. By externalizing this internal tug-of-war through dialogue and a
spatialized shot-reverse-shot technique—inside the prison the warden is hard, inhuman, but
outside on his smoke breaks with !mijewski he’s introspective and thoughtful—the video works
to isolate the role of ‘the warden’ and its context as an alien, threatening force. The man and ‘the
warden’ are not the same person; it is their coincidence that has dangerous results. The
man/warden prefaces the final meeting by listing words and phrases on sheets of paper he
distributes to all participants: “Correctional facility, rehabilitation, prisoner, guard, warden, man,
dignity, regulations, the golden mean.” The list is an agenda, but also a dissection. Seeing the
prison microcosm thus splintered, the participants take control and bring the experiment to a
conclusion. They all shake hands and introduce themselves as though meeting for the first time.
The only person denied forgiveness by the group at the debriefing session held the
following day (true to OWOW form) is the inmate who acted both most defiantly and with the
most servility. (This inmate convinced others to shave their heads and performed the operation
himself, even after they had refused to capitulate to the warden’s demand to do so.) The warden
finds redemption, the inmate demonization—each for the extent to which he is able to extricate
himself from the strictures of role. If the Zimbardo study makes one wonder whether people can
ever be in control, !mijewski’s makes us believe we should always be able to draw on an
internal reserve of righteousness to pull ourselves up by the bootstraps and do the right thing.
When the stakes are less clear, however, it gets harder to achieve such a shining
outcome. Even if !mijewski’s subjects were unaware of the original prison study, the option to
quit would have clued them in to the idea that the game was designed to test the limits of their
tolerance for degradation. In The Game of Tag, there is more of a disjunction between the rules
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of the game and what is at stake. This almost-four-minute video features eight Polish men and
women of various ages playing tag. They are all naked, and this causes some amount of
discomfort and embarrassment. So, too, does the location, a cold, unfinished basement. Soon,
however, they acclimate and the game takes off running. Everyone is having fun, laughing,
smiling (3.12). The editing—all jump cuts—adds to the frenetic pacing without interfering with
the story (since there is none). Only occasionally are there passages where we think we might be
able to grasp something like a !mijewski message, like when the action slows and the camera
focuses in on a man leering at a young woman, his closing in for the “tag” smacking for a second
of sexual predation. One of the jump cuts, however, takes us almost imperceptibly to a different
location. The subjects are still playing tag, but the lighting is slightly different, the walls a bit
narrower and darker, and there’s a little embankment running along the wall that looks like it
could function as a bench. We learn at the very end of the video, through a message in white text
on a black screen, that this second location is the former gas chamber of a Nazi concentration
camp.
The effect is shock. The video caused an uproar when it was displayed in 2011 as part of
a show at the Berlin Martin-Gropius Bau called “Side by Side, Germany-Poland: 1,000 Years of
Art and History.” Advocacy groups complained, tabloid news media sensationalized the
controversy with headlines like “Modern art exhibition of emaciated naked Nazi war camp
prisoners is withdrawn after Jewish protests,” and curators decided to remove the work from the
exhibition.85 Disingenuous in the extreme, !mijewski answered that the piece is about exploring
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memory and that “Instead of a tragedy we see here an innocent child’s game.” But Fort/Da
fails here because there is no way out of this game. It is difficult to imagine how such a work
could help the portrayed individuals or any of us watching after the fact process the historical
trauma of Zyklon B. What makes the work difficult to watch, however, is not that it fails to
master the memory (as if such a thing were possible), but the fact that its subjects could be
persuaded to have fun somewhere we normally think it is and ought to be impossible to do so.
Tag revisits not the fact of the Holocaust, but the mechanism by which individuals can forget
themselves in deference to rules. The tether between group-think and death is palpable.
In this way, Tag is an embryonic, non-narrative version of Them (2007). The latter
differs, however, insofar as !mijewski uses the structure of a game not to test participants’
willingness to comply with rules he imposes, but to elicit from them the rules that govern their
daily lives and, hence, how they forfeit their own subjective freedom to collective experience all
the time. For this work, !mijewski invited representatives from four groups with well-defined
political/cultural affiliations—members of All-Polish Youth, older devout Catholic women,
young Jews, and a social-progressive coalition—to participate in a performance-art-based-gamecum-political-discussion in a large studio space. The initial task presented to each group is to
paint a representation of their ideal Poland, to condense it into an image for all to see. For this
phase of the game, the groups come to the studio one by one. The nationalists render a tall,
inverted Szczerbiec, a medieval Polish sword with a golden horseshoe-shaped handle and
emblazoned with the Polish coat of arms at the hilt, the whole thing criss-crossed by strips of red
and white tape (the colors of the Polish flag) (figure 3.13). The Catholics depict a tall church
with multiple domes, stained glass windows, and a soaring crucifix (figure 3.14). The Jews
outline the shape of Poland’s geographical territory in red paint, filling the interior with the
86
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Hebrew spelling of “Poland” in large black letters, which is translated into Polish in smaller
letters below (figure 3.15). The progressives create a red shield, limned by a multi-color border,
on which they paint the Polish word for “Freedom” in the same polychrome motif (figure 3.16).
On arriving for day two, or “Meeting One,” of the game, !mijewski announces the task:
“Our game begins here. If you feel you don’t like something about this situation, you can change
it. You can re-edit [sic] it, rewrite it, draw it again, destroy it or add something. There are no
restrictions.” The result is predictable. Initial attempts at accommodation and compromise spin
out into iconoclastic fits and shouted accusations. The game ends when !mijewski extinguishes
the third in a series of arsons, and everyone has to leave the room because of the looming
miasma of smoke and flame-fighting chemicals. As Claire Bishop puts it, “Them offers a
poignant meditation on collective identification and the role of images in forging these
identifications, as well as a harsh parable about social antagonisms and the facility with which
ideological differences become hardened into irresolvably blocked patterns of communication.”87
We can further specify and sharpen this point, however, by placing it in the context of
!mijewski’s discourse. We should see how he twists the knife into his OWOW training here; it is
belonging to a group itself that makes communication impossible. When faithful representation
of a group’s platform supersedes interpersonal exchange, intersubjectivity is foreclosed because
subjectivity recedes. This is why !mijewski begins the exercise by having the groups define
themselves in corporate terms (through symbols). For him, “The art object can provide a kickstart, with an incendiary effect on the ‘vapors’ of our world-views… Mental space may be
pierced or penetrated by an object, and art-objects reveal a specific map, the map of those world-
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views.” His claims to the contrary notwithstanding, he knew this game would go down in
flames (figure 3.17).
At the same time, the failure of communication in Them is the success of his theory. By
catalyzing world-views, he points to the everyday deadlock of group-think. In concluding this
chapter, I will discuss one last work in terms how it harnesses repetition to illustrate not only
!mijewski’s notion that the internalization of a social role destroys individual will, but how
dwelling on repetition might contribute to a larger conversation about how one’s own sense of
authenticity is produced by history. 80064 (2004) might be the most excruciating piece in
!mijewski’s house of horrors oeuvre. In this eleven minute video, !mijewski convinces 92-yearold Holocaust survivor Józef Tarnawa to have his Auschwitz prisoner number tattoo, 80064,
refreshed (re-inked) by a tattoo artist and then films it happening. Gone are the trappings of a
game—there are no rules to be announced, no songs to be sung, no pictures to be painted.
Tarnawa is both subject and object; the world-view inscribed on his subjectivity is whatever
issues from the literal mark of captivity he bears on his left forearm. Already in the title, though,
some of !mijewski’s not-so-subtle argumentation peaks through. The video opens with 80064 in
white numerals on a black ground; the next shot is an extreme close-up of Tarnawa from
mustache to eyebrows—the equation of the man with the number is underway. The first few
minutes are an interview of sorts, the camera panning back-and-forth between a seated Tarnawa
and a standing !mijewski. A third man is in the shots with !mijewski—we realize soon enough
that he’s the tattooist. !mijewski asks Tarnawa to identify himself and describe a little about life
in the camp, channeling discussion toward whether anyone resisted. Taranawa replies no, people
just did what was needed to survive.
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!mijewski asks him about his tattoo, and he obliges, rolling up his sleeve to display the
number, of which Tarnawa is evidently very proud—not only because it is a relatively low
number (meaning he survived a long hardship in the camp), but, interestingly, he speaks
admiringly of its shape as well. A certain kind of pride in concentration camp number tattoos,
however, is far from unusual. In October 2012, the New York Times ran a story about young
Israelis getting their grandparents’ number tattoos inked on their own skin as acts of homage and
reverence.89 Tarnawa mentions how people can recognize him as a survivor because of the
tattoo, then trails off, clearly wanting to conclude, “But it’s all forgotten. One has forgotten being
in Auschwitz.” !mijewski nods; Tarnawa adds with a smile, “Anything else?” !mijewski
reminds him that he wants to “renovate” the tattoo. This is the first the viewer’s heard of the
plan, but over the course of the ensuing negotiation it becomes clear the renovation has been prearranged, and that’s why they are where they are. Suddenly, the setting stops looking like just
some small room and starts looking like a tattoo parlor.
Tarnawa resists, nearly begging !mijewski to drop the subject. The scene is pathetic,
horrible. Tarnawa had previously agreed, but since changed his mind, and he appeals to
!mijewski as though it were !mijewski’s decision to make: “I’ll be happy if you don’t do this.”
But the machine is already moving; Tarnawa bends to seeming inevitability: “All right. What can
I say? After all, I agreed on it.” His grumbling gives way to a minute-and-a-half of the needle’s
buzzing. The same power imbalance that foisted the tattoo on this man the first time seems to
manifest all over again, amplified by the camera’s vision of !mijewski’s erect monumentality
and Tarnawa’s slouching frailty. Or, at least, this is !mijewski’s take on the events. He says
“When I undertook this film-experiment with memory, I expected that under the effect of
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tattooing the ‘gates of memory’ would open…a stream of images or words describing the painful
past. Yet that didn’t happen.” What did happen, he insists, is that “In the memory of this former
prisoner, the condition for survival, necessitated by the extremely oppressive and restrictive
environment, was extreme conformity. And in the film such an act of conformism, consent and
subordination is repeated.”90 Again !mijewski positions events in the Fort/Da idiom: Tarnawa
could have willed his own tattooing, thus bringing it under his mastery, but failed to do so and
submitted to it nonetheless. Either event would have confirmed !mijewski’s theory of
subjectivity; in this case, the slave remains a slave.
But the most fascinating vector of their exchange—and one that is constructive in placing
!mijewski’s approach within our larger framework—concerns the tattoo’s authenticity.
Taranawa protests (figure 3.18), “It won’t be the same number, it will be restored…It won’t be
original.” !mijewski doesn’t miss a beat (figure 3.19): “It will remain the same. We won’t
corrupt it…The number won’t turn unauthentic… It will be original. Things like that cannot be
removed or changed. It will remain original.” As awful as it is, the passage is also a crux and
delivers two important lessons—one to do with art, one with life; together they show us how
repetition negotiates the space between the two.
First, on the art axis, the tattoo remains original for !mijewski, even on being touched up,
because the renewed experience repeats the events of its initial appearance. That is, the second
tattooing remains faithful to the first event because it recapitulates the same power relations (of
domination) and the same subject position on Tarnawa’s part (submission). The event shuttles
through time; the past springs whole from the “art-object” (the tattoo and its facture) into the
present moment. Every time !mijewski repeats an event—the confrontation with the vicissitudes
of embodiment, the prison study, the failure of political communication, and so on—it is not a
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copy of an original, but the real thing taking place there and then. The “renovated” tattoo is
therefore original. Even more significant to the larger argument of this dissertation, this view of
repetition means that each video work portraying these life and death struggles then becomes the
art-object that sets our own world-views aflame as we watch. Each screening is original—like a
nightmare spread out across a disaggregated collective unconscious, each recurrence generating a
fresh experience. Or as Freud would have it, another fright.
The value of such an exercise (and the power of these works), in fact, is that !mijewski
compels us to repeat what we see. In this way, his works enact the same reproducibility (of life)
as do Sierra’s hybrid installation/photo/videos and Schlingensief’s multimedia actions. All these
purport to condense reality into a framed proposition that then elicits and catalyzes viewer’s
worldviews through the work of interpretation, thus producing a reflected image of social reality.
We end up parsing the people on display, including the artist, into an ‘us’ and a ‘them.’ We
blame unthinking “healthy” society for looking down on people with disabilities, we blame
partisan zealots for political impasses, we blame !mijewski for the sad case of Józef Tarnawa.
When we do this, however, we fall into the trap he’s laid. We’ve started to treat the analyst as
though he were our father instead of talking about our father. (And this should remind us of the
tendency of Sierra’s critics to blame either him or the world universally for the social relations he
puts on display.) As !mijewski puts it, “Renouncing the role of judge will reveal our collective
and individual complicity... Then it will no longer be ‘them’ but us who will share responsibility
for the way our shared reality looks.”91
But !mijewski makes a terrible analyst. This is where life intrudes, complicating art.
Recall that Freud laments when a patient, “is obliged to repeat the repressed material as a
contemporary experience instead of, as the physician would prefer to see, remembering it as
91

!mijewski, “The Applied Social Arts,” 33.

171
something belonging to the past.” To invert this formulation, to wish for another fright, is to
discount or simply ignore the context of a given repetition. A memory is no less real than a
repetition—it only makes available a different kind of work that might be accomplished in the
therapeutic situation by accounting for difference across time in this new space. For !mijewski,
there is no such difference not only because he is not a therapist, but because the space of the
game is autonomous, able to contain or conform to whatever personalities might enter.
Repetition here, in this autonomous zone, is both historical (because it activates neuroses
stemming from past trauma) and presentist (because it imagines that each repetition must be
identical). In the end, there is only repetition; never difference. This focus on art’s autonomy
reverses the category confusion we saw in chapter one, wherein people mistake unfurling the
Marxist critique of capital for elaborating how art mediates it for audiences. !mijewski’s
assertion of autonomy (no matter how instrumentalized) results in the same deadlock, this time
mistaking his own aesthetic frame of reference that posits collective life as deadening for a
political truth. This categorical collapse motivates his own belief that rupture—eruptive
individuality this time—is our best and only hope (which, oddly, reflects back the logic of
“Political Minimalism” from across the looking glass).
!mijewski’s notion of art’s autonomy—of the game as an ideal laboratory for testing
individuals’ self-awareness and self-construction—comprises an aesthetic inheritance stemming
from his own historical situation. Two generations of Polish artists worked to create the
autonomy that !mijewski instrumentalizes. His rejection of the community model he inherits
from Kowalski (by taking the studio game “out into the world,” or perhaps filling it with the
world) only reinforces its presumption of comprising a space apart from ideological capture, its
definitive disjunction between individuals (and their provisional groups based on insular
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identity) and the larger social world. There is nothing “post-studio” about !mijewski’s
practice—he just takes it with him wherever he goes. His theory of the subject, then, was not
only born of a specifically sited art history, but remains inside it. This is why his notion of the
individual can seem revolutionary to him, but regressive to me.
But it is also why !mijewski’s use of repetition in imagining how one can take individual
responsibility for collective history adds to a comparative history, and to a general theory of the
historical character of performance-driven works and their lives as mediated forms. His works
offer another example of how reproducible performance elicits and reflects an individual’s
aesthetic judgments as an understanding of one’s own relation to collective life. In this case, the
works and their cultural inheritance infuse collectivity with a negative power against which
individuals must rebel. As we have seen, this aesthetic frame functions like a disavowed
specter—it’s most powerful when believed inert. !mijewski’s pursuit of rupture, like so much
thrashing around in quicksand, only drives his works and their effects deeper into a contextuallyspecific mode of perception. The next chapter directly addresses the spatial character of
history—not only the informing influence of context, but how context itself gets defined—in
considering the works of the former-Yugoslavian/Slovene collective, Neue Slowenische Kunst.
We will see that these artists of the former East approach the question of collectivity from the
same angle as !mijewski, asking after the location and nature of individuality, but that by
pursuing the construction of context in geopolitically comparative terms they develop a model
that responds (rather than reacts) to history.
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Chapter Four
Ambassadors of the Future Past:
IRWIN and History as Readymade
Among all these elements intended to provide representations, while impeding
them, hiding them, concealing them because of their position or their distance
from us, this is the only one that fulfills its function in all honesty and enables us
to see what it is supposed to show… But it isn’t a picture: it is a mirror.
-Michel Foucault on Velázquez’s Las Meninas1
The history of painting is the history of repetition.
-IRWIN2

In Medias Res
Without an appreciation of the political-aesthetic landscape of Yugoslavia in the 1980s
(and then Slovenia in the early 1990s), it would be impossible to recognize the salient aspects of
IRWIN’s method, thought, and work. At the same time, however, the combined practice of their
roughly thirty years’ production amounts to a critique of the idea that ‘context’ is something

1

Michel Foucault, The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences (1966) (New York:
Vintage Books, 1994), 6-7.
2
IRWIN, “A Diary of Work” (1985), quoted in Marina Gr+ini&, “Neue Slowenische Kunst,” in
Impossible Histories: Historical Avant-gardes, Neo-avant-gardes, and Post-avant-gardes in Yugoslavia,
1918-1991, eds. Dubravka Djuri& and Mi"ko ,uvakovi& (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2003), 258-260.

174
given in advance, a background that can be taken for granted as the stable support of a figure.
The collective courts liminal states, testing the strength of categories that organize daily life—
institutional, temporal, and political. Their art lives in a conceptual terrain roughly equivalent to
the charged field Clement Greenberg once described as the special province of Modernist
painting—the palpable suspended tension produced by the coincidence of literal flatness and
perceived depth.
This chapter will trace IRWIN’s production of these zones of suspension across the
related fields of time and space in order to detail how this interest in liminality constitutes, above
all, a unique approach to understanding the role of collective history in producing individual
consciousness. First, I will describe how and why IRWIN began as an artists’ group, exploring
through their own working method questions of collectivity, individuality, and institutional
power. This will entail a brief history of the group’s inception in 1983, especially how the
IRWIN collective developed as a subsidiary group under the umbrella collective, Neue
Slowenische Kunst [New Slovene Art]. We will see how IRWIN’s works (and the initial works
of their partner collective, Laibach) differ from that of contemporaries in pursuing what it is that
determines collective life.
I will analyze why IRWIN became a painters’ collective at exactly the moment when
most so-called “New Art Practice” in Yugoslavia involved modes we more reflexively associate
with contemporary art such as performance and video. We will see that IRWIN’s development of
a rigorous painterly practice of “unoriginality” and repetition details how the past persists in the
present by producing temporal suspension. By working through the visual languages of
ideologies that were at once officially off-limits and constitutive of Yugoslavia’s political selffashioning—Suprematism, Socialist Realism, Nazi Kunst, and folk and religious traditions—
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IRWIN’s paintings effect historical condensations, collecting points where remnants of the nottoo-distant past can be confronted and contemplated in the present, fixing the viewer at the crux
between then and now.
Further, IRWIN’s emphasis on display and historical narration differs from that of their
contemporaries—both the performance-based works of artists associated with New Art Practice
and that of their NSK compatriots—in looking to create a mode of spatial analysis. That is, while
New Art Practice could be suborned by official culture in a liminal position of its own, existing
as a kind of unofficial official art, to the extent that it could be understood as the personal
reaction of a given artist to the world around them, IRWIN’s paintings ask how collective
context is created through the geopolitical production of space. An analysis of IRWIN’s
involvement in East Art Map (2006), a historical textbook and web-database that comprises the
first ever attempt to narrate for a global audience the history of contemporary art in the now
former Eastern bloc, will begin to elaborate how they conceive the importance of place to the
experience of time—what it means to consider that history is not given, but something
experienced differently by populations variously sited within with the field of Cold War
relations.
Finally, in fully enunciating the double movement involved in finding oneself in both
time and space, I argue that IRWIN conceives of history as readymade. Emphasizing the dual
spatial-temporal character of the readymade demonstrates that confronting history and its
informing influence entails thinking the flow of time and the production of space together. This
art historical and theoretical consideration will frame the discussion of one final IRWIN project.
After Slovenian independence, NSK (with members of IRWIN at the helm) transformed itself
into a state with no territorial claims, the NSK State in Time. This ongoing conceptual project,
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now more than twenty years old, concretizes many of the more abstract notions at work across
their practice. In performatively founding a new state, the group offers a global audience a new
route to historical self-understanding by staging the conflict between the models of utopia
offered by East and West in their world-historical contest on the occasion of its purported
conclusion. The IRWINs themselves adopt the pose of state bureaucrats, disseminating lucid, but
densely packed official statements, founding temporary embassies and going on diplomatic
junkets (where they appear in suited and tied uniformity), and the state issues passports to an
ever-expanding number of NSK State citizens. Through the form of the NSK State passport,
individuals confront their position within diffuse powerful global networks by enunciating their
particular experience of the state’s collective project. NSK State brings the gestures of nation
building into the space of art as performance (one that comes to include citizens in its
composition) and thus brings about a collision between political aims and aesthetic modes of
perception similar to those precipitated by all the other works described in this dissertation.
Moreover, this performance-based approach to the question of nationhood and transnational
utopia only makes plain the way IRWIN’s earlier works also index and describe the social aspect
of individuality through the processes of reception they catalyze. I argue that through a
readymade approach to historical painting styles, the form of the state, and historiography alike,
IRWIN offers audiences the chance to find an image of themselves as a unique node suspended
in the flow of time and between the grinding tectonic plates of transnational ideologies.
Un/Official Art
The ideological lay of the land in post-World War II Yugoslavia was unusual, or at least
difficult to classify. Composed of the now independent regions of Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and
Herzegovina, Serbia, Kosovo, Montenegro, and Macedonia, the region was united as the Federal
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People’s Republic of Yugoslavia from 1946 to 1963 and then known as the Socialist Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia until its eventual atomization, which began in the 1980s and continued
until Kosovo’s declaration of independence—the last in a fraught series—in 2008. The regions
bound by federated Yugoslavia vary by language, religion, cuisine, and so on, and the bloody
sectarian wars of the 1990s gave violent expression to differences that had always existed, but
had been held in balance, more or less, by the World War II partisan-cum-president-for-life Josip
Broz Tito. (Germany invaded Yugoslavia in 1941; we should count the resistance to this
occupation among the political factors that sustained Tito’s popularity, as well as Yugoslavia’s
sense of corporate togetherness.) Tito helmed the Federal Republic from 1943 until his death in
1980; through the unique admixture of the region’s cultural and geographical spread and Tito’s
leadership, Yugoslavia’s Cold War position was nothing short of absolutely in-between. Tito
famously broke with Stalin in 1948, but he also refused to ally with the United States, even
though the U.S. supplied the country with aid. Yugoslavia was therefore something of a Cold
War platypus: a communist nation supported by the West, at odds with the East, and allied with
neither.
Considered culturally, Yugoslavia’s category confusion only compounds. At the height of
its unified breadth, the federation stretched from the bordering countries of Italy and Austria (in
the northwest) to Bulgaria and Greece (in the southeast) along the Adriatic Sea. As much as it
represented one nation under Tito, it was constituted by a wide variety of historical inheritances.
Slovenia, for example, (in the nation’s northwest) had wildly different cultural traditions as
compared with Macedonia (in the southeast). Considering even more proximate countrymen,
historian and theorist Ale" Erjavec writes, “Neither Croatia nor Slovenia had their own national
states before Yugoslavia was formed… It was language (and the ensuing culture) that
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distinguished, say, a Habsburg Croat or a Slovene.” Yugoslavia was always a balancing act
between local differences and prospective unity, a kind of national nominalism that sought to
create a new entity of already extant parts.
Aesthetically speaking, much of what constituted the Yugoslavian whole beyond the sum
of its parts, then, stemmed from its unique Cold War position. As art historian Bojana Peji& puts
it, “Due to the break between communist Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union in 1948, the ‘official’
art in Yugoslavia was not socialist realism, but Modernism.”4 The particular brand of Modernism
that flourished in postwar Yugoslavia was always promoted as an enlightened riposte to Soviet
centrally planned culture. That is, the promotion of Modernism valorized “aestheticized,
nondogmatic, ideologically neutral, and artistically independent expression and presentation” in
direct opposition to the dictates governing Soviet socialist realism.5 Art historian Mi"ko
,uvakovi& terms this aesthetic imperative “moderate modernism” and argues, “On the one hand
this allowed artists to approach the mainstream of international Western modernism, while on the
other it was a voice of resistance to the more radical versions… [It] focused on the laws of form
and pictorial problems.” For him, this modernism is moderate because it remained “traditional
enough… to satisfy new tastes arising from social conformism, and inert enough to fit into the
myth of a happy, unified community.”6 Peji& avers, “Despite a one-party system and a state-run
economy, Titoist Yugoslavia was a country which intended to prove its internationalism and
cultural openness.”7

3

Ale" Erjavec, “The Three Avant-Gardes and Their Context,” in Impossible Histories, 39.
Bojana Peji&, “Body-based Art: Serbia and Montenegro,” in Body and The East, from the 1960s to the
Present, ed. Zdenka Badovinac (Ljubljana: Moderna Galerija Ljubljana), 72.
5
Mi"ko ,uvakovi&, “Impossible Histories,” in Impossible Histories, 10.
6
Ibid., 11.
7
Peji&, “Body-based Art,” 72.
4

179
This openness, however, was not without its limits. There existed a paradoxical official
policy of promoting non-ideological art; this chimerical quality was secured by a narrow focus
on medium identity. NSK member Eda -ufer reports that even in this “friendliest version of
Eastern European communism” artistic practices that exceeded the medium-specific brief posed
a problem. She writes:
Official cultural professional organizations had monopolies in their fields and acted
repressively towards any cultural practice that did not wish to submit to their
hierarchies… Unions of Visual Artists tolerated or even propagated rigid versions of
Greenbergian modernism while remaining intolerant of any approach to art other than the
one they prescribed… The artist who submitted to the policy of the unions had work and
was exhibited, while those who did not were abandoned and dropped into the void of
historical amnesia.”8
The state’s assumption of Modernism, then, only served as a counter-move designed to establish
a relative difference from the Soviet Union, a stylistic evil eye meant to signify autonomy and
ward off interlopers. The structural mechanics of monopoly over “the use of language, the
proscribed interpretation of reality,” in the two federations, however, remained deeply similar.9
For -ufer, it makes little sense to think of “West-East as a line and a divide, as opposed to a
continuum and a unity.”10
That said, one should be clear that access to institutional backing and funds, uncertain
though it may have been, was indeed a much more friendly game in Yugoslavia than elsewhere
along the Eastern end of the spectrum. Whereas the 1970s saw repression enforced by bulldozer
in Russia, in Yugoslavia the decade witnessed a rapid expansion in state-funded “unofficial”
activities.11 Particularly in the capital city, Belgrade, the government financed experimental
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production and hosted international festivals. The Belgrade International Theatre Festival
(established in 1967), for example, convened foreign practitioners of various stripes of
conceptual and performance art (including Michelangelo Pistoletto and his Lo Zoo troupe, Jannis
Kounnelis, and Daniel Buren) along with Yugoslavian artists like Slovenia’s OHO.12 Similarly,
in nearby Novi Sad, public galleries like Tribina mladih not only showed such works, but
published reviews and reports on international goings on—this gallery published the first
Yugoslavian analyses of body art in 1972. Peji& states the “anthology edited by Vlado
Kopicl…(The Artist’s Body as Subject and Object of Art) was comprised of the translated texts
dealing with early American body works,” and she further underscores the importance of this
publication hazarding, “If I am to mark the very beginning of body art in Serbia, I can say that,
although some works are of earlier date, the body boom occurred in 1973.”13 It was in 1973, for
instance, that Marina Abramovi& presented her first body-based work, Rhythm 10, at the
Edinburgh Art Festival—an example of reciprocated international openness, no less.
It is clear that during this period there were outlets in the region for a wide variety of
approaches to art: “earth works, conceptual and process art, anti forms, arte povera, video and
artist’s film, analytic painting and body-based works, like street actions, fluxus-oriented events,
performances”—all of which came to be grouped under the heading “New Art Practice” during
the 1970s.14 OHO and Abramovi& rank among the period’s pantheon; others like Sanja Ivekovi&,
Braco Dimitrijevi&, and Mladen Stilnovi& have only begun to receive comparable international
attention in recent years. What is more, Peji& asserts that curators and critics settled on the
before militia backed by bulldozers charged the assembled artists and viewers, injuring some, arresting
others, and destroying artworks. See Primary Documents: A Sourcebook for Eastern and Central
European Art since the 1950s, eds. Laura Hoptman and Tomá" Pospiszyl (New York: Museum of
Modern Art, 2002), 65-77.
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descriptor “new” as a way of marking this generation’s interest in making a “shift from art as a
‘universal language’ to art as an individual ‘language.’”15 This shift from “universal” problems
of form to “individual” preoccupations also gave politics a way to re-enter conversations about
art within the terms of the mandate for “artistically independent expression.” If and when such
expression ever exceeded the bounds of the officially permissible, however, funding was
withdrawn from an exhibition.16 So while artists exhibiting through the infrastructure in Serbia
did not have carte blanche, there existed enough leeway in this realm of official unofficial art to
probe the limits.
We should note, however, that such tentative transgression was successful, or acceptable,
in direct proportion to the extent that it could be understood as individual, as the unique
expression of a creative subject rather than direct political agitation. Abramovi& is paradigmatic
in this respect. Curator and historian Zdenka Badovinac invokes the language of Peggy Phelan to
describe how Abramovi&’s “ritual body… featured in performative practices primarily as a
bearer of freedom and individuality.”17 She writes, “The pain in body art is irreproducible, and
precisely this quality makes it [a] significant ‘means of expression.’”18 This focus on the
“irreproducible” moment of performance, the experience in time that disappears instantly,
undergirds the assertion that Abramovi&’s practice could signify as eluding ideological capture—
the part of performance that cannot be reproduced is the part that could stand aloof from official
discourse.
At the same time, however, Badovinac relates that Abramovi&’s body possessed a
subversive element for artists and audiences attuned to the way it differed in relief against the
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“asexual, androgyne” body of socialist realism. What actually made Abramovi& available to
critical discourse, then, was precisely the ways it did signify, what it did represent—a counterdiscourse of sexual embodiment only visible through comparison. Pace Phelan (and Badovinac),
the legibility, the representational capacity, of performance is what provided any political thrust.
The ability to speak to an audience rooted in a particular place and its ideological horizon drew
on a collective condition of subjection to authority and, hence, acted as subversion. The focus on
“irreproducible” time, however, universalizes performance, denaturing its site-specificity, and,
ironically, converts this “post-medium” practice into a medium par excellence, one so rigorous
that identity is its only characteristic—the identity of one moment to itself (which can never be
retrieved) and the identity of an artist to him or herself (which can never be known or spoken by
anyone else). Small wonder that Abramovi& would have been able to represent Yugoslavia on an
international stage. (The facts of reception on the ground in Yugoslavia do not bear out the
rhetoric deployed to explain them; I would hazard that the importation of performance theory in
that same Serbian text of 1972 is to blame.)
The focus on individual creativity, moreover, suggests why -ufer’s criticism of state
culture is accurate and its embattled tone justified. And it is not just because artists did not have
total freedom to express themselves in any way whatever. Rather, there are two intrinsically
related factors that motivate her charge that unofficial artists were always at risk of being swept
away in tides of “historical amnesia.” First, there were relatively few institutions in Slovenia
until the late 1970s and early 1980s. Indeed, Slovenian artist and theorist Marina Gr+ini&
remarks that the OHO group had no choice, but to “seek refuge” in Belgrade.20 Arts instruction
at the Academy of Plastic Arts in Ljubljana focused on modernist (or moderate modernist)
19
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training in traditional media; the few Slovene artists to attain any (local) public profile were
painters working in the idioms of Art Informel or post-painterly abstraction.21 And there were no
venues for the exhibition and discussion of contemporary production until the Students’ Cultural
and Artistic Center (,KUC) opened in 1978.22 When this autonomous gallery opened (with a
homecoming retrospective of works by OHO), it represented a new kind of venue for Ljubljana
and Slovenia.
,KUC ushered in a new era in the Slovene art scene. And by 1980 a great deal was
changing throughout Yugoslavia; Tito’s death weakened the federated union—it was by no
means clear how the country would move forward without him. The existential anxiety is
palpable in the contemporaneous slogan: “After Tito – Tito!”23 ,KUC itself became what
Gr+ini& and Erjavec describe as the “central cultural and artistic institution of the alternative
movement.”24 The physical space of the center served as a collecting point for the previously
underground energies and activities circulating in and around the university—in the forms of
Radio Student (the university station), Mladina and Tribuna (zines), theater groups, bands, and
artists experimenting with new media (especially video). In addition to initiating new projects
and works “out of the almost physical condensation of multifarious happenings” and staging a
few public performances (in addition to the exhibitions in the gallery), ,KUC served as an object
lesson in the power of self-organization and testified to the amount of interest in unofficial
culture that existed in formerly diffuse corners of the city.25 Over the next few years, similar
collective spaces sprung up around Ljubljana to host screenings, concerts, and young people
21
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looking for a place to congregate. Clubs like FV Disco and K4 Club showcased local
experimental video works alongside punk music videos from abroad, generating a heady
aesthetic mixture of détourned state propaganda and aggressive DIY that marked acolytes in
their dress and comportment and the streets with graffiti—the visibility of difference and dissent
became an everyday affair.26 By 1984 Ljubljana became the first Eastern European city to have
an organized, politicized movement of gay people with the advent of the men’s artistic and social
group Magnus and a lesbian subdivision of the women’s group Lilit.27 The existence of all these
groups was precarious—they were often forced to move from one place to another, to exist as
something in between public spaces and secret societies—and all had evolved from and in
connection to the ,KUC umbrella.

Unoriginality and Modernist Myth
The existence of these unofficial networks of unofficial artists also meant that different
types of art were made—art that confronted (through collective production and address) topics
like the images and legacies of forbidden political thought and their roles in contemporary
society. In fittingly counter-intuitive fashion, it was more difficult and unorthodox to examine
old forms of art than to experiment with ones that seemed entirely new. The industrial-art-rock
band Laibach (which would go on to be one of the three founding member groups of NSK) got
its first taste of art history’s ability to foment political controversy in September 1980 (just four
months after Tito’s death). Dejan Knez, a Laibach member, worked with ,KUC to organize a
show (featuring his and other bands, as well as short films and graphic works by various artists)
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in Laibach’s hometown, Trbovlje—a small mining town about 60km east of Ljubljana. The
show, which was called “An Alternative to Slovene Art,” never materialized. Overnight the
band’s posters of single black crosses on white ground (in the style of Kazimir Malevich (figure
4.1)) and underscored by the word “laibach”—the band’s name, but also the German word for
Ljubljana—were papered over by state propaganda posters advertising “The Week of the
Campaign Against Smoking,” “Thrift Week,” and “The Week of the Child.”28 The zine Mladina
reported the story in critical terms in November and then in December ran a letter-to-the-editors
rebuttal from the Trbovlje Youth Organization: “We, the young, feel that not everything,
especially not what our elders went through during the war, can be pasted on walls under the
cover of the word punk.”29
The mixture of the cross’s stark form and German orthography catalyzed an iconoclastic
reaction rooted in memories of World War II. Either simply by virtue of its severity or because
the German and cross combination actually read as the almost identical “Balkenkreuz,” a blackand-white rectilinear cross insignia worn by German Armed Forces, the posters appeared as a
sign of resurgent fascism. The episode crystallized a way of conceiving the relationship between
artwork, artist, and viewer for Knez; the following Christmas he distributed an image-cummanifesto as a greeting card. It was a black-and-white photocopy collage with its title scrawled
across the bottom: Artist Condition I. [from] Rene Magritte-1934 (figure 4.2). The image is
almost identical to Magritte’s La Condition Humaine (1933), in which an easel positioned in
front of a window holds a canvas painted with what seems to be the landscape one would view
through the window were the canvas not “in the way.” In Knez’s photocopy collage, the same
internal canvas is present (with the same trees, pathway, horizon, and so on) as are the same
28
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curtains that serve to delimit the space of the window, but the view available through the window
(around the occluding canvas) displays Adolf Hitler marching in the viewer’s direction up the
stairs at the Nuremberg rally of 1934 surrounded by soldiers and swastikas. The collage
articulates a commonly held attitude about the hypocrisy of state-mandated non-ideological art.
The landscape canvas within the image stands in for all moderate modernism that would pass
itself off as autonomous and self-contained; the collage suggests that artistic production willing
to ignore the circumstances that surround it cannot escape political character—it can only
pretend to do so.
But more than this, it points to a program of artistic production. The collaged view
through the window is terrifying, and the notion of painting an idyllic landscape while
contemplating such a vision is equally so. Magritte’s commentary on immediacy, representation,
and authenticity becomes a vision of something much more diabolical and distressing; the
landscape canvas becomes horrific, transformed by its relocation. Moving the Malevich cross
through time and across space managed to convert an image of the Russian revolutionary period
into a symbol of fascism. The ultimate meaning of the cross existed in the space between the
image (and its historical provenance) and the context in which it operates at a particular moment,
and it was enunciated by its audience through the act of repudiation. That an image is contingent
in this way entails two conclusions. First, its content is not inherent, but subject to the
functioning of context—location has an informing influence on the meaning of a given work.
Second, the much more often ignored corollary: A form’s lack of innocence—that it can never be
non-ideological—means that the work itself still somehow delimits or guides the ways in which
it can be interpreted. Both the cross and the landscape canvas can be read as out of place because
of their formal specificity.
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This notion that a work and its context are co-determinants of meaning produced a boom
in repeated and recycled imagery in unofficial unofficial circles. Laibach is probably the most
famous example of this interest in unoriginality; they developed a mode of performing that
blends Nazi jack-booted imperialism with Suprematist geometrical mysticism. The group would
appear in quasi-military uniform, streamlined like so many New Men, surrounded by banners
and wearing armbands featuring back squares and crosses; stuffed birds of prey would sit in
mock attack on the stage (figure 4.3), and the music itself—performed with the seriousness and
ferocity of army rangers on maneuvers—has been described as anything from “martial
industrial” to “neoclassical dark wave.” In Slavoj .i+ek’s Lacanian idiom, the total spectacle of
Laibach “‘frustrates’ the system (the ruling ideology) precisely insofar as it is not its ironic
imitation, but over-identification with it—by bringing to light the obscene superego underside of
the system, overidentification suspends its efficiency.”30 According to .i+ek, Laibach embodies
(without ever breaking character for an instant) the purest form of official culture they can distill
not in order to satirize, but to interrupt others’ ability to enjoy it by making disavowed
totalitarian brutality legible. As .i+ek puts it, “Laibach itself does not function as an answer but
a question.”31 A viewer has to answer for their own desire, and the imposition supposedly shortcircuits the pleasure of the ritual.
To think about Laibach’s investment in totalitarian aesthetics this way, however, is to err
through solely temporal analysis. First, it is inaccurate to say that the Trbovlje poster frustrated
the obscene superego of totalitarianism—the Malevich cross only excited it, catalyzed it. .i+ek is
right about the perverse mechanism he describes—as is evidenced by the fact that the Laibach
posters were censored and papered over with other forms of propaganda for the sake of
30
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“protecting” society from the intrusion of the fascist past into the present. He’s only wrong to
assert that Laibach halts this flow—especially in the context of newly post-Titoist Yugoslavia,
the visual languages of revolutionary Russia and Nazi Germany would have been supercharged
with illicit energies. Both Laibach’s having been banned from performing between 1983 and
1987 and the fact that they continue to produce music, tour, and have thousands of fans (who
emulate their style with extreme unoriginality) attest to the persistence of fascist pleasure in
Laibach’s wake. Second, .i+ek can only ignore this because his analysis individualizes artistic
production and reception according to the logic of that same obscene superego. In making the
argument / apology that Laibach overidentifies in order to query the public, .i+ek posits a final
meaning to their work—he offers a correct answer to the question: ‘They’re not really fascist;
they’re just trying to see if you are.’ Moreover, a viewer’s (correct) answer becomes a function
of personal psychological rupture. Logically, it should work that the spectacle of Laibach
instantiates a break; the shock would awaken one as from sleep by disrupting an unconscious
libidinal jouissance. There are echoes here of critical missteps discussed in each of the previous
three chapters. We should hear in this equation of one meaning of a work with a supposed
necessary effect the voices of the Political Minimalist approach to Sierra, of critics who reduce
Schlingensief’s Please Love Austria to a straightforward satirical proposition, and of
!mijewski’s own insistence that the masterful selfhood his works seek would constitute an
escape from collective contextual formation (if such a position could ever be achieved). In shortcircuiting the aesthetic functioning of their objects (through these reductions), each of these
ignores and obscures how the works can elucidate the social dimension of individual perception,
how aesthetic judgments index the context of encounter, producing a portrait of social reality.
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The political thrust of Laibach’s performances is not that it neutralizes fascism, but that it elicits
viewers’ ideas about what fascism is (as well as whether it’s desirable or disgusting).
Psychoanalysis is often accused of ahistoricism, but in this case .i+ek’s Lacanian schema
definitely offers a way of interpreting a historical condition—superegoic functioning stems from
a specific power economy. As such, his description of Laibach as a question works well. His
analysis misfires, however, because it is atopic—exercised without regard to place.32 Laibach
may be the artists, but their performances rooted in repetition should not be the focus of any
conversation about their art. The real performance—that is to say, what they make—is what
takes place all around them. The repeated and recombined signs point out at the audience—out
the window, as it were—making viewers define the relation between work and context. The
result, then, is not necessarily either the destruction of fascism by critique or its spread through
some kind of half-ironic, mutant mass ornament, but a reflection of the audience by means of
whichever way they participate. The overriding question posed by Laibach and their reception
concerned the nature of Slovenia—what is this place, what has it been, what will it be?
When Neue Slowenische Kunst was founded in 1983, it dedicated itself to exploring this
question.33 Calling themselves New Slovene Art and doing so in German, all while trafficking
solely in recycled imagery signals the central conceit of their collective activities—whatever
Slovenia will be issues from some other time and from some place supposedly elsewhere.
Crucially, even the collective’s name signals the need to analyze Slovenia’s location in the flow

32

It is tempting to speculate on the popularity of Lacanian psychoanalysis in 1980s Slovenia with regard
to this distinction. An excellent way to analyze the operations of power and desire within a specific
cultural horizon, the terms it makes available nonetheless have difficulty grasping the different ways
either power or desire might be construed across contexts—i.e., from various perspectives. Does the
mirror-phase exist in a culture that values collectivity over individuality? Does the purloined letter still
arrive when there’s only one way to read it anyway?
33
Erjavec and Gr+ini&, Ljubljana, Ljubljana, 100.

190
of time (what about it is new?) and its development within and through the spatial relations of
national cultures (whence Slovene identity?).
Consisting at first in three subsidiary artists’ groups—Laibach, IRWIN, and Theater of
The Sisters of Scipion Nasica—the collective defines itself as a retro-avantgarde, working
according to the logic of what they call the retro-principle.34 NSK pursues a rigorous practice of
unoriginality in order to discern how transportation through time affects the meaning of images.
For all three sub-collectives this involves recycling images from Nazi kunst, Suprematism,
Socialist Realism, folk traditions, and religious icons. For Laibach, this results in performances
as described above. For Scipion Nasica, it also means recycling theatrical tropes of modernist
biomechanics and techno-utopianism—staging a performance in zero-gravity-producing
parabolic flight, for example—but most of all in repeating their own performances at intervals of
many years, replacing deceased performers with symbols left in their stead. For IRWIN, it means
creating paintings that blend all of these artistic traditions at once and experimenting with the
logic of display.
Working as a collective, NSK not only created a networked space in which to operate—a
lesson learned by all self-organizing unofficial artists in Ljubljana—but sought to reimagine the
political stakes of art once it was reclaimed from the state. As the artists put it, “Retro avantgarde is the basic artistic procedure of Neue Slowenische Kunst, based on the premise that
traumas from the past affecting the present and the future can be healed only by returning to the
initial conflicts.”35 The still-reverberating trauma under discussion here is how “Modern art has
not yet overcome the conflict brought about by the rapid and efficient assimilation of historical
34
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avant-garde movements in the systems of totalitarian states.” The project undertaken involves
36

exploring how artists can address and influence entire populations in a way sufficiently informed
by history so as to avoid the pitfalls of official culture’s slippery slope to aesthetic domination
and the monopoly over interpretation.

Tu m’, or IRWIN’s Readymade Reflections of The ‘Former East’
I focus on IRWIN for the rest of this chapter because, beginning with the earliest
paintings and moving through the inception and administration of the NSK State in Time, their
focus on formal condensation and exhibition strategies offers the most pointed insights into how
meaning is produced by the hydraulic action of form and context—history in its dual, temporalspatial aspect. IRWIN’s canvases conduct a systematic analysis of these two registers at once by
executing a conceptual mash-up of Laibach’s performative probing of totalitarian aesthetics and
Serbian artist Goran $or%evi&’s reproductions of seminal works of modernism. Throughout the
1980s $or%evi& mounted exhibitions (in Belgrade and at ,KUC) of painted copies of works by
Malevich, Mondrian, and others, emphasizing the international traffic in modernism as form and
rhetoric. For example, in in Belgrade in1986 he mounted a version of the 1913 International
Exhibition of Modern Art with exuberant anachronism, featuring (reproductions of) works such
as Duchamp’s Fountain alongside paintings by Roy Lichtenstein and Jasper Johns (figure 4.4).
IRWIN’s works blend the two approaches, focusing both on modernism’s local political legacies
and its lives as a wedge or crux in the operations of transnational geopolitics.
Acknowledging that IRWIN’s paintings meditate on how particular images become
invested with state power, some authors and critics have described their works in the language of
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trauma and repetition compulsion. From this perspective, a painting like Malevich between Two
37

Wars (1984-86) (figure 4.5) would be understood as an explicit re-enactment of the avantgarde’s traumatic subsumption under totalitarian aesthetics. In this painting a Suprematist
cross—this time with a vertical red bar and a black horizontal one against a white background—
is sandwiched between two other painted planes. In the deep background, a romanticized, folksy
young woman with a halo of braided flaxen hair; in the extreme foreground are superimposed
two naked young men rendered in the chiseled, geometrical style of idealized Aryan sculptural
allegory. The composition asserts a continuity of the three discourses, an ideological layer cake
of complementary, if not identical flavors. The idea of a Volk timelessly rooted to the land
travels through Suprematism and its equally transcendent claim to a different truth, one that
promises to remake the world into a purer version of itself, purged of excess and oriented toward
the future. The Nazi bodies represent the sublation of traditional identity in its modernist
transformation, as well as the failure of modernism to deliver enlightenment rather than
barbarism. The painterly collage is housed in a chunky black frame that mimics the entombment
of Byzantine icons, lending the work a ponderous corporeality that sutures Christian icons to
Suprematist ones. In so doing, the frame presents Malevich between Two Wars as a work of
mourning, as an emotional and physical working-through of historical violence, containing the
three images to make them into one object lesson.
Another, more localized, line of thinking suggests that analysis of this painting should
shift from the level of general concern for the tragic appropriations of various modernist
aesthetics in the past to a focus on the Slovene experience of its consequences in the present—
that we should not focus on temporal reprisal so much as the physical site of production. Art
37
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historian Myroslava Mudrak, for example, argues that the Malevich cross and its invocation of
the search for the zero-degree of form should be read as an analogue to Slovene culture in the
1980s—not because Slovenia is modernist or utopian or totalitarian, but precisely because it is
emergent. That is, Slovenia, in its double aspect as the westernmost place in the East and the
easternmost place in the West comes into being in the flux of a hegemonic, transnational
crossfire. Mudrak therefore argues that the sign of Suprematism should be read as the index of a
specific contextual experience of forming a culture in relation to overwhelming ideological
programs. The pastoral portrait background evokes a notional pre-lapsarian innocence attributed
to pre-World War II Kingdom of Yugoslavia while the cross and sculptural bodies struggle for
dominance in modernity. The legacies of both East and West surround and suffuse the sign,
determining the horizon against which it can become form.
In these two readings, then, the function of repetition in the paintings oscillates between
signifying a generalizable art historical condition and offering insight into its specifically sited
meaning in the present moment of its production. On the first reading, repetition is meaningful
for everyone insofar as it concerns world-historical events of the past century, and history is a set
of events that happened in a discretely sectioned-off past—this is a reading conducted in
temporal terms. On the second, it means something more targeted for members of a specific,
geo-politically bounded, or determined, community and how history influences it in the
present—this is a reading conducted in spatial terms. That the paintings can support and bear out
the two readings equally illustrates what it means for IRWIN’s paintings to proceed from a
particular political-aesthetic context and simultaneously question and reflect upon how that
context comes into being.
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The point is that the repetition appeals to, signifies for, and even interpellates viewers in
different circumstances of reception. The paintings seek out how the same history conjoins and
divides different people, both as groups and individually. A viewer approaching the works from
a wide-angle perspective and concerned with the historical baggage imagined to be inherent in
their signs and symbols can mount an argument about how the paintings digest the so-called
failure of modernism, a condition asserted to be the global backdrop for much contemporary
artistic production. The result is an historical argument that nonetheless glosses over more
granular, locally-focused readings. Another viewer can meanwhile focus on the granular, delving
into the Slovene significance of the images to make an equally historically rigorous argument
that nonetheless misses out on the transnational dimension by eschewing the “original” meanings
of the paintings’ images. In either case, the argument made offers historical insights, but cannot
exhaust the meanings made available by the work’s densely packed surface. Instead, each
reading serves as an index of the viewer’s position insofar as it entails the delineation of a
particular context through which to read the work. In this way (and like all the works discussed
in this dissertation), the paintings are theatrical in Fried’s sense of the term. Their richness
provokes a variation in interpretation, however, well beyond the vicissitudes of mere physicality
(as if there were such a thing). Rather, the repeated images trigger a cognitive balancing act that
makes the construction of context a dynamic activity and places local and global priority in
tension. And once context itself becomes unsettled, its narration again gestures out the
window—the implication is that history itself varies with perspective.
This inevitable variation is one way to explain the fact that not only do IRWIN’s
paintings reproduce images from the past, but IRWIN painters reinterpret each other’s recompositions. The version of Malevich Between Two Wars described above was made by Du"an
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Mandi' (who, incidentally, was one of the directors of ,KUC Gallery from 1980-82). Miran
Mohar made another version in 2003 (figure 4.6). The iconographic elements are the same, as is
their arrangement. The frame is different—simpler, more regularly rectilinear. This alteration
does, however, call attention to the subtle differences in the newer painting’s facture. The
background portrait is more fully modeled, with clearer contours and more resolved features that
lend its subject an air of solemnity or maybe even displeasure absent from her earlier
counterpart. The sculptural pair in the foreground is much brighter than in the earlier painting,
and a bit cropped about their heads and shoulders—the effect is to make them seem like they’re
leaning into one another, making them more static and heavier as a group. And indeed, to
concretize an earlier metaphor, the white background against which the cross appears is also
transformed—a sort of brick-like latticing of off-white tracery has replaced the prior painterly
haze.
It is certainly not my intention to graft onto these potentially completely accidental
variations on a theme any necessary lesson about the historical moments of 1984 and 2003.
Rather, my point is to bring out how the detection of these differences depends equally on
repetition and framing—not just the literal framing, but the entire context in and through which
the image is viewed, the relative difference produced by what we might call an image ecology.
The elements only appear different in relation to earlier versions—whether these be the original
historical uses or the artistic re-uses of the same motifs—and in relation to our prior exposure to
those images as well as how our investments and situation guide our engagement with them.
This notion that history varies with its framing finds its most pithy description in the
slogan that accompanies East Art Map (2006), an ongoing research project, on which IRWIN
collaborated with Afterall publishing and artists, curators, and historians from across the former
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Eastern bloc: “History is not given. Please help to construct it.” The project has taken the form of
a textbook, as well as an online database, and it attempts to narrate the history of contemporary
art in formerly socialist countries with equal emphasis on national and transnational registers.
The book (and the conceptual architecture of the project at large) is split into two sections. The
first features essays accounting for what all former-Eastern countries share in terms of their
relation to central Soviet authority and how this produced clandestine, unofficial artistic
economies and how being part of a bloc designated “The East” cut them off from interaction
with and careful consideration by the bloc designated “The West.” The second serves a
differentiating function, comprising mini-histories that narrate the particular, distinct ways in
which that “same” condition developed in the different, individual countries. East Art Map
balances identity and difference in recovering a history that, on the one hand, had never been
accumulated because its constituent elements were forced to exist underground and, on the other,
had never been sought by a Western-dominated “artworld” that always spoke for the East,
imagining it to be homogeneous—if it existed at all. The need to juggle these two registers—
corporate identity and individual difference—produces the demand to construct history, in a
dialectical sense. There is something that unites the East: its double subjection. Subaltern to both
the totalitarian East and the Western discourse of contemporary art, Eastern artists have to learn
to speak themselves. And this speaking, even from the most local of positions, must articulate as
part of its own experience that very condition of being spoken for.
Moreover, this dialectical sense of that seductive, staccato slogan—“History is not given.
Please help to construct it.”—separates the notion of reconstructed history at work in their
paintings and East Art Map from at least one totalitarian model to which it refers (and for which
it might be mistaken). In discussing Soviet photographic practice from the1920s into the 1930s,
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art historian Leah Dickerman emphasizes how the legibility of censorship was meant to index
Stalin’s ability to control and reshape history. She writes:
Paradoxically, the revolutionary rhetoric of a total break with the past coexisted with a
series of historical reversals…history’s status as a given was fundamentally shaken.
During the mid-1920s, the period in which the model of socialist realism developed, one
sees much self-conscious thinking about historical self-construction.38
The manipulation of the past is part of how socialist realism understands the composition of
reality in the present. She continues, “While what we might normally understand as censorship
exists beneath the realm of visibility, what is particularly remarkable in these examples is how
the censor’s hand is insistently marked.”39 Censorship always intentionally displayed itself.
This would be true for even the most technically adept altered photographs and for the
imagined realities of socialist realist painting when earlier versions of images were well-known.
Dickerman points to Isaak Brodskii’s painting, Lenin Giving a Speech to Troops Departing for
the Polish Front on 5 May 1920 (1933). The original photograph (figure 4.7) would have been
familiar to contemporary audiences; and so would have its second iteration (figure 4.8)—printed
and disseminated after Stalin outmaneuvered Leon Trotsky to replace Lenin. Even the invisible
photographic subtraction of Trotsky and Lev Kamenev would have been read as such. The
painted version then repeats the excision, and, what’s more, Brodskii injects just enough of the
artist’s hand to transform the thirteen-year-old event into a present utopian vision by animating
Lenin and the assembled crowd with vibrant colors and ecstatic hand gestures (figure 4.9). The
obvious manipulation of these images is meant to work toward a constructed reality in the
present and future by conspicuously wielding images of the past. And the more conspicuous the
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manipulation, the more tenuous is our experience of the present. The present entirely recedes in
an anticipation of a future when we will learn what the past was really like.
By invoking location through the importance of framing, the historical mutability
IRWIN’s works possess and proliferate works against historical amnesia and totalitarian control
over memory by bringing the present to the fore. They assert not the ability to remake the past,
but the limits for building the future imposed by the intransigence of the past while
simultaneously expressing its perspectival nature. The installation “Was Ist Kunst?” (1984), an
early show of IRWIN paintings, invokes the range of motifs already enumerated, but it also
repeats a historical installation format (figure 4.10). Clearly referring to “0,10: The Last Futurist
Exhibition of Painting” (1915), this installation of “Was Ist Kunst?” recapitulates a mode of
encounter, calling attention to how viewers experience works. (In a nod to preserving a historical
chain rather than eliminating it, %or&evi# appears prominently in one of the few installation
photographs.) By shuttling the format of “0,10” into its present moment, the show points to the
differences that surface in relation to this same spatial arrangement. The works have changed—
Malevich’s have been substituted by IRWIN’s—but so too have the viewers and the associations
they bring to the allover hang and the famous icon corner.
In an installation from 1996 entitled “The Heart of Transcentrala,” this kind of audience
parallax becomes part of the show’s visual scheme (figure 4.11). Moored to wall-sized mirrors,
the background for each painting shifts as viewers move about the room, and a viewer’s own
image is reflected back at them as one of these reverberating signs. The past becomes entangled
with its present moment of recognition. The repeated appeals to the past suggest that some kind
of meaning inheres in an image’s morphology. But the address to individual viewers in concrete
circumstances foregrounds the fact that our hermeneutic horizon is determined by the culture
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through which we emerge, the position we occupy in space and time by historical accident, by
chance. The paintings, then, describe a double contingency.
For a piece called IRWIN Live (1996), the members of the group installed a set of
paintings on the ceiling and—bringing the expanded spatial theatricality of their paintings full
circle—suspended themselves from the ceiling horizontally by wires (figure 4.12). An
installation photograph completes the defiance of gravity, fixing this moment of suspension and
allowing us to think for a second that the IRWINs are being lifted from the floor by the force of
the paintings. This uncanny confrontation, which suggests a magnetic attraction, enacts the
hermeneutic dialectic I have been describing. The paintings and the people hold each other in
place. The meaning of these historical images does not inhere constantly in their motifs nor is it
fashioned by the hand or eye of the beholder, it happens in the space in between. That is, the
images signify differently from different perspectives, but this does not suggest that their
meaning can be anything whatever. They are not signs completely cut loose from meaning,
floating freely in a never-ending play of dead authors and accidental receivers. Rather, the
repetition in and across works signals a kind of historical, hermeneutic tethering. And it allows
us to see that the works are less about what they might mean in any particular reading than they
are means through which location displays itself through the description of context. If the
paintings ask the viewer a question, it is not who they are or what they want, but where they find
themselves. The paintings perform a spatial-indexical operation, functioning as a locus from
which any observer measures their distance and reflexively takes stock of what they recognize.
The images create a space where we confront the relationship between what history has given us,
and how we make sense of it.
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In this way, IRWIN’s works operate less like Stalinist revision and more like
readymades.40 Discussing Marcel Duchamp’s The Bride Stripped Bare by Her Bachelors, Even,
(or, The Large Glass), Rosalind Krauss explains that the readymade works by way of “the
isolation of something from within the succession of temporality, a process which is implied by
Duchamp’s subtitle… ‘Delay in Glass.’…It is about the physical transposition of an object from
the continuum of reality into the fixed condition of the art-image by a moment of isolation or
selection.”41 Or, as Duchamp puts it, “The important thing is just this matter of timing, this
snapshot effect, like a speech delivered on no matter what occasion, but at such and such an
hour.”42 The Large Glass achieves this snapshot effect, this isolation of something from the
continuum of reality, in a number of ways. Readymades are not only urinals and bottle racks—
various kinds of matter in the wrong place. Famously, much of the pigment used to create the
shapes in the lower half of the glass was made of dust that collected on its surface as it lay flat on
the studio floor. The dust that accrued to the glass was fixed to the conical forms that circle the
image of the grinder, and thus chance determined how much material would be available for
filling in the shapes and what color they would be. This is only an exaggeration of the more
subtle and profound forms of chance involved in the glass’s production.
For Krauss, it is above all a description of historical self-understanding; The Large Glass
is a self-portrait of the artist’s inability to produce original work—for her, this is to do with how
abstraction and photography change the game of easel painting, but we could equally widen the
frame to see how the readymade negotiates the vexed life of craft in the face of a major historical
transition to modes of mass production. Either way, the figure of the grinder is a poignant cipher

40

Before IRWIN was called IRWIN, they called themselves R. Rose Irwin Sélavy.
Rosalind Kraus, “Notes on the Index: Part 1” (1976), in The Originality of the Avant-Garde and Other
Modernist Myths (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1986), 205-206.
42
Duchamp quoted in Ibid., 206.
41

201
for history, Duchamp’s own training in technical drawing as a young boy, and the more general
condition of being historically determined, churned out indifferently by greater forces. The Large
Glass and IRWIN’s paintings work by similar means of suspension. They adopt materials given
by chance, by inheritance, in order to determine the nature of agency, to probe the extent to
which we are determined by history and, hence, how we come to make facts meaningful. And
what bringing the readymade into this discussion makes clear is that the seeming cosmopolitan
gregariousness of IRWIN’s works, their ability to speak across multiple contexts in any viewer’s
own language, is actually the paintings’ ubiquitous and instantaneous translation into different
dialects. These dialects, however, share a common root and contribute to the same conversation,
albeit from different circumstances and in their own ways.
Accounting for history by reproducing its image in painting is like making meaning out
of dust—insofar as each is an indexical operation. Duchamp’s Tu m’ (1918) (figure 4.13), which
represents a history of the readymade’s evolution, highlights the two most salient aspects of
historical reconstruction as I’ve been describing it. These are also two different senses of the
word “index.” First, in offering a catalog of partially-motivated signs—the index is a trace, a
mark that refers to the process of its own making because it has a physical relation to it—Tu m’
elaborates the same negotiation of the perceptual limits and capacities given through cultural
inheritance we’ve encountered in all the works discussed (both in this chapter and in this
dissertation as a whole). The blocks of color layered and advancing from the top left refer to the
readymade quality of pigments available to painters in mass-produced tubes; images of elements
from the chance-based work Three Standard Stoppages (1913-14) appear in both bottom left and
top right. And several readymades appear through traces of themselves. Painted shadows cast by
the hat rack, bicycle wheel, and corkscrew seem to float across the surface, though they’re firmly
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fixed (painted) in place. What is pointed up by Tu m’ that remains more subterranean in The
Large Glass, however, is how an artist’s negotiation of the limits of creative capacity
communicates to and with a viewer. The painting constantly provokes a boundary confusion
between shared reality as some kind of inert, brute background, and intentional representation
supported by it; this confusion animates each. The topmost painted color swatch is fixed in place
by a metal bolt. An actual bottle brush protrudes from the canvas’s surface, and the
illusionistically painted tear in the very center of the canvas is fastened by real metal safety pins.
The insistence on the porous boundary between that which simply is (like a safety pin)
and that which has been represented (a negative space in the middle of the canvas) points quite
literally and insistently to the process of reception that triangulates an author, a work, and an
audience—it is a relationship between people as well as between one person and an image. If
The Large Glass helped us to see how an object and a viewer hold each other in a mutually
supportive suspension, Tu m’ makes that suspension an interpersonal one. In addition to being a
physically motivated sign, Krauss reminds us that the index is a linguistic shifter. A word like
“this” or “that,” or “you” or “me,” that changes meaning depending on who is speaking about
what and to whom. Tu m’ invokes this contingent aspect of communication not only in its title,
but with the pointing finger that takes center stage. And while the indexical shifter changes
meaning depending on its situation, it also relies on the shared context of being in conversation
about something in particular. The finger comprises a call from one subject to another. It says:
Look at this. Neither modernist rupture nor postmodern pastiche, IRWIN’s paintings take a
readymade approach to history in order to point to its persistence and interrogate the limits of
ways we can reshape the world. Tu m’s lateral composition (also determined by the “given”
condition of being commissioned to fill a wide horizontal expanse above a bookcase in Katherine

203
Dreier’s library) echoes in the image that adorns East Art Map’s frontispiece and back cover
(figure 4.14). The image, created by IRWIN, comprises a laterally oriented world map—in the
style of an unfurled and flattened globe—making its proportions similar to Tu m’. This map,
however, features a vast black expanse (rather than an illusionistic tear and the painted shadow
of the hat rack), where the former Soviet Union appears negatively as a sprawling terra
incognita. East Art Map, then, also asks the reader to look at this. And the meaning of this will
vary depending on one’s perspective in looking—from “The West”? From “The East”? From
Yugoslavia? Belgrade? Ljubljana?
Thinking history as readymade, or thinking the readymade as a theory of history, means
conceiving history in terms of temporal-spatial coordinates. In making unoriginal paintings,
IRWIN asserts that art does not exist “in itself” because not only does the past not stay in the
past, but because context is not autochthonous. The narration of history through the
interpretation of painting’s recycled imagery points beyond the work to the way a viewer is held,
suspended, at a node where the accidents of time and space intersect to produce their individual
consciousness. The way we make meaning of what the world gives us details not our
omnipotence in “constructing” history, but the limits it imposes on our perspective. Discussion
of one last IRWIN project, one that changed the very nature of the NSK collective by broadening
it to the scale of a potentially infinite, global work of performance, will further illustrate this
readymade theory of history. It will also demonstrate how a work of art can enable a viewer to
fully account for their own position within the sublime expanse of global history.

Contesting Utopias, or The Importance of Place in the State in Time
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“Between 1990 and 1992, with the emergence of a new political, ideological, and
economic reorganization of Europe… NSK reinvented itself, changing from an organization into
a State.”43 This brief excerpt from Laibach’s description of how and why NSK founded a state
that exists not in space, but in time, casts the inception of the state as directly responding to a
new ordering of European society, one built after the collapse of the Soviet Union. At this
writing the state is thriving—it has over 7,000 citizens and has held citizens’ congresses and
even a biennial of “NSK folk art,” each in physical space. In exploring the structure, process, and
reception of the NSK State in Time, especially as embodied by the NSK passport, we will see
how the project articulates the role of Eastern Europe’s communist past in the context of what
Boris Groys describes as a global, “post-communist condition.”44 Through an engagement with
Groys’s formulation of the specificity of Soviet utopian temporality and Fredric Jameson’s
suggestion that the exercise of cultural power in a globalized economy should be evaluated
through Hegel’s dialectic of Identity and Difference, we will further see that the seemingly
paradoxical mission of NSK state to “keep Utopia real”45 produces the radical individualization
of its citizens, who articulate themselves through various recognitions of utopia’s impossibility.
According to Laibach, NSK state:
has no formal ‘government’ and no central committee, only citizens, few bureaucrats and
some administrators. The last two only deal with technical issues – keeping the State
formal. It is based on self-management and non-alignment and it coexists as a parasite
within existing, already established bodies in the entire area of Time.46
Existing as what is sometimes called a “virtual state” and at others a “micronation,” NSK State is
a voluntary association of NSK State passport holders, “people of different religions, races,
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nationalities, sexes, and beliefs, people from all over the world. The right to citizenship is
acquired through ownership of the NSK passport.”47 These passports (figure 4.15) are available
at embassies or consulates temporarily established in actual physical sites (the state has
materialized in Dublin, Aarhus, Thessaloniki, Athens (figure 4.16), London, Taipei, New York,
among other places) and on the Internet.
The application for citizenship itself used to be available online, but owing to
complications that will be discussed below (and which are inherent to the project), the
application was taken down from the official website of NSK state (the NSK Times). The
application can still be obtained electronically, however, after one purchases the passport through
the merchandising page of Laibach’s website. The application is purely formal; no one is denied.
One fills it out in order to supply the name, photograph, and so on that will appear on the
passport (figure 4.17).
The members of IRWIN have become those “few bureaucrats” whose job it is to keep the
state formal. They play the part with an intimate knowledge of official language and style that is
the hard-won inheritance of the cultural battles of 1980s Ljubljana—the IRWINs dress like party
appratchiks, matching Laibach’s self-styled recombinant fascism with a technocratic communist
reserve, blending politics and aesthetics with similar aplomb. A group photo from 1995 shows
them in dark suits, but both the architectural backdrop and the apparition of uncanny black
squares in the place of mustaches conjure historical specters (figure 4.18). Their own
pronouncements about the state braid the received political and artistic styles as well:
The NSK state in time is an abstract organism, a suprematist body, installed in a real
social and political space as a sculpture comprising the concrete body warmth, spirit and
work of its members. NSK confers the status of a state not to territory but to mind, whose
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borders are in a state of flux, in accordance with the movements and changes of its
symbolic and physical collective body.48
As dense and oblique as the statement is (and even so it offers more sense than some official
decrees, such as the utterances of Günter Schabowski we encountered in chapter two, while
mimicking the form), it points to how the NSK State in Time is an expansion of the original
collective to potentially infinite proportions. IRWIN and NSK collaborator Eda -ufer write,
“The most important and at the same time traumatic dimension of avant-garde movements is that
they operate and create within a collective.”49 The trauma occurred, on their account, when the
state took this work of collective production as a “question of how to collectivize and socialize
the individual, whereas avant-garde movements tried to solve the question of how to
individualize the collective.”50 A traumatic inversion of this formulation is how, according to
Inke Arns, socialist realism could be taken to realize “the ideals and utopias of the avantgarde.”51 Socialist realism executed the inversion in its attempts to collectivize the individual.
The NSK State in Time seeks to individualize the collective, rather than to collectivize the
individual, and it does so by voluntary citizenship to a transnational utopia, which is itself
understood to be open to all and constantly in flux. Or, again, in the artists’ own words:
Neue Slowenische Kunst defines its collectivism within the framework of an autonomous
state, as artistic actions in time to which all other spatial and material procedures of
artistic creation are subordinated. This means that the procedure of the deconstruction
and analysis of past forms and situations functions as the creator of new conditions for
the development of the individual within the framework of a collective.”52
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The collective that is the State in Time is less a corporate body devoted to a mission or program
than it is an umbrella organization under which and through which individuals might explore
their own definition.
This emphasis on the reworking of the literal, historical past is nothing new for NSK.
What makes this project different is its investment in creating a populated utopia through the
retrieval and rehabilitation of avant-garde practice. What is more, in the context of this project,
utopia itself is a concept freighted with historical significance. In this way, the State in Time
offers what Boris Groys calls “artistic means that might be used to thematize the special nature
of the post-communist art-context.”53 As an instance of retro-avantgarde strategy, the State in
Time comes directly out of the communist form of modernity. “It is surely quite evident to all
concerned,” Groys avers, “that the true specificity of Eastern Europe can only reside in its
communist past.”54 Groys, however, realizes that a statement like this flirts with tautology, and,
for this reason, he looks to move beyond “the language of trauma” we have seen to be so
important to IRWIN.55 Groys dislikes this mode of metaphor not just because, according to him,
it is “the least interesting,” but because “ultimately, the various forms of traumatization all begin
to look remarkably similar.”56 Indeed, in the previous chapter we saw how !mijewski’s
mobilization of a Freudian model of repetition resulted in a willful ignorance of the power of
context. Groys searches instead “precisely what kind of past the communist past represents and
what distinguishes this past from other pasts.”57
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According to Groys, the unique situation of the newly opening, formerly communist
context is that it was not closed to the wider world because it was pre-modern (meaning insular
and therefore left behind), but precisely because it represented an “outstanding example of
modernity.”58 According to Groys, communist Eastern Europe closed itself as part of its own
formulation of modernity, itself modeled on the avant-garde. He writes, “modernity has
persistently spawned its own apocalyptic sects, radical parties or avant-garde art movements that
isolated or insulated themselves against their respective contemporary societies.”59 Groys thus
echoes NSK’s traumatic formulation while shifting the focus. He continues, “ultimately,
communism is nothing more than the most extreme and radical manifestation of militant
modernism, of the belief in progress and of the dream of an enlightened avant-garde acting in
total unison, of utter commitment to the future.”60 In other words, for Groys, when formerly
communist countries opened up, they relinquished their avant-garde insularity. And when this
finally occurred, what was left behind was “not the past, but the future.”61 For Groys, this aspect
of communism, its special mode of prospective utopian modernism, is what makes the
communist past different from other pasts.
Despite disputes concerning the usefulness of the language of trauma, these are the very
terms employed by NSK. The State in Time’s retro-avantgarde reformulation of collectively
produced utopia is born of communist modernity’s prospective orientation, which, according to
Groys, should be understood as uniquely Eastern. Utopia, the future left behind, returns in the
form of a collective whose very borders are always shifting and, therefore, whose very
collectivity is itself subjugated to the individuality of its members. This utopia, then, consists in
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reworking the notion that the modern, the avant-garde, needs to be both universalizing (in
leveling its membership) and insulated from those who do not belong. Anyone can become a
citizen of the State in Time and doing so does not require one to toe a party line or to do anything
in particular. And just as Groys maintains, we cannot understand all this if we do not take
seriously the specificity of the former-communist context and the particular modernity of its
unique temporal orientation.
But this is only yet half—and possibly less than half—of the entire constitution of the
State in Time. One of the most interesting things about the State in Time is the frequency with
which passport holders, in interviews conducted and filmed by members of IRWIN and
collaborators, describe their relations to their passports in terms of space, not in terms of time.
Even as they extol the virtues of a voluntary association of citizens, allowed to be alone in their
striving to make something together (even if that something is simply the “space” to be alone),
citizens constantly imagine their passport’s relation to physical borders and geographical
nations.62
In Sarajevo, early recipients of the passports relay stories of actual border crossings aided
by the NSK passport. One man used his to travel from Ljubljana to Zagreb during the chaos of
the breakup of Yugoslavia (figure 4.19), another to enter Korea when he arrived without a visa.
A younger cohort of cosmopolitan Berliners and self-described “nomads” describe not border
crossings, but the way in which the passport itself is a critique of the systems orchestrating
border crossings. Taiwanese NSK citizens half-jokingly describe how the NSK passport is like
their own national passport in that it is effectively useless for international travel. And perhaps
most dramatically, and certainly most poignantly of all, in 2007, IRWIN traveled to London to
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conduct a series of interviews with Nigerians living there because NSK State had received over
1,000 applications from Nigerians acting under the misapprehension that the NSK passport
guaranteed citizenship of Slovenia (and hence the ability to travel there and to other places their
own papers (if they had any) could not take them). In addition to these interviews, which mostly
feature members of IRWIN explaining to applicants what they mean when they say NSK is an
“artistic state” and trying to figure how best to correct the rumors (figure 4.20), the magnitude of
this debacle prompted the removal of the application from the homepage of the NSK Times and
the presence of strongly worded disclaimers where it could otherwise be found:
*NSK State is not an internationally officially recognized country and the NSK State
passport is not a legally valid document. Owning the NSK passport does not grant
citizenship of the Republic of Slovenia or any other country of the world beside the NSK
state. YOU CANNOT LEGALLY CROSS ANY INTERNATIONAL BORDER USING
AN NSK PASSPORT!63
The profundity of this misunderstanding should suggest an interpretive warning to us as
well. We should not think of the project as being solely about or as being exhausted by a
discussion of the context that informs its inception and its preoccupations with the retroavantgarde retrieval of utopia. The State in Time is much more complex; we cannot
underestimate the fact that the transnational utopia born of communist modernity’s particular
temporality is often understood in the context of international relations. And Groys certainly
realizes that formerly communist countries (and the artworks produced therein) exist within a
broader, global context. He writes, “the entire world… currently finds itself in a condition one
could term post-communist.”64 For Groys, this means that the collapse of the Soviet Union and
the resultant process of opening up need to be understood as leading to an exacerbation of Cold
War tactics on the part of the West. What is more, these tactics concern a claim to utopia’s
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fulfillment. He argues, “The communist demand for the fulfillment of utopia on earth dealt
traditional politics a blow from which in all probability it will never recover.”65 He continues,
“The true challenge posed by the Soviet experiment was the claim… that the Soviet Union
represented the place and earthbound incarnation of utopia—if not in the sense of its total
fulfillment, then at least in terms of its practical advancement.”66 Again, the specificity of
communist prospective temporality comes into play—for, “none of the former ‘actually existing’
socialist countries ever claimed to have achieved communism, but saw themselves merely as
transitional forms.”67 The Soviet claim to utopia consisted in the affirmation of its closer
proximity to an ideal society, an ideal itself designed to be transnational, even if its actual
historical articulation resorted to avant-garde insularity.
As a result, according to Groys, the West’s Cold War rhetoric propounded the
counterclaim that it was, in fact, “the true place of utopia fulfilled.”68 “To win the competition
against Soviet communism,” he asserts, “its rivals felt compelled not only to appropriate this
claim as their own but even to outdo it—and thereby redefine their own societies as universal
political models.”69 The result (and best proof) of this “protracted one-upmanship” is that the
Soviet Union’s dissolution did not result in the abandonment of Cold War rhetoric, but in the
West’s even more aggressive assertions that it is a utopia of the present, one that exists here and
now. 70 We might, for example, think of Francis Fukuyama’s “The End of History?” (1990),
which trumpets the global triumph of liberal-democratic capitalism, as an emblem of this postcommunist condition. Pronouncements of this kind, coupled with what Groys considers

65

Ibid., 166.
Ibid., 167.
67
Ibid., 165.
68
Ibid., 166.
69
Ibid., 167.
70
Ibid.
66

212
Orientalizing denials of communism’s modernity (rooted in its real difference from Western
modernity), were always and are still designed to increase the West’s share of what Groys terms
an “international political market for competing models of society.”71
Thinking along these lines, we might imagine the varying degrees to which the state in
time undergoes spatial translation, or is understood by passport holders as cause for
contemplating issues of contemporary international mobility at the expense of the state’s
prospective utopian dimension, as misreadings of the work occurring where the West’s tactics
are successful. That is, a focus on how the passport might increase (or simply comment upon)
one’s own relation within and to the utopia of the present could appear to us as a failure to
identify the NSK State in Time’s specificity as a utopian project itself (designed to reconfigure
an individual process of becoming experienced in relation to a collective). Further, we might see
this translation of time into space as prompted by the rhetoric and sheer economic force of
Western-style liberal democracy. The NSK passport could, on this reading, serve as a marker of
the triumph of the utopia of the present (The West) over the utopia of the future (The East)
insofar as the former eclipses the latter.
This adversarial understanding of time and space in the “international political market” is
typical of approaches to globalization in the 1990s and early 2000s. Fredric Jameson, for
example, goes even further in suggesting that the notional utopia of the West—which, for him in
1996, means America—would eventually erase any local specificity, subordinating it to an
amoebic transnational liberal-democratic sameness, or identity, everywhere replacing local
difference. For Jameson, the cultural battles of globalization are fought on the fields of mass
culture, and America is the aggressor and inevitable victor. According to Jameson, in an era
marked by “the becoming cultural of the economic, and the becoming economic of the cultural,”
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globalization “is a zero-sum game in which [America’s] freedom results in the destruction of
other people’s national culture industries.”72 That is, relative ideological market-share is
determined by the production and exportation of mass culture. Thus, for Jameson, his perceived
global ascendancy of American culture entails the ascendancy of the American way of life. He
pays due lip-service to potential processes of hybridization, through which denizens of the
margins might make something new of imported cultural artifacts, but the overwhelming thrust is
another end-of-history narrative—figured this time as a lament. This strand of Jameson’s
thinking would also have us understand the international understandings of the NSK passport
granting transnational utopian citizenship as a sign of the increasing inability to think utopia in
its prospective dimension. That ability is replaced by the weighing of relative privilege and
access to the so-called utopia of the present.
But the real value of Jameson’s thinking on globalization to this discussion, however,
comes not from his analyses of America’s overpowering cultural-industrial complex, but from
his suggestion that the true problems to work out are not so much whether a singular identity
replaces local difference, but how and where? If anything, Jameson’s account of East/West in the
post-communist condition is far less compelling than Groys’s, insofar as Jameson’s overarching
center versus margins model itself levels differences between particular “marginal” contexts.
Jameson, however, closes his discussion of globalization by noticing that, depending on context,
the prospect of singular identity is accorded different values. He writes, “everything depends on
the level at which a malign and standardizing or despotic identity is discerned.”73 Sometimes
identity figures as a hegemonic interloper (as in the case of his diagnosis of expanding
Americanism), but sometimes (when, for example, it is aimed against this transnational
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juggernaut) it can function as a consolidating and progressive political force: “at certain key
moments… something like an affirmation of federalism is invoked as a future ideal.”74 This
affirmation is one way to conceive the strategic value of East Art Map’s attempts to pinpoint
what it is that unites the various experiences of communism across the different former-Eastern,
Soviet bloc countries. And further, at other times, residents from the various different regions of
such federalisms might see the federation itself as despotic—hence, the need to represent the
relative differences obtaining between those same once-socialist nations.
These, of course, are not revelations in themselves. What is significant here is that these
observations suggest to Jameson that there is a flaw, an instability, in the categories we use to
conceptualize the operations of globalization. If a singular identity can be, by turns, both good
and bad, politically progressive and too limiting, identity per se is not the problem. Rather, it is
identity’s position within a system of relations that must be formulated in order to understand
how a complex global order comprised of individuals, their states or regions, and transnational
political models and ways of life operates in any given context—and is apprehended differently
depending on the frame of analysis employed. Jameson is searching for a new way to think the
relation between the individual and the collective and between a given collective and other
collectives of larger orders. Ultimately, however, this line of thinking goes undeveloped, save for
Jameson’s call for a “return to Hegel.”75 The benefit of such a return, according to Jameson,
would be its potential to shed some light on “the categories themselves, the modes and forms of
thought in which we inescapably have to think things through, but which have a logic of their
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own to which we ourselves fall victim if we are unaware of their existence and their in-forming
influence on us.”76
I contend that the NSK passport helps us to answer this call in how it navigates and
activates the formal instability Jameson observes. Let us recall the interpretive warning raised by
the State in Time’s spatial translation. While it might be tempting to see passport holders’
discussing their citizenship in terms of space as misapprehensions of the work’s thrust—or
worse, as a sign of the project’s somehow necessary failure—it should prompt us to ask how the
various levels of identity and difference (the individual, national, and global) function along both
temporal and spatial axes. For NSK citizens, the document granting membership in a utopian
collective becomes the fantasized sign of greater mobility within capitalism. The key to moving
forward with Jameson’s questions concerning categories lies in admitting that this fantastic
exercise never constitutes a misreading of the State in Time or its foreclosure, but rather is part
of the project’s full-throated articulation, which is of course multiply articulated depending on
the varying situations of the passport holders. Each personal understanding of the state (insofar
as it is these that comprise the state) merits the careful contextual scrutiny on which Groys insists
in describing communist temporality. Further, I would suggest that the Nigerian debacle is only a
difference in degree from the Taiwanese reaction, not a difference in kind.
First, the passport grants citizenship of NSK state, a state that exists only in time (and the
genesis of this concept needs to be understood as rooted in a particular context). The passport
holder, then, finds him or herself a member of a virtual state, the tangible presence of which is a
passport, which looks like a real passport (and is even printed using official Slovenian state
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machines and materials). The form itself condenses time and space. Why else create a tangible
77

passport for a conceptual state? The passport as artifact initiates the contemplation of one’s own
concrete geopolitical situation—in other words, a significant part of what happens in NSK State
is that people individually (and, hence, collectively) think about geopolitical nations. And each
articulation of the State in Time varies according to context. Each passport creates its own
context of articulation. The State in Time animates and denaturalizes history by staging the
opposition between the utopia that does not yet exist (because it is always coming into being)
and the best case present “utopia” of real power relations as they exist at the moment. The
passport produces and is produced by a collision of temporal orientations, a temporal hybridity.
It entails remaining open to an unknown future (to which untold numbers contribute) while
calling explicit attention to actual conditions of life in the present, and it does so in the name of
the individual specificity of each passport holder. The individual made possible by the collective
is one who is aware of all these levels of difference and identity, and who experiences this
individuality as the awareness of the categorical instability Jameson (via Hegel) locates at the
root of political identity.
Groys points at this temporal hybridity in his vehemence that post-communist context
matters—he argues that there are specific attributes of the Eastern context that constitute a real
difference from the West. He does not, however, pursue the collision of the two to imagine what
the interaction of Eastern and Western modernities might look like. Similarly, Jameson gestures
toward this hybridity when he imagines that someone could simultaneously be troubled by
national identity and hold it up as a future ideal mobilized against encroaching transnational
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homogeneity, but falls short of theorizing what this could mean and how it might be experienced
as anything other than the end-of-history figured by America’s substitution of itself for
everything else it encounters. Making a hybrid of these two analytics by incorporating Groys’s
notions of communist modernity’s prospective temporality into Jameson’s observations
concerning the instability of the formal categories of globalization distills an engine that can
animate the opposition of East and West while taking each on its own terms. In so doing, we
might begin to develop a picture of the interrelation of East and West. This engine is what
Jameson describes as “the most momentous single reversal in Hegel’s entire system”—the
moment at which “Opposition stands unveiled as Contradiction.”78
Without reconstructing the whole of how Hegel reasons the engine of history from a
revaluation of formal logic’s law of non-contradiction (A = A; A / ~A), we should examine
what is, for our purposes, a uniquely well-suited thought experiment. Hegel writes:
An hour’s journey to the east and the same distance traveled back to the west, cancels the
first journey…At the same time, the hour’s journey to the east is not in itself the positive
direction, nor is the journey west the negative direction; on the contrary, these directions
are indifferent to this determinateness of the opposition; it is a third point of view outside
them that makes one positive and one negative.”79
Because Hegel’s two terms, east and west, are equal and opposed; working through the dialectic
of this opposition will help us in our pursuit of a way to imagine the relations of East and West
as a contest of two modernities, each with a claim to utopia. The difference between the terms in
Hegel resides in their opposition; any other difference between them (such as an attached value)
is extrinsic to the dialectic. The qualitative difference, however, is real. According to Hegel, this
opposition is revealed to contain within itself a contradiction exactly when we realize that the
intrinsic values of the terms themselves are actually equal, one hour = one hour. He writes,
78

Ibid., 76.
G.W.F. Hegel, Hegel’s Science of Logic, trans. A.V. Miller (New Jersey: Humanities Press
International, Inc.), 428.
79

218
“Opposites, therefore, contain contradiction insofar as they are negatively related to one another
or sublate each other and are indifferent to one another.”80 In other words, through their relation,
or confrontation, east and west both confront their own relatedness in the form of equality. The
difference between them depends on their shared identity—each one necessitates the other in
order to maintain its own identity through their relative difference. Each opposed term includes
the other in its very constitution; their difference is what renders them equal.
The point is that the opposition, the difference, relies on identity and vice versa. They are
only different in relation to each other and hence constituted by this very interrelation. The
revelation of this contradiction sublates the proposition into ground, what Jameson calls “the
situation itself”81 and what I have called the context of articulation. In terms of the NSK State in
Time, wherever the passport is and whoever is holding it comprise the context of articulation—
the arena in which the oppositions of Identity (citizenship) and Difference (concrete geopolitical
location) are framed as opposition and experienced as contradiction at the very moment, as in our
example from Hegel, when time undergoes spatial translation (one hour to the east, and so on).
In other words, the simple elegance of the passport is that it re-animates the movement of history
through its necessary invocation of dialectical interrelation. This interrelation produces new
forms—in the case of the passport, a temporal hybridity—and the experience of temporal
hybridity in contemplation of the passport always continues the dialectical movement. The socalled end of history never comes to pass. No such end can occur when the utopia of the future
and the utopia of the present collide on the ground of geopolitical reality. Crucially, the distance
to the East and to the West are measured from the location of the passport and seen as equally
elusive. This location is the third point of view that attaches value. The passport holder, through
80
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joining a collective, becomes aware of his or her own unique position in the world understood as
the difference between where they are and where they want to be (in the present and in the
future). And only at this point, when we can incorporate supposed misreadings of the NSK State
in Time into our understanding of it as a project can we truly claim to have a sense of what the
state itself looks like, how it functions, and how it might allow us to conceive not only of the
interrelations of East and West in the post-communist condition, but how an artwork can
facilitate a viewer’s auto-location as a suspended point in time and space, a self-conscious
accounting for one’s position in history.
Given that this opposition of modernities, of East and West, sublates into ground, does
this mean, paradoxically that we should understand the post-communist condition in its full
dialectical character as a world with something called a Former West and something called a
Former East, given their mutual necessity for the maintenance of their difference? Can we say
there is no more East or West when their confrontation forms a global backdrop, prompting the
proliferation of hybridized forms, none being exactly The West or exactly The East?
When we remember that what really enables the dialectic to work, what discloses the
contradiction at the heart of the opposition is the real, qualitative difference between eastern and
western directions in Hegel, then it is clear that any such assertion would be false. According to
Hegel:
Something moves, not because at one moment it is here and another there, but because at
one and the same moment it is here and not here… the ancient dialecticians must be
granted the contradictions they pointed out in motion, but it does not follow that therefore
there is no motion, but on the contrary, that motion is existent contradiction itself.82
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In other words, simply because the terms East and West are disclosed in one another, composed
of one another, especially in the post-communist condition, does not mean that they disappear.
Rather, the existence of the contradiction forms the very basis of the contest and their existence.
If, then, we are to retain the terms “Former West” and “Former East,” we always need to
remember their fully dialectical character – in fact, these terms are well-suited to doing this. The
“Former” in front of each should be read not simply as ‘the place that used to be’ but rather as
‘the place that in one moment is and is not.’
What the NSK State in Time does is take us one step further and show us that the “not” in
the preceding formulation also refers to “place.” While the utopia represented by each claim,
each modernity, is a non-place, what it points to above all is the location, the point of view, of
each citizen. The NSK passport holder feels the difference between their own position and both
utopias. The individual confronts their national alignment and that nation’s position in relation to
the utopia of the present (this is the spatial translation) at the same time as, and because, he or
she confronts their involvement in the production of a utopia of the future (this is prospective
temporality). The disjunction of these two, contained within the passport, provokes the
description of the context of articulation, which is both the passport holder’s unique difference
and something they add to and share with the collective at the level of identity (everyone is
having this “same” experience). Insofar as the passport condenses time and space, produces a
temporal hybridity, and induces the simultaneity of all the levels of identity and difference that
Jameson observes in his thinking about globalization, it does nothing so much as produce the
citizen as an absolute singularity. In other words, when the passport catalyzes the full articulation
of context, the citizen of NSK State confronts his or her own situation in the world as an
individual produced through the interactions of collectives of varying magnitudes. Whether this
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is experienced happily in Sarajevo as the memory of a ridiculous and fortuitous border crossing
or in London as a confrontation with a renewed sense of frustration and helplessness, it is the
collision of temporal orientations that produces a sense of location. And location is above all an
index of contingent history. The retro-avantgarde strategy used to found NSK state and “keep
Utopia real” irrevocably alters the nature of utopia. Each citizen stands alone.
As a work of performance, the NSK State in Time asks its citizens only to be themselves
in order to explore how collectivity produces individual identity. The NSK collective performs
the apparatus of the state, instituting a framework for corporate belonging that brings facets of
everyday political life into the space of art and provokes the work of aesthetic perception that
indexes the contextual situation of every citizen and their apprehension of social reality. It shares
this basic maneuver and relation to performance with all the other works discussed in this
dissertation. Sierra’s works trade on the legibility of individuals as representatives of
demographic categories in describing the intractable exploitation that obscures the social
relations of global capitalism, compounding political critique with aesthetic judgment.
Schlingensief’s conjure demons in diagnosing and exorcising the history that persists in
Germany’s corporate consciousness. If Sierra and Schlingensief seek to elicit from individual
viewers something interior to them, unearthing a subterranean collectivity, then Zmijewski’s
works travel in the opposite direction by searching out ways to break with and master history,
calling on individual responsibility as the key to the production of a better social reality.
Dialectically, however, this search for rupture only drives his works deeper into the terms of a
local aesthetic horizon. IRWIN’s projects—from the paintings to the State in Time—also
proceed from this position that asserts the primacy of collectivity and the need to articulate
individuality. For this Slovene collective, all of us live every day in the grips of a globalized
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double consciousness, constantly oscillating between local and transnational registers of selfunderstanding. But when IRWIN’s works seek to “individualize the collective,” the task they
allot to art is to help us mediate between collectives of various orders. By thinking the
readymade as a theory of history and performing the state as a way to invoke the local histories
of all NSK State citizens, IRWIN achieves a way to visualize the irreconcilability of various
vantages onto our shared global condition.
That is, rather than moving toward a reserved interiority, the object is to widen the
frame—to see how the perception of shared reality and the creation of context that makes given
facts meaningful vary with analyses conducted at different levels of collectivity. As we have
seen, this orientation to the relationship between individual and collective stems from the
specific constraints experienced by the artists under the political-aesthetic economies of formerYugoslavia and the newly emergent Slovenia. What this chapter contributes to this dissertation’s
discussion of post-1989 performance art in particular is the lesson that the dissonance produced
through comparative (spatialized) perspective, in the end, is what produces a keener sense of
identity and, hence, a more rigorous understanding of art’s relation to politics. It is not enough to
criticize the notion that performance can rupture the flow of time (and our sense of history)
through immediacy on the grounds that history itself guides how we will understand
performance. Rather, we must also contend with the way in which that history itself appears
differently in distinct places. As a reproducible performance, the State in Time typifies the
insistence on spatial analysis that we have seen at play in the works of all the artists discussed in
this dissertation and that I have been developing as a method in conversation with them. Primed
to perceive this spatial-indexical operation, the analysis of these performances becomes a way to
surface and articulate the understanding of self and other that guides our interactions with art.
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Discerning the place of performance in “global” contemporary art requires this sensitivity—not
only to ‘context’ but to how we conceive the nature of context. The conclusion to this
dissertation offers final thoughts as to what this looks like as a method and how we should
understand the descriptions of performance art, its audiences, and the relationship between
interpretation and context it makes available.
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Conclusion
Standard Deviations:
Performance Art and Spatial-Indexical Politics

What our performances—be they teaching or playing, speaking, writing, making
art or looking at it—verify is not our participation in a power embodied in the
community. It is the capacity of anonymous people, the capacity that makes
everyone equal to everyone else. This capacity is exercised through irreducible
distances; it is exercised by an unpredictable interplay of associations and
dissociations.
-Jacques Rancière, The Emancipated Spectator1
Thus an inquiry into our location is more productive than ever, as it examines the
place that humans create in order to have somewhere they can appear as who
they are.
-Peter Sloterdijk, Spheres I: Bubbles2

The calculated uses of repetition we have seen—whether they figure the exploitative
nature of capitalism, the nationalist drive to exclusion, the foreclosure of individuality through
group identity, or the competition of transnational claims to the future—all view the question of
identity and difference from a local vantage, and therefore represent its stakes in contextually
determined fashion. Place is important, on the one hand, because the context in which a work
operates entails that its forms and its reception exist within a particular horizon of meaning. This
1
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is always true, and it is a usual way in which we think about interpretation. On the other hand,
however, in each case these works of art create a spatial representation of history’s role in
creating the context that guides interpretation by producing a place that can give this reckoning
an intelligible form. The work is the space that shapes place.
Santiago Sierra’s works perform scalar translations, condensing the machinations of
global commerce into iconic representations. They reproduce capitalist exploitation by paying
participants a bare minimum wage in exchange for their labor (and appearance) in creating
installations and images that trade on their legibility as representatives of a class (understood as a
matrix of race, nationality, and socio-economic status). Each work, therefore, serves as an index
of economic conditions wherever the work is produced, targeting the most vulnerable in a given
locale. At the same time, by framing class (and its iconic legibility in the form of actual persons)
as an index of local conditions within the space of art, the works catalyze a second spatialindexical operation. Viewers encountering such a work—whether the live moment of its creation
or its various traces later on and even elsewhere—are pulled into the work by their own
recognition of its human materials. The work indexes each of us—in terms of our local,
contextual experience of global economy—by the way we understand its composition. In so
doing, the work points at what it is in each of us as individuals that is shared across a collective
identity related to, but different from the class antagonism identified through Marxist critique.
The second operation is an aesthetic one. Sierra’s works demonstrate the non-coincidence of the
two, and, in so doing, simultaneously vitiate the rupture model of art’s political capacities and
suggest we have to seek elsewhere a language for understanding this second-order operation and
its ability to describe viewers through their aesthetic judgments. This is what we pursued in the
works of Christoph Schlingensief.
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In his films and actions, Schlingensief also looks to create a space in which participants
and viewers can see how social reality is produced by their collective being. His works restage
the drama of national self-definition; by continually invoking the process by which the sausage
of German identity gets made, his works make war on the nationalist (and National Socialist)
specters that always come back again. Crucially, this spiritual battle happens in and through the
flesh of individuals—it is not enough just to make arguments through representations of reverent
memory or progressive conduct. Rather, he reproduces anxieties around German national
character by creating controversial works that conjure historical demons. The controversies these
works create produce public séances, treating every viewer as a medium for spiritual
communication and dragging out into the open their different relations to cultural inheritance.
Schlingensief’s works and the theory of spectatorship they mobilize must be understood through
the local history of New German Cinema, but they also function in the continually developing
present to generate an image of an ideological field, to create the star charts that put all viewers,
their prejudices, assumptions, and convictions into collective relation by virtue of their shared
legacy.
Artur !mijewski also creates works that look to exhume seemingly deceased aspects of
subjectivity from participants and viewers. In his works, however, the element to be excavated is
not collective cultural inheritance, but individualist self-direction. These works compulsively
repeat scenes of human aggregation and disaggregation, constructing games and rules that ask
how groups form and when they can dissolve. The context of Soviet Poland shaped !mijewski’s
approach to life, art, and individuality—setting the stage both for his “instrumentalization of
autonomy” and the binarism that guides it, wherein individuality is authentic life and collectivity
waking death. Only by repetition of group dynamics can the conditions for individuality emerge.
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As video works, these games include viewers by evoking our own tendency to understand
individuals as subsumed under group identities. By subjecting people to situations in which such
an identification can be perceived as vulnerability—whether by physical limitation, the rules that
govern the “experiment,” or !mijewski himself—the works describe the harmful effects of
groupthink even as they force us to read the individuals according to that same logic. They thus
point outward at the audience, catalyzing our own habits of grouping people. Only when we can
begin to recognize this habit of perception and move toward imagining individual agency can we
grasp what the work is about and what it has done to us. One has to burrow further into everyday
collective existence and, thereby, into one’s own history in order to create a minimal distance
that makes its everyday operation available for recognition.
The IRWIN and NSK collectives also begin from the conceptual primacy of collective
life. They shuttle images of futures past—in unoriginal paintings and a “new” utopian state—into
the present. The way they do this, however, invokes history’s spatial dimensions as well. For
these artists, time is geopolitical. The institutional history of official and unofficial art in
Yugoslavia taught them two lessons: aesthetics are always political, and those politics are always
relational. Only by working collectively could they organize to achieve room—not only
conceptually, but institutionally and physically—to produce and exhibit work. And by exhibiting
this collectively produced work they could begin to approach the question of how the
interrelations of collectives of different magnitudes—each with a different vantage onto
collective history—produce an individual’s consciousness. Groups are not deleterious to
individuality in this case, but rather the very ground of existence from which something like
agency emerges. It is thus important to see how their work attempts a circumspect historical selfunderstanding, one that accounts for the chess game of geopolitics without dismissing it as false,
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but instead as constitutive of reality. Especially after the dissolution of Yugoslavia, they sought a
way to make meaning of their past and future that accounts for the persistent effects of the Cold
War global framework. IRWIN’s paintings and especially the NSK State in Time create a
conceptual space in which this complex dynamic can find simple expression for people all over
the world. Viewers and passport holders held in suspension between utopia and their own
physical location articulate their individuality as a specific, situated experience of the hydraulic
interaction of these two fields.
If the traditional discourse of performance posits its immediacy to valorize a supposed
capacity to provoke a rupture in how viewers understand reality, these works utilize performance
as a medium to further immerse viewers in their habits of perception. This immersion illuminates
a political topography as more and more viewers interact with a work, seeing it from where they
are (in temporal-spatial history). Reactions to a work gather around it; the work indexes the
worldviews that live in and through its viewers. It becomes the task of the critic and scholar to
accentuate and voice the immersive character of this interpretive activity—not because this will
then be the moment for rupture that reveals to viewers something they didn’t know already
(when it comes to art, people always already know what they like), but because making the work
fully legible in this way thematizes the irreconcilability of disparate visions and points to the fact
that their derivation lies elsewhere. All the works share this mode of address and the resultant
capacity for describing social-political reality by making performance that frames, creates a
space, for confronting local understandings of the relation between individuals and collectives.
But if this dissertation has demonstrated anything, it is the heterogeneity with which artists in
different places have structured that space and how it should mediate the relations between the
people it comes to involve.
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The summaries of each chapter above already go some distance in describing these
differences, but here we should focus on one major difference that also begins to clarify what it
means to refer to the standardizing effects of context. Sierra and Schlingensief, the two artists of
the former West, construct the space of performance as a place to elicit from viewers’
interpretive frameworks the collective aspects of their subject position—class and cultural
inheritance, respectively. The two artists of the former East, !mijewski and IRWIN/NSK,
however, construct it as a place for people to articulate the individual component of their subject
position. Within each subgroup there are many distinctions as to how the aim is achieved, value
placed on different terms, and so on, but both the overarching difference between former East
and former West and those intra-group differences stem from localized experiences of place.
From the West, it seems worthwhile to emphasize collectivity; from the East,
individuality. It is tempting to say that the reasons for this disparity are obvious: the Western
capitalist experience of constant mutual self-interest makes people yearn for collective solidarity
and authentic connection, and the Eastern experience of enforced collectivity puts a premium on
the freedom to be an individual. If this were all there is to say, moreover, we could characterize
this cross-purposed global quest to understand identity as cleanly complementary and maybe
even imagine that the globalized circulation of such projects might eventually tend toward some
kind of equilibrium, each of us getting to learn not only from our own pasts, but others’ too.
Maybe thinking performance cross-contextually is a way to reclaim its legacy of rupture.
Tempting though it may be, the folly of such a suggestion is clear if we imagine a simple thought
experiment: What if everyone just switched places? Say, Sierra participated in an OWOW, or
IRWIN did a residency in Berlin and made a work about German reunification… Would they
find the answers they were looking for? Of course not. In each place, the very terms at stake—
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individual and collective—have specific meanings rooted in daily practices and long histories.
The individuality that the Eastern artists want to articulate is not the same one the Western artists
take for granted (and vice versa for collectivity). In fact, these terms don’t mean the same thing
to any of the artists. As we have seen, in every case, the local investigation of this global
question—made urgent by the processes that brought about and issued from the end of the Cold
War—takes on a distinct idiom.
At the same time, however, we can discern a general conceptual trend—emphasizing
either collectivity or individuality—that falls in line with an East-West divide. To understand it,
we have to be precise about how we conceive ‘the local.’ Peter Sloterdijk argues that, “Usually
‘local’ is used as an antonym of ‘global’ or ‘universal’—with ‘global’ and ‘local’ referring to the
same homogeneous and continuous space. Homogeneous spaces are defined by the equipotency
of points within them, and the connectivity of those points through direct lines.”3 This
conception of global and local posits the former as merely the container for the latter, and the
distances between localities as infinitely reducible—subject to what Sloterdijk calls “spatial
compression”—through technological means.4 For him, this world picture started to come into
view with the geo- and “hydrographical” feats of the Age of Exploration; he traces the rhetorical
coincidence of ‘globalization’ and ‘Westernization’ to Columbus’s journey from the East.5 We
live now in the post-history of globalization, the world’s circumnavigation and dissection as an
object of knowledge having been completed by the end of the nineteenth century, after which
point compression only gathered speed “thanks to radio-electronic systems.”6
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Sloterdijk writes, “What the sixteenth century set in motion was perfected by the
twentieth: no point on the earth’s surface, once money had stopped off there, could escape the
fate of becoming a location—and a location is not a blind spot in a field, but rather a place in
which one sees that one is seen.”7 For him, being in a place on the globalized earth means
knowing that one is apprehended from myriad other perspectives, and comprehending those
other places from the vantage of one’s own. He adds, “One of the outstanding mental effects of
‘globalization’ is the fact that it has made the greatest anthropological improbability—constantly
taking into account the distant other, the invisible rival, the stranger to one’s container—the
norm.”8 This cognitive condition of being in global relation itself takes on forms that range along
a spectrum from outward-directed attempts to organize relations across localities (Sloterdijk
mentions environmentalism) to inward-minded efforts to solidify and specify relations within a
given location (here, he thinks of nationalist-ethnic politics). Thinking along these lines, Sierra’s
works have more in common with NSK’s, and Schlingensief’s are more similar to !mijewski’s.
Sierra attempts a macrocosmic imaging in shrinking world markets to human scale, and NSK
adopts a similar perspective in their self-historicizing, siting Yugoslavia at the center of a global
ideological crossfire. Schlingensief and !mijewski, on the other hand, adopt microcosmic
perspectives in exploring how smaller units isolate and “purify” themselves against external
intrusion.
But no matter how we align the works when searching similarities—whether with the
East-West divide or this macro/micro one—the fact remains that such comparison can be
misleading because it can fall into imagining a transparent commensurability where none exists.
This is a pitfall of the “usual” way of thinking the local—in that commonsense model, “The
7
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error, simply put, lies in relating the local and the global to each other in the same way as the
point and the field. Wherever this occurs, the local is inevitably understood as if its nature were
the same as the global, but the local residents simply refuse to admit it.”9 This way of thinking
identity and difference will be familiar from the Western discourse of “the utopia of the present”
discussed in chapter four.
In order to make meaningful comparisons between the many ‘locals’ that comprise the
global, we must advance, against this notion of homogeneous global space, the awareness that
“positions are ontologically inexchangeable, like the left and right hands of the bilateralized
body.”10 We can deploy this metaphor of Sloterdijk’s—which he offers as a kind of
Heidegger/Merleau-Ponty mixed drink—in discerning what kind of knowledge we can develop
from the East-West divide identified above. The results will move us toward final remarks on
comparative art history, spectatorship, and performance art. Let us consider Sierra to be this
dissertation’s right hand; Schlingensief the left hand. And !mijewski will be its left foot; NSK
the right foot. And so attempting to identify collective elements of subjectivity is equated with
being a hand (maybe desiring embrace?). And seeking to express individuality means being a
foot (contemplating one’s own unique position?). This would be one natural way to group the
works: is it a hand or a foot? We could also divide them by leftness (microcosmic analysis) and
rightness (macrocosmic). First, a hand is like a hand, but left and right are not the same—they
have different orientations to the space of the world and, hence, different modes of being—and
then, being on the left is like being on the left, but a hand is not a foot. None of these could be
effectively exchanged with any other. If I linger on this point, it is not only to re-emphasize what
all the works insist on—the dialectical character of identity and difference—but because,
9
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according to Sloterdijk, “In reality, the meaning of the ‘local’ lies in…placing this weight on the
place [and] heralds a language for the non-compressed.”11 So when we think the local, we have
to see a place, its traditions, and even its global spatial-political interrelation to all other places,
not as just one among many points (each of which might be in a different spot, but is essentially
commensurable), but rather as a unique position of engagement with the whole, which by virtue
of that position possesses a non-compressibly other mode of relating to, or ‘being of,’ space. This
appreciation of geopolitical non-compressibility is what becomes available through these artists’
appropriation of modes of cultural analysis pioneered by feminists working in the 1970s (as
described in the introduction), but if phenomenological analysis of the world through
performance art used to mean exploring physical embodiment in the abstracted space of
vanishing time, now it involves investigating abstracted, signifying bodies via the determining
influence of physically embodied space.
So when we consider what conclusions to draw from the fact that Western artists search
for collectivity, we should by all means note the standardizing influence of ascendant
neoliberalism in generating a particular sense of subjectivity, but we also have to remember the
local deviation as to how this takes shape. For Sierra, fluid markets (in the spheres of both labor
power and art) obscure the social character of commodities, engendering a sense of self as
removed from the fate of others. For Schlingensief, the subsumption of East Germany by West
Germany (and Western markets) foments a historical amnesia regarding the ghosts of German
national unity. These are two very different articulations of collective forgetting. Further, each
process of remembering collectivity responds to those unique contours. This is crucial because it
means, even in their basically similar approach to the relationship between individual and
collective being, that the vision each proposes for the shape of collectivity is not an emancipatory
11
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dis-identification with the notion of individuality altogether, but a further immersion in the local
articulation of its nature. For Sierra, class is always site-specific, and for Schlingensief, what
people share is the process of cultural inheritance. These are Western standard deviations of
collective identity.
Likewise for the Eastern artists, the historical fact of forced collectivization impresses a
standardizing mold on the dialectic (while reversing its antipodes). But again, each local
expression deviates in its own way. For !mijewski, collectivity is a denaturing force that governs
social life and must be pushed into crisis for the individual to emerge. For IRWIN/NSK, the
collective identities always operate in contesting relation; the individual is unique insofar as she
or he occupies an intersection of these vying forces. In each case, collective life grounds
existence, but the location of the individual has different mechanisms and stakes. Again, the way
each of these artists positions moving past the first (collective) register into the second
(individual) is not an escape from context, but a deeper entrenchment in its terms. This is
especially important to recognize in analyzing !mijewski’s works because his own rhetoric
evinces a wish for an ontological outside, a break with life as it has been known. As we have
seen, however, the way that outside autonomous space is conceived is itself contextual,
irreducibly situated in the local history of Polish art and politics; moreover, it is only through
repetition of group dynamics that an individual can deviate from prescribed course. These are
Eastern standard deviations of individual identity.
This notion of the standard deviation suggests a caveat and a guideline for the practice of
comparative art history: Even the exploration of comparative similarities reveals noncompressible differences. And yet, had this dissertation not set out from the sense of a
widespread formal similarity between all the works discussed, it never would have been able to
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identify all the kinds of difference described in their full contextual significance, at least insofar
as they concern questions of reality, reproducibility and performance. In a comparative study
such as this one, complete knowledge of all contexts involved is impossible. But to imagine or
desire such total comprehension runs counter to the most important lesson comparative study has
to offer: the overwhelming importance of place. For, the investigator—like the artist, the work,
and the viewer—is situated. The onus of making meaning and offering scholarly insight
therefore falls on the arrangement of materials presented, the framing devices, the guiding
questions. Only by delineating scope in this way can a comparative approach contribute to our
(inter)discipline. This study proceeds from my own investment in questions about performance
art and how we can appraise its political capacities as it interacts with viewers in all its mediated
forms (stemming from a more general preoccupation with the nature of agency). In the end, then,
this dissertation would go well beyond its brief by making pronouncements about things like
global commerce or the political futures of nations (or micro-national utopias). It can, however,
offer conclusions as to how performance art mediates the experience of these for its practitioners
and audiences.
Sloterdijk sensitizes us to the fact that life, art, and interactions between the two occur
within non-compressible lifeworlds rather than exchangeable homogeneous spaces—an insight
that can only be delivered through a globally comparative approach to ‘location,’ no less. This
helps us to account for the standardizing pressure of place and its infinitely fractured specificity
at the same time. In addressing individual viewers (in multiple places), these performances
approach that specificity with a superlative precision. They all appeal to place in foregrounding
what Jacques Rancière calls the “work of translation.”12 For Rancière, “The collective power
shared by spectators… is the power each of them has to translate what she perceives in her own
12
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way, to link it to the unique intellectual adventure that makes her similar to all the rest in as
much as this adventure is not like any other.”13 Confronted with an artifact, viewers see it from a
unique vantage and, in so doing, make it their own, understanding it through their usual mode of
making sense. Rancière calls recognizing this fact of ontology “emancipation,” but we know it is
immersion.
Further, the artifact not only mediates one’s own worldview, giving it an occasion and
idiom for expression, but mediates between the multiple subjects who engage the work. Rancière
argues the text “is the third thing that is owned by no one, whose meaning is owned by no one,
but which subsists between them.”14 We have seen this kind of triangulation at work in every
chapter—the work of art is a place to meet, one that defines the contours of an interaction
between people, even when they are not in the same place at the same time. Understanding
performance as a mediating third term that creates relations between subjects helps to articulate
how interpretations, or translations, of a given work will always deviate one from another based
on individuals’ unique positions in the world, and, when we consider this activity from the
position of a traveling, reproducible work of performance, we can see what it means for a work
to create a spatialized representation of viewers’ reactions, what it means for a work to map the
territory in which it operates.
Indeed, throughout this dissertation, incorporating into the analyses of these works the
various supposed misreadings of their intentions have supplied some of the most valuable
insights. (Recall, for example, those who celebrated Schlingensief’s staged expulsion of asylum
seekers, or the case of the Nigerians applying for NSK State passports). It happens with every
situated translation of a work (but is most clear when confronting such dramatic misprision of an
13
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“original” aim) that, as it circulates or meets with new viewers, it poses the question of its
meaning in its own language. For these works, that means some particular formulation of the
dialectic of identity and difference. Answers array around the work, translating its formulation
and responding with an equally situated reply. The political capacity of these performance works
lies not in deranging people’s sense of the world, but in indexing their non-compressibility, in
creating a place where the non-commensurability of local experience can be articulated and its
biodiversity put on view. In the end, reproducible performance has infinite live moments—one
for every time a viewer makes sense of what they see in front of them, adding one more standard
deviation to the work’s potentially infinite description of reality.
I realize that this emphasis on immersion in context (rather than rupture) and description
(rather than transformation) is a drastic revision of what we have come to expect from
performance and political art alike. It is not my intention, however, to claim transcendence for
this model—it comes about in a historical moment of fever-pitch globalization rhetoric; as such,
deploying the past against the future and intransigence against fluid mobility has distinct tactical
appeal. In fact, in the present moment (that began in and around 1989), rupture with the past is
both promise and premise of the notion of globalization as the spread of homogeneous space.
Again, this stand against universalized homogeneity owes a conceptual debt to feminist artistic
practice, but the appeal of insisting on this historical-spatial difference only points up the
reconfigured aims of performance in this moment and in relation to this question. A mode of
making art that treats people as reproducible subjects of long historical trajectories—and
therefore focuses on how the past not only lives in, but continues to shape the present—itself
heralds the non-compressible, as Sloterdijk might put it. In this context, continuity can be
advanced as precisely that which contradicts claims to universality. In the context of politically-
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engaged feminist practice of an earlier moment, however, such an insistence on traditionally
entrenched worldviews would prove counter-productive, bolstering claims to universality. This
diametrically opposite effect of immersing viewers in habits of perception offers further evidence
of the importance of recognizing the scope of our analyses—what artworks and our engagements
with them can be expected to deliver and what they cannot. If this new performance art loses its
storied, presence/absence-driven radicality (as immediate political intervention and
enlightenment) in the exchange, reproducibility accentuates the social aspect of aesthetic
perception, restoring to performance a broader (because more circumspect) power of making the
world visible. That is, we gain a new purchase on what it means to see ourselves seeing, one that
takes history seriously and as the starting point for a kind of knowledge only art can produce. If
we are to believe there is any chance of shaping a shared future, we have to begin by accounting
for the standard deviations of our past. Additionally, that these artists use performance to effect
this call to history’s unfinished business offers clear evidence that our ways of analyzing art’s
relation to politics carry their own ghosts, with which we always need to be in conversation.
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